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The criminal law is the most coercive institution of social control in the modern liberal state.  It 
criminalizes conduct, prosecutes individuals, and treats offenders in ways that under other 
circumstance we would consider as serious violations of individuals’ rights.  At a time when this 
institution has been described as a lost cause serving immoral ends, it is all the more urgent to provide 
a normative account of the criminal law’s limits and scope of action (ch.1).   
  A starting point of this thesis is that any successful normative account of the criminal law 
must ground penal principles and practices in an explicit, and sufficiently delimited, political 
philosophy.  This thesis does just that: it advances an account of the criminal law and criminalization 
that derive from central premises of classical liberalism.  I contend that an account shaped by such 
liberal values and premises is capable of responding successfully to one of the most urgent 
predicaments of the criminal law today; that is, the abuse of coercive power by the state through the 
enactment of criminal statutes.  This is the problem of overcriminalization (ch.2). 
  The argument for such a liberal model of the criminal law proceeds in two general steps.  
First, I offer a general account of the state institutions of a free society; a free association of individuals 
committed to basic principles of equal liberty for all.  I argue that, insofar as they are genuinely liberal, 
these institutions should serve the purposive nature of individuals and their basic interest in living 
their lives as they think fit (chs.3-4).  This ‘service conception’ of the function of state institutions is 
specified further in terms of the principle of freedom of association – a sine qua non of free social 
coexistence.  This is a general principle of political morality that holds that purposive individuals have 
a liberty-right to enter into associations with others for any purpose and duration in time, compatible 
with the same liberty for all, and with no constraints whatsoever on the voluntary benefits and 
obligations that may emerge from this association.  
  Second, I argue that, within the sphere of the criminal law, our commitment to this general 
principle of political morality means using the coercive power of the state only to regulate conduct that 
violates at least one of two basic preconditions of free association.  These preconditions are the claim-
right to bodily ownership, and – derivatively – the claim-right to ownership in external things (ch.5).  
These two claim-rights represent the two juridical goods that the criminal law in a free society is to 
honour and protect and, thus, they constitute the limits of legitimate penal coercion in a free society.   
  Finally, and in order to show the capacity that this abstract model has to respond to the 
concrete problem of overcriminalization, the thesis presents the two principles of criminalization that 
derive from the basic preconditions of free association: the principle of direct violation of bodily 
ownership and ownership in external things, and the principle of effective reduction of violations.  
Unlike other influential liberal principles of legitimate penal coercion considered in this work – 
namely, the harm principle, penal paternalism, penal moralism, and penal consequentialism – I argue 
that this two-principle model has the capacity to respond successfully to different forms of 
overcriminalization (chs.6-7). 
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The Rationale of the Thesis 
In The Eumenides, Aeschylus tells us how the Erinyes, the goddesses of retribution, pursued 
Orestes for matricide.  They followed and tormented him until his trial, after which he was 
liberated from blood-guiltiness.  The Erinyes were in charge of exacting punishment for 
crimes of blood and thus the outcome of the trial did not please them given that Orestes had 
actually killed his mother Clytemnestra.  In order for them to accept the verdict and calm 
their anger, the gods granted the goddesses a new sanctuary in Athens where they were 
praised, and received great honours and respectful worship.  The gods even renamed them 
as the Eumenides, the gracious ones.   
This comes as quite a surprising outcome, especially when we compare it to the 
description the Erinyes receive in the rest of Aeschylus’ play and in the work of other 
tragedians.  Indeed, in the Ancient Greek literary corpus, the Erinyes stand for feelings of 
deep offence, bitter displeasure and resentment that arise when what belongs to us – or what 
is owed to us – is impiously violated.  The Erinyes, the followers of the track of blood, are 
three sisters: Alekto, the relentless, Megaira, the one who holds a grudge, and Tisiphone, the 
avenger of bloodshed.  They are loathsome dark creatures wreathed in snakes, crawling to 
scent their prey, whining and howling like dogs. 
The fact that the gods rename the Erinyes and give them a new sanctuary to be 
honoured and worshiped points to a duality which, according to a classical scholar, “must be 
understood to mean that these deities, so mild and benign on the one hand are withal […] 
perverted into resentful, destructive deities” (Muller 1835, p.191).  They are feared and 
venerated, cruel yet benign.  They are not different sets of goddesses, but one and the same.  
Thus, Aeschylus concludes The Eumenides – the last part of his trilogy The Oresteia on the 
theme of justice – by adding a new layer of meaning to the figure of the goddesses of 
retribution.  By allowing the avenging and tormenting Erinyes also to incarnate the much 
kinder figure of the Eumenides, the tragedian hints at the complexity of retributive justice.  
This complex, slightly paradoxical account of the Greek goddesses of retribution 
mirrors the most salient of our contemporary retributive institutions, the criminal law.  On 
the one hand, the criminal law is a system of coercive rules that legitimately responds to 
wrongdoers and contributes to the security and order necessary for social life.  On the other 
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hand, this institution is a source of problematic practices (it coerces, prosecutes, and 
punishes individuals) and, not infrequently, deep injustices (as when, for example, it coerces 
illegitimately or punishes unfairly).  Like the Greek goddesses of retribution, our modern 
institution of retributive justice, the criminal law, has a benign and a dark side; one that 
protects individuals from serious perils and harms, and other that restricts individuals’ 
freedoms and puts their rights at stake. 
This thesis deals with this Janus-like nature of the criminal law.  The general aim of 
this work is to provide an account of the criminal law that explains the central importance 
this institution has for the individual members of society without forgetting the risk it poses.  
More precisely, I shall defend the importance and adequacy of the criminal law as a response 
to wrongful conduct within the free society – a society that takes individuals’ freedoms as 
having fundamental value – but I shall also be alert to both the problematic practices the 
criminal law involves and the unacceptable conditions it may impose upon those who are 
subject to its rule. 
To undertake this task, this thesis focuses to a considerable extent on one of the most 
pressing problems of the criminal law today: overcriminalization.1 Studies of 
overcriminalization – the abuse of coercive power by the state through the criminal law – 
concentrate almost exclusively on solutions that are internal to the system of law but leave 
aside the moral and political philosophy that we need in order to give determinacy to these 
solutions (see Stuntz 2001, Beale 1995, 2005, Husak 2008 int.al.).  This, I take it, is a 
mistaken strategy.  Indeed, a basic contention of this work is that we cannot get 
criminalization right if we do not back up our principles of penal prohibition – which are 
internal to the criminal law – with moral and political principles – which are independent of, 
and to this extent external to, the criminal law.2 This thesis tries to do just that and advances 
a political and moral framework – grounded in a conception of human nature and society 
influenced by principles of classical liberalism – from which I derive the limits of a liberal 
system of criminal law that avoids (or, at least, minimises) the pressing problem of 
overcriminalization. 
Thus, this work straddles legal, penal, and political philosophy.  It reformulates the 
limits of a legal institution, the criminal law, by offering an account of the state grounded in 
basic principles of classical liberalism.  So understood, this thesis is an exercise in political 
                                                
1 The common spelling in the literature is ‘criminalization’ and ‘overcriminalization’ (as opposed to ‘criminalisation’ 
and ‘overcriminalisation’).  I have kept this use.   
2 I use the words ‘criminal’ (and its derivatives) and ‘penal’ (and its derivatives) interchangeably. 
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morality that aims to limit in a principled manner the way the state should relate to 
individuals through the criminal law.  It embraces the thought that “the law is the offspring of 
politics”, and that legal theorising requires, if not presupposes, political theorising (Waldron 
1999b, p.36. See also Besson 2005).  As I take it, without an explicit account of the principles 
and values shaping our understanding of the state, the specification of the boundaries that 
should constrain the practices and functions of the criminal law are doomed to fail.  Thus, 
theorising about legal institutions must begin by (or, at least, must not be separated from) 
theorising about politics. 
This intimate connection between the legal and the political is as much about the 
importance of deliberation in the creation and discussion of the law as it is about the 
functioning of the law in circumstances of politics.  In the words of Jeremy Waldron, these 
circumstances refer to “the felt need among the members of a certain group for a common 
framework or decision or course of action on some matter, even in the face of disagreement 
about what that framework, decision or action should be” (Waldron 1999a, p.102).  In 
modern complex societies, the circumstances of politics are characterized by disagreement 
and conflict.  We could go even further and say with Rawls that a diversity of conflicting 
comprehensive views is, ultimately, “a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy” 
(Rawls 1993b, p.246).   
Independent of the position we adopt about the permanent or contingent nature of 
conflict and disagreement, what I would like to emphasise here is that conflict and 
disagreement are characteristic features of the way we actually coexist with others and that 
any theorising about the criminal law and politics must consider these features as key factors 
in the shaping of the institutions we should have.  If the criminal law is to take individuals 
seriously – and therefore take their views about the good, justice, values and so on with due 
respect – it must recognise the fact that people disagree, deeply and fundamentally, about 
these core issues.  In other words, the criminal law we ought to have must reflect the 
circumstances of politics.  This is a premise that runs throughout the different stages of the 
re-articulation of the criminal law that this thesis proposes. 
The urgency of this project – an account of the criminal law grounded in principles of 
freedom and that takes circumstances of politics seriously – becomes particularly evident 
when we reflect on an unfortunately widespread view of the role that the criminal law should 
have in our societies.  A telling example is a letter in relation to assisted suicide written by 
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Professor Nigel Biggar, Director of the McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics and Public 
Life at Oxford.  
Sir, […] Dignitas assisted Sir Edward Downes to kill himself, even though he 
was not terminally ill. This was entirely in accord with the view of its founder, 
Ludwig Minelli, that anyone with “mental capacity” should have the right to kill 
him or herself with assistance — and presumably also without it. 
It follows from this that not just the terminally ill, but the chronically ill or 
disabled, the grievously bereaved, the philosophically miserable and the 
amorously unsuccessful should have the same right. After all, if the individual is 
the sole arbiter of the value of his or her own life, and if some adult reckons that 
living is no longer worth the candle, then who may gainsay them? 
It also follows that when someone should volunteer to die in the 
masochistic ecstasy of being mutilated and eaten – as happened five years ago in 
Germany in the case of Armin Meiwes – the law should be silent, no crime 
having been committed. 
The problem is that what fends off interference also generates 
indifference and carelessness. If my life only has the worth that I accord it, then 
it has no objective value; and if it has no objective value, then why should anyone 
else care for it? […] (Biggar 2009). 
Independent of the moral position one may favour regarding matters like assisted suicide, 
euthanasia, and consensual masochism and cannibalism, what is worrying in the view 
expressed in Biggar’s letter is the suggestion that these matters can be (or ought to be) solved 
by resorting to the criminal law.  There is nothing in the forms of conduct he describes, 
however we appraise them, that suggest that the criminal law is the proper response to them.  
Yet, we constantly see that the argument for criminalization is reduced to evaluating conduct 
as inappropriate, morally wrong, revolting and so on, and then there is the assertion of some 
sort of natural connection between the conduct and a response to it through the criminal law 
and criminalization.  There is, in short, a feeling that ‘something must be done’ and, all too 
often, the something demanded is that a criminal law should be passed.    
What this thesis offers is an argument against this flawed way of reasoning about the 
role of the criminal law in society.  In addition, it suggests a way to reason about 
criminalization and the function of the criminal law in a society that takes individuals and 
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their liberty as having paramount value.  If these arguments and suggestions prove to be 
persuasive we may then begin to look at, and think of, the criminal law in a more careful way, 
as a crucial institution of our liberal societies, but one that needs to be tightly limited and 
controlled on pain of becoming (or continuing to be) an instance of illegitimate oppression by 
the state. 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is in three parts.  Part I, “The Criminal Law: Setting the Scene”, is divided into 
two chapters.  Chapter 1 begins by briefly describing the present and regrettable state of the 
criminal law, characterised by too much punishment and too many criminal prohibitions.  
The chapter then moves on to consider the three core elements of this institution – the 
coercive, condemnatory, and public character of the criminal law.  These elements, in 
conjunction, represent what I call the specificity of the criminal law, as opposed to both the 
specificity of non-criminal branches of the law and non-legal state institutions.  By 
considering its specificity, I argue, we obtain a clear sense of the seriousness of the difficulties 
that characterise the current condition of the criminal law.  The chapter closes with some 
plausible explanations of why this institution has gone so wrong. 
Chapter 2 analyses the pressing problem of overcriminalization.  The chapter 
develops in length the worries involved in the abuse of the coercive power by the state 
through criminalization.  I argue that overcriminalization involves more than the excessive 
multiplication of penal statutes.  Indeed, it is a phenomenon independent of such a 
multiplication.  Thus, we have a strong presumption that a statute is an instance of 
overcriminalization when it regulates types of conduct that are beyond what ought to be the 
business of the criminal law; or when it makes liable people who have not acted in a blameful 
way; or when it criminalizes actions that do not wrong anyone.  Given this, it follows that we 
do not need too many statutes to talk about overcriminalization; we just need one statute 
imposing the coercive power of the criminal law in an illegitimate manner.    
Part II, “The Free Society and the Criminal Law”, is divided into three chapters.  
Chapter 3 argues that rules are a function of social groups.  The argument grounds the idea 
that an account of society, which is a type of social group, is crucial to determine the type of 
rules that ought to constitute the penal law.  The chapter offers an account of social groups 
understood as joint activities and considers the minimal conditions that constitute any joint 
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enterprise.  In addition, it illustrates the idea that the penal law is a function of our account of 
society by focusing on some central aspects of Antony Duff’s prominent model of society and 
the criminal law.  However, the chapter critically assesses the capacity Duff’s account has to 
minimise or overcome the problem of overcriminalization.  The conclusion reached is that, if 
we want to succeed in attaining an account of the normative limits of the criminal law that 
may help us to minimise or overcome overcriminalization, a different articulation of society 
and the state is required.   
The task of advancing that articulation of society is undertaken in chapter 4.  This 
chapter offers an account of society from which, I argue, we can derive a general theory of the 
criminal law that is capable of responding to the problem of overcriminalization.  Such 
model of society is the free society: an association of purposive individuals subject to liberal 
state institutions.  From the premise that these institutions ought to serve the purposive 
nature of all the members of society, I argue that central to the function of the state of the free 
society is honouring the principle of freedom of association.  My claim is that for individuals 
in society to live life as they think fit, the state must be committed to the protection of the 
conditions that allow them to freely associate with others.  In other words, the exercise of the 
capacity to associate with others, essential to social coexistence, is only possible because of 
the state’s fidelity to the principle of freedom of association.  The institutions of the state, on 
pain of turning into non-neutral, oppressive, illiberal institutions, should have as a core aim 
the honouring and protection of this freedom.   
From this articulation of the liberal state I then derive in chapter 5 the general aim of 
the criminal law in the free society, namely, to contribute to individuals’ stability of 
expectations in relation to their capacity to live their lives as they think fit.  More precisely, I 
shall argue that the general function of the criminal law of the free society is to protect no 
more (and no less) than the preconditions of individuals’ capacity to associate with others, 
which I specify in terms of bodily ownership and ownership in external things.  If the 
criminal law is to live up to the promises of a free society, the limits of this institution must be 
set in this principled and minimalist manner.     
Part III, “Criminalization in the Free Society”, moves on into more specifics and 
considers the question of criminalization in the free society.  An answer to this question 
should count as a response to the problem of overcriminalization.  Chapter 6 introduces this 
issue by both presenting the question of criminalization – what types of conduct and on 
which grounds may a free society legitimately criminalize? – and reviewing and criticising 
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different liberal principles and/or motives for criminalization -- the harm principle, penal 
paternalism, penal moralism, and penal consequentialism.  The chapter concludes that these 
principles or motives for criminalization are, in the face of the problem of overcriminalization 
and the requirements of the institutions of the free society, either insufficient or flawed.   
Building on from the general aim and function of the criminal law defended above, 
chapter 7 develops an alternative model of criminalization.  This model is constituted by two 
necessary and sufficient filters of criminalization, namely, (i) the filter of direct violation and 
unacceptable risk to individuals’ bodily ownership and ownership in external things, and (ii) 
the filter of effective reduction of direct violations and unacceptable risks.  These filters 
establish that in a free society there is a strong presumption for the criminalization of a given 
conduct C if and only if (i) C represents a violation of an individual’s bodily ownership and/or 
ownership of external things and (ii) by criminalizing C, the occurrence of C is effectively 
reduced.  When legislatures overlook these filters they contribute to overcriminalizing the 
system and, thereby, use the coercive power of the state illegitimately.  By considering an 
example drawn from hate-crime legislation, the last part of the chapter puts this minimalist 
model of criminalization to work.  This illustration shows the way in which this model 
responds to the problem of overcriminalization in a manner that is principled and consistent 











The Criminal Law: Current Predicaments,  Specificity,  and 
Explanations 
 
It is a mark of the politicization of our times, and of the decline of 
other institutions that used to support the fabric of how we ought 
to act, that so many people nowadays see the state as the basis of 
all human decency and decent society, if not as coextensive with it. 
   Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p. 503 
 
1 .  Introduction:  Current Predicaments 
At the turn of the 21st century, Andrew Ashworth, one of the most thoughtful theorists of the 
criminal law, suggested that the criminal law is a lost cause (Ashworth 2000).  His claim is 
that it has become unprincipled, chaotic, and subject to the unreflective and populist 
practices of politicians, practitioners and other social actors.  What is worse, within this 
unpromising framework the criminal law has been adopted as the “natural, or the only 
appropriate response to a particular event or series of events giving rise to social concern” 
(Ashworth 2000, p.225).  Thus, not only are we experiencing an unprincipled, chaotic and 
populist criminal law, we are also using it as if it were the main way – or perhaps the only way 
– by which the state can put its policies into practice.3 
The results of these developments are well-known: many institutions within society 
have become bodies of control for the prevention of crime, a mirror of the Brave New World; 
the media have swamped the public with alarmist stories about the dangers of monstrous 
criminals walking freely on the streets; people have been bluntly labelled as either law abiding 
citizens or criminal enemies, and when for some good or bad reason they fall into the latter 
category, they are, in extreme circumstances, dispensed from basic social, political and moral 
rights and turned into ‘bad bacteria’.4  As a foreseeable consequence, many prisons have 
become overpopulated and ended fulfilling a role not very different from dumps of human 
                                                
3 Consider also the more recent words of Douglas Husak, another prominent theorist of the criminal law: 
“[C]ontemporary decisions about criminalization conforms to no normative principle whatever.  The criminal 
justice system [...] is used for perverse and immoral ends” (Husak 2008, p.vii). 
4 I borrow this expression from Morse 2004. 
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beings.  At the cost of abandoning central commitments of a decent society, the most 
coercive of the institutions of the state has become omnipresent and oppressive. 
To account for this unsettling state of affairs that has made Ashworth aptly describe 
the criminal law as a lost cause it is illustrative to look at one of the most criminalized 
societies on earth.  At yearend 2009, the United States had 1,613,656 prisoners (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics 2010, p.1), which is a ratio of around 748 people in prison out of 100,000 
(International Centre for Prison Studies 2010).5 Most strikingly, these numbers are 
distributed unequally throughout United States society.  In 1997, 9% of the black population 
in the U.S was under some form of correctional supervision compared to 2% of the white 
population (see U.S. Department of Justice 2000, p.2) and, according to official estimations, 
28,5% of black males will enter a United States prison during their lifetime, which contrasts 
starkly with the estimated 4,4% of white males who will go to prison at some point during 
the same period (U.S. Department of Justice 1997, p.1) .6 
Arguably, one of the causes of these injustices is the continuous expansion of 
substantive criminal law.  To illustrate, consider the case of England: in the last 11 years over 
3.000 new offences have been enacted in this country (Ashworth & Zedner 2008), which is a 
particularly striking number if we think that in 1980 the total estimated number of offences 
known to English law was 7.000 (see Ashworth 2000, p.226 fn.2).  Thus, in hardly more than 
two decades the number of offences of the country has grown by more than 40%.  In the 
United States things are not different and the criminal law expands constantly, to the 
extreme that it ends up covering the most unsuspected matters: in Alabama it is a felony to 
maim oneself to 'excite sympathy', Kentucky bans the use of reptiles during religious services 
and Massachusetts punishes those who frighten pigeons from their nests.7 If the scope of the 
criminal law is so unexpectedly wide, then citizens cannot be expected to know the law, and 
cannot plan their lives within the limits that it sets.   
As these developments suggest, the criminal law may be aptly described as an 
institution suffering from serious problems: too many inmates living in unspeakable 
conditions; legislators using the criminal law for whatever purposes they deem suitable; law 
abiding citizens turned criminals without even knowing why.   
                                                
5 Compare this number with the rates of England (153 prisoners per 100,000 residents) and France (96 prisoners per 
100,000 residents).  
6 Tonry’s Malign Neglect offers a general account of the problematic connections between race and crime in the U.S.  
7 This requires some qualification.  To say that the number of substantive criminal laws is increasing does not 
necessarily mean that criminalization is increasing.  This is so because on many occasions new criminal law refers 
to further specifications of offences already in existence.  Chapter 2 addresses this issue. 
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However grim this account appears to be, a note of qualification is in order.  From 
the examples presented – drawn exclusively from the U.S. and the U.K. – it is not difficult to 
portray the criminal law in a dystopian manner.  However, such a portrait may not be 
adequate or precise.  It is a portrait that takes a part for the whole and, therefore, is a 
reductionist picture of a complex reality.  This is precisely the criticism advanced to 
commentators that elevate an explanatory framework specific to a given context into a 
general explanatory theory (see Zedner 2002 and Lacey 2008).  Thus, I am aware that, if read 
without qualification, the brief picture I have just presented, as well as the explanatory 
framework I am going to outline in section 3 below, may count as an example of a 
contentious over-generalisation.  In effect, the penal dynamics of the U.S and the U.K. are 
different from each other, and, in turn, these dynamics taken together are very different from 
the developments in other European countries – especially Germany and the Scandinavian 
countries – and the rest of the world.   
However, without denying the complexity and variety of penal dynamics existing in 
different places, or that it is impossible to offer a unitary account of the predicaments of the 
criminal law in all penal jurisdictions, it is still noteworthy to say that all jurisdictions suffer 
from at least one of the problems I have just mentioned.  Perhaps, overcrowded prisons are 
more characteristic of, say, Italy and South America than of Germany or Norway, and 
inhumane punishments are more common in Iran than in France.  True as this is, it is also 
clear that all penal jurisdictions suffer from some of these problems.  Thus, in the picture 
presented above and in the explanatory framework I outline in section 3, I emphasise what 
these predicaments are, not the extent to which they affect different jurisdictions.  
 
2 .  The Specif ic ity  of  the Criminal  Law: Coercion,  Condemnation,  and the 
Public  Dimension 
I have suggested that the present condition of the criminal law is worrisome, to say the least, 
and great efforts should be afforded in order to improve this state of affairs.  Before 
undertaking the tasks of amending and improving this institution we need to be clearer 
about the peculiarities that give shape to the system of criminal – as against any other kind of 
– law.  These peculiarities are what I call the specificity of the criminal law. 
Given that, throughout this thesis, I rethink and rearticulate many central aspects of 
the criminal law it is important to be clear about the specificity of this institution.  Insofar as 
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these re-articulations are consistent with the specificity of the criminal law, they should count 
as amendments of, not substitutions for, what we generally understand this institution to be.  
My analysis will focus on three central elements: the coercive, condemnatory, and public 
nature of the criminal law.  In the absence of any of these elements this institution loses its 
most distinguishable features and becomes something else.  Thus, independent of how 
radical or conservative the re-articulation of the criminal law offered in this work might be, if 
my proposal – and any proposal for this matter – is going to be intelligible, it must fit all these 
three elements. 
This analysis will provide not only an account of the most basic structure of the 
criminal law, but also an answer to the question of what is so special about this institution 
and its problems that makes them deserve as much (or more) consideration as other state 
institutions and as other timely socio-political issues affecting people’s lives.  My interest is 
not to try to balance other state institutions and their predicaments with those of the criminal 
law in order to decide which is more worrisome and urgent.  Instead, what I want to claim 
here is that the criminal law deserves careful consideration because, despite the serious perils 
it involves, it is a core institution of the liberal state and of the free society.   
As I put it in the Preamble, like the Greek goddesses of retribution, the criminal law 
presents a dual nature which, on the one hand, provides us with a sense of security and 
purposefulness and, on the other, makes us fear its power and the way its practices are put to 
work today.  By focusing on three core elements of the criminal law – coercion, 
condemnation, and its public dimension – this section makes further sense of this duality and 
offers an account of the specificity of the criminal law that should be present in any 
theoretical attempt to amend it. 
 
1.1 Coercion  
One commentator on criminal justice matters has stated that the practices that constitute the 
criminal law are located “at the most coercive end of a continuum of institutions of social 
order” (Zedner 2004, p.3).  The claim is not only that under present conditions the criminal 
law is to be so characterised, but rather that this institution is by virtue of its very nature, and 
independent of its context, located at that extreme of the continuum of coercive institutions.  
The point is that practices inherent to any system of penal law, like prosecution by the state, 
penalties in the form of loss of money, liberty and civil rights, criminal statutes working by 
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threats, and so on, are intrinsically coercive (even when considered under ideal conditions). 
At first sight, this appears to be a problem, particularly if the rationale of this study is 
to develop a liberal model of the criminal law.  The difficulty comes from the thought that 
coercion does not fit with basic liberal ideas and, in turn, represents a danger to liberal values 
like freedom and autonomy.  In effect, authors with liberal leanings have argued against 
coercion on these grounds.  Joseph Raz, for example, has argued that “[a]ll coercion invades 
autonomy by subjecting the will of [those that are] coerced” (Raz 1986, p.155), thereby making 
them unable to be “creators of their own moral world” (ibid, p.154).  Others have even 
articulated their own intellectual projects in terms of the aim of reducing coercion within 
society.  For instance, Friederich Hayek’s first line in The Constitution of Liberty expresses 
his primary concern, namely, the “condition of men in which coercion of some by others is 
reduced as much as is possible in society”.  This is, Hayek claims, “[t]he task of a policy of 
freedom” (Hayek 2009, pp.11, 12). 
This tension between liberalism and coercion described by such diverse liberal 
thinkers as Hayek and Raz, has led some to conclude that, when talking about punishment – 
the culminating practice of the criminal law – liberals must either “not authorize punishment 
or do so at the expense of their more fundamental principles”  (Brubaker 1988, p.821).  In the 
face of the dangers involved in the coercive nature of the criminal law, this thesis is in part an 
attempt to reject Brubaker’s conclusion and defend, instead, the possibility of legitimate 
coercion by the liberal state through the criminal law.  In the rest of this section I offer some 
general conceptual clarifications about the coercive nature of the criminal law that will prove 
helpful when evaluating the possibility of legitimate coercion discussed in the chapters that 
follow. 
Robert Nozick has advanced the most influential contemporary account of the 
concept of coercion.  In a groundbreaking article (Nozick 1969), he offers an analysis of what 
we can call the formal structure of coercion.  According to this structure, an individual P 
coerces an individual Q to not doing A if and only if: 
1. P threatens to produce some consequence if Q does A; 
2. A, through this threatened consequence, is rendered substantially less eligible as a 
course of action for Q than A was without this threatened consequence; 
3. Part of P's reason to produce this consequence is that P believes this consequence 
worsens Q's alternative of doing A or P believes that Q would believe it does; 
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4. Q does not do A; 
5. At least a part of Q's reason for not doing A is to avoid (or lessen the likelihood of) 
the consequence which P has threatened to produce; 
6. Q knows that P has threatened to produce the consequence mentioned in 1 if he, Q, 
does A.8               
Before referring to what is, for our purposes, the most important aspect of Nozick’s account, 
it is important to consider some aspects of coercion that may not be clear enough in his 
position.   
Some theorists have rightly pointed that the conditions of coercion considered by 
Nozick are insufficient (e.g., Frankfurt 1988, p.37, Hoekema 1986, pp.27-8).  They are not 
sufficient because we need to say more about the character of the act demanded by P and the 
nature of the consequence that P has threatened to produce in case Q does A.  To give an 
example adapted from Harry Frankfurt: Pamela threatens to break Quentin’s thumb if 
Quentin does not set fire to a hospital, and, for that reason, Quentin sets fire to the hospital.  
According to Frankfurt, in these circumstances we do not want to say that Quentin has been 
coerced, even if the ‘action’ of not setting fire to the hospital has been made substantially less 
attractive to Quentin given the prospect of a broken thumb.  What this example suggests is 
that correctly to determine whether an instance of coercion has taken place we need more 
than the simple claim that an undesired consequence has been threatened. 
Additionally, it is also important to note that a threat, which, under certain 
circumstances may constitute a genuine instance of coercion, under other circumstances may 
not.  If Pamela threatens Quentin to take £1 from his wallet unless Quentin goes naked to the 
middle of Trafalgar Square, we could hardly say that – in case he goes naked to central 
London – he has been coerced to do so.  However, if Quentin needs £1 to buy the medicine 
that will save his life, and Pamela threatens to take that £1 in circumstances in which there is 
no way for Quentin either to get that money from a different source or to refuse Pamela, then 
we can arguably say that Quentin has been coerced (provided that Quentin goes to Trafalgar 
Square naked because of Pamela’s threat). 
These considerations are important because they establish the contextual nature of 
                                                
8  Nozick 1969, pp. 441-445.  These are necessary conditions to coerce someone to refrain from doing something, but 
mutatis mutandis they also apply to coercion to do something. 
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our coercive practices.9 Coercion emerges as a result of a particular combination of the threat 
posed by the coercer and the action to be performed by the coerced.  There needs to be a 
certain type of proportionality between the two, so that not performing the act by the 
coerced amounts, in the face of the realisation of the threat, to a serious enough disruption of 
what the coerced values.  Thus, and unless we believe in the existence of objective and 
undisputable values, what counts as an instance of coercion must consider the circumstances 
of value in which a possible case of coercion takes place.  To continue with the previous 
example, if Quentin were an exhibitionist looking for requests for showing his bare body in 
public places, Pamela’s threat and Quentin’s acceptance of her command would not be an 
instance of coercion. 
Following these clarifications, we should now focus on one of the most relevant 
aspects of Nozick’s account.  This aspect links coercion to the rational capacities of the 
individual coerced such that coercion need not bypass our rationality, but may instead 
confront it.  This is suggested by the combination of (some of) the clauses in conditions 2, 3 
and 5, which, in conjunction, establish that an instance of coercion is successful only if the 
coerced exercises his capacity to act according to his interest given the circumstances of 
coercion.  In different terms, coercion is not forcing or compelling the coerced to do as one 
wishes, but it is rather offering reasons to the coerced to act as one wishes (but note that this 
says nothing about the nature of those reasons).  This means that coercion is not merely an 
instance of offering of reasons, but is a successful offering of reasons.  Nozick's analysis, in 
effect, makes the coerced and her acquiescence to the reasons offered by the coercer in her 
threat a necessary condition of coercion.  As I understand it, this suggests that the coerced 
could have done otherwise had he decided to do so, and that, consequently, he could have 
resisted the threat of the coercer (thus, being coerced to do something is different from being 
forced to do something).10 This is a crucial difference between coercion and other instances 
of infringements upon individual freedom.   
To illustrate, imagine that Pamela threatens Quentin with some consequences if 
                                                
9 That was certainly not the aim of Harry Frankfurt’s objection.  He was rather pointing to the fact that Nozick’s use 
of the term differs from his own in that Nozick did not try to establish the conditions under which acting under 
coercion excludes moral responsibility (Frankfurt 1988, p.37 fn.11). 
10 Frankfurt has a different view on this respect.  For him, “[c]oercing someone into performing a certain action 
cannot be, if it is to imply his freedom from moral responsibility, merely a matter of getting him to perform the 
action by means of a threat.  A person who is coerced is compelled to do what he does.  He has no choice but to 
do it.” (Frankfurt 1988, p.36)  Frankfurt’s argument for this idea is that otherwise, he believes, we could not 
ground the claim that coercion frees the coerced from moral responsibility.  It seems to me that Frankfurt 
overlooks the fact that there are degrees of coercion.  The degree of a token of coercion is obtained by considering 
different factors, some of them variable some of them constant, all of which contribute to the relative degree of 
irresistibility of an instance of coercion.          
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Quentin does A, and these consequences make A substantially less eligible as an option for 
Quentin.  Now, Quentin suggests that he will do A regardless of Pamela’s threats, to which 
Pamela responds with a certain course of action that forces Quentin not to do A.  In this case 
what we have is not an instance of coercion, as Quentin did not respond to the reasons 
(good/legitimate or bad/illegitimate) offered by Pamela in her threat.  Even though Quentin 
did as Pamela wished, Quentin was not coerced, but forced to satisfy those wishes.   
This example is helpful to draw our attention to two important distinctions.  First, 
there is the distinction between coercive and non-coercive infringements upon individual 
freedom.  Unlike non-coercive infringements, coercive infringements have as a necessary 
condition that the coerced responds to the reasons provided by the coercer.  Thus, Quentin 
is coerced by Pamela only if he responds to her reasons.   
Second, and more importantly, there is the distinction between coercion and 
legitimate coercion.  The key to legitimate coercion is in the acquiescence of the threatened 
person to certain types of reasons advanced by the threatening person.  An account of the 
types of reasons that makes coercion legitimate requires a more detailed inquiry that I shall 
leave for later.  For the moment, and given the introductory nature of this first chapter, I shall 
refer to them in a general fashion by resorting to the idea of an individual’s values:  what 
makes coercion an instance of legitimate coercion is some degree of conformity between the 
reasons offered by the coercer and the values held by the individual coerced.  If an instance of 
coercion overlooks, or is simply intended as an act against, a relevant value held by the 
individual coerced, then we can talk of an instance of coercion but not of legitimate coercion.  
Thus, a thief who coercively gets his victim’s money is, all else equal, performing an act of 
illegitimate coercion: some values held by the individual victim has been violated (or at least 
overlooked) by the coercive act rendering this an instance of illegitimate coercion.  
Conversely, when an instance of coercion aims to keep or protect the values of the individual 
coerced, then we can talk, all things being equal, of an instance of legitimate coercion. 
To illustrate legitimate coercion consider the following two examples.  It is plausible 
to argue that parents may justifiably coerce their child in order for her to succeed in her 
studies.  They may tell her that if she does not prepare for her exams, then she will stop 
receiving her pocket money.  If, given her parents’ threat, she decides to revise for her exams, 
then they have, arguably, justifiably coerced her.  Similarly, think of the officers of a publicly 
funded shelter for unemployed people who have come to realise that the shelter does not 
have enough resources to help all those in need.  They decide to change the shelter’s policy 
 23 
and offer help only to those who are active in looking for a job and who help with the 
cleaning of the place.  If at least one of those helped by the shelter decides to change his 
behaviour to stay in the shelter, the officers and their policy have been successful in justifiably 
coercing those who comply with the new orders of the shelter. 
What these cases show is that, although any type of coercion supposes some level of 
intromission in people’s lives, there are circumstances in which this infringement is consistent 
with, and perhaps required by, the respect owed to people.  For the purposes of this section 
we do not need to elaborate further the conditions that make coercion by the state through 
the criminal law legitimate or illegitimate.  This will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5.  
Instead, having considered the first feature of the specificity of the criminal law, what we 
need to consider now is the characteristic type of threat that the state poses to others within 
the coercive structure of the criminal law.  Put differently, how does the state coerce through 
the criminal law? 
 
1.2 Condemnation 
The culmination of the whole institution of the criminal law is the practice of state 
punishment.  This is the way in which the state both responds to those who commit crimes 
and makes some courses of action – those actions that are criminalized – less eligible.  
In the view I adopt here, what makes the practice of punishment so special is not its 
hardship but its condemnatory nature.  Joel Feinberg, in support of this view, has 
influentially argued that punishments are not penalties – mere burdensome orders imposed 
on people – but expressive acts that aim to condemn those who offend (Feinberg 1968).  In 
this sense, throughout this thesis I understand the criminal law as an institution defined in 
terms of its expressive function, namely, the function of expressing condemnation to those 
who commit crimes.  If we place this understanding of condemnation in the Nozickean 
structure of coercion revised above the following claims result: 
1. The state, through the criminal law, threatens to condemn a potential offender if he 
or she acts in a way that violates the commands of a penal statute (call that action φ). 
2. Because of the threat of condemnation, φ is rendered substantially less eligible as a 
course of action than φ without the threat of condemnation. 
This understanding of condemnation as the threat presented by the state through penal 
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coercion raises questions about the connection between crimes, condemnation and 
punishment that we must now consider. 
As is familiar from the literature, what explains and/or justifies the connection 
between a wrongful act and our response to it can generally be presented in two ways 
depending on the normative position we adopt.  Thus, from the point of view of the 
deontologist, condemnation is the proper response that wrongdoers deserve for their deeds.  
When thinking of penal condemnation, the deontologist makes an analogy between the 
reactive attitudes present in our moral experience and those that exist in our penal practice 
(for reactive attitudes see Strawson 1962).  Thus, in a way analogous to our condemnatory 
attitudes directed against those who act wrongly, the criminal law condemns those who 
violate the criminal law.  By contrast, from the point of view of the consequentialist, the 
condemnation of wrongdoers has less to do with reactive attitudes than with the 
achievement of desired outcomes.  In the penal sphere, these expected consequences have to 
do, generally speaking, with the modification of future behaviour and the maximization of 
welfare across the whole society (see ch.6 for a more detailed account of penal 
consequentialism).   
So understood, my articulation of the criminal law as an institution defined in terms 
of its expressive function fits adequately with the deontologist account and not with the 
consequentialist one.  However, as discussed below, this is not to say that consequentialist 
considerations have no room in the account I adopt here. 
In Censure and Sanctions, Andrew von Hirsch has pursued an account of 
punishment and the criminal law that influences my own proposals on this matter.  He says 
that “punishment should convey blame; and blame gives the offender reason for an 
appropriate moral response”  (von Hirsch 1993, p.77 and ch.2).  This conveying of blame and 
condemnation, however, does not try to induce or elicit a certain internal state in the 
offender, even though punishment does express disapproval of the action committed by the 
wrongdoer.11 Instead, it is left up to the offender to determine how to respond to the message 
of punishment and the criminal law is not meant to intrude into that sphere.  In this sense, 
von Hirsch’s model conceives of the criminal law in a rather unambitious form and portrays 
                                                
11 Antony Duff has persuasively pursued this alternative line of argument. According to him, blame should be seen as 
“a kind of moral argument with another person” (Duff 1986, p.47).  In this account, the adequate purpose of blame 
is to persuade the blamed in order for him “to see and to accept, not my judgment, but the truth about the moral 
character of his conduct; to engage with him in a search for and an attempt to understand that truth, not simply to 
force my own fallible and imperfect judgment on him” (Duff 1986, p.49).  For von Hirsch’s discussion of this 
position, see von Hirsch 1993, ch.8.   
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the institution as an expressive instance that serves merely as an opportunity for the offender 
to reconsider and provide a response to the wrongness of her past action (see von Hirsch 
1993, p.10).  Penal condemnation is not meant to influence the moral psychology of the 
wrongdoer, but simply to serve as a framework in which certain modifications of the 
wrongdoer’s attitude towards his past act may take place.   
However, despite the generally retributivist character of this model, 
consequentialism still has a place within it.  Consequentialist considerations are 
accommodated within von Hirsch’s account through a specific and contingent aspect of the 
practice of punishment: hard treatment.  Given the type of flawed and imperfect beings we 
are – incapable of assuring constant and full abidance to the law or absolute respect for our 
fellow citizens – hard treatment emerges as an additional reinforcement of the disapproval 
that condemnation expresses.  Including hard treatment in our practices of condemnation 
aims to provide prudential and supplementary reasons to restrain one’s conduct and, thereby, 
to avoid criminal behaviour.  Whereas condemnation is meant to express attitudes of blame 
towards offenders for their offences, hard treatment is seen as a pragmatic (because more 
effective) element of the criminal law aimed to provide additional prudential reasons to 
control individuals’ future actions.  It is in this limited way that consequentialist 
considerations enter into the equation of the criminal law and punishment. 
To some, this distinction between condemnation and hard treatment may seem 
surprising or simply mistaken (e.g., Duff 1986 and 2001a, Skillen 1980).  In effect, according 
to the definition of punishment advanced by Flew, Benn and Hart, which can arguably be 
called the standard definition of punishment, punishment “must involve pain or other 
consequences normally considered unpleasant” (Hart 1968, p.4).  In contrast to what I have 
suggested above, the standard account establishes that hard treatment is not a contingent 
aspect of, or a merely prudential addition to, the practice of punishment and the criminal law.  
To punish someone is to inflict hard treatment.   
My account is at some distance from this standard account.  As I see it, the notion of 
condemnation, plus some minor contextual additions – additions related to the existence of 
institutional principles and procedures – captures all the relevant aspects of what the state 
should do when it punishes.  To put it straightforwardly, punishment is a form of 
condemnation.  More precisely, punishment is an act of condemnation by the state imposed 
upon an offender for her offence.  In this sense, a core feature distinguishing an act of 
interpersonal condemnation from an act of punishment is that in the latter the state is 
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condemning an individual for her past violation of the criminal law.  This is all we need to 
specify the connection and establish the difference between punishment and condemnation 
simpliciter.12 
On the one hand, this is to say that there is nothing obviously contradictory in 
thinking of an instance of state punishment that is not an instance of hard treatment.  On the 
other hand, my argument is that we fail to understand punishment if we refer to it as 
conveying no condemnation whatsoever.  In this sense, and returning to the structure of 
coercion reviewed in the previous section, the fundamental threat that makes actions less 
eligible is, in my account, condemnation and not hard treatment.  Following von Hirsch I 
decouple condemnation (punishment) and hard treatment (a prudential supplement 
designed to reduce future instances of criminal wrongdoing).  Unlike von Hirsch, though, I 
believe condemnation (and not hard treatment) is necessary and sufficient for punishment.  
Thus, in my account, the criminal law threatens people with condemnation if they act in ways 
prohibited by its statutes.13 Of course, as it happens, the expression of condemnation is 
conventionally done through hard treatment, and such hard treatment has an effective 
deterrence effect.  However, and this is my point here, condemnation does not need to be 
expressed by hard treatment, and we can legitimately expect condemnation itself – no matter 
how convention dictates it is expressed – to have some deterrence effect on persons’ 
willingness to break the law.14 
 
1.3 The Public Dimension 
There are two elements that need to be highlighted for the public dimension of the criminal 
law to be articulated.  To identify the first of these two elements, it is useful to ask the 
following question: in the name of whom does the state coerce and condemn?  In other 
words, in the name of whom does the criminal law perform its functions?  The position I 
                                                
12 Thus, I am using the term ‘punishment’ as shorthand of ‘state punishment’.  I keep this use for the rest of this thesis. 
13 For von Hirsch “[a] condemnatory response to injurious conduct [...] can be expressed either in a purely (or 
primarily) symbolic mode; or else, in one in which the reprobation is expressed through the visitation of hard 
treatment.  The criminal sanction is a response of the latter kind” (von Hirsch 1993, p.14). 
14 In this respect, and to respond to an anti-conventionalist passage by Thomas Scanlon, we could have expressed 
condemnation with flowers or weeds, but we did not (Scanlon 1988, p.214.  See also Matravers 2000, p.257, fn.19).  
Had we developed a convention according to which the state condemns others for their offences by sending them 
red roses, we would not wonder how absurd flowery punishments are.  Independent of the way in which 
conventions develop, when conventions become cemented in our social practices it is certainly difficult to think of 
these practices being otherwise, but that difficulty by no means entails that conventions could not have evolved in 
very different ways.  
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adopt here is that the state criminalizes and punishes in the name of its citizens.15 The central 
point is that when a criminal offence is committed (because a penal statute has been violated) 
and an offender prosecuted and convicted, the condemnatory response of the state is 
performed by an official body in the name of the members of the polity.  This means that 
criminalization and punishment are not something done in the name of the direct or potential 
victims of the crime, or of some faction within the community, or, as some theorists with 
Hegelian leanings suggest, something done because it is owed to the offender (see Hegel 
1967, §100).16 Instead, criminal laws are enacted and punishment is undertaken in the name of 
the members of the polity in which the criminal law operates.  
This leads us to the second element of the public dimension of the criminal law.  The 
relevant question here is why coercion and condemnation are performed in the name of all 
the members of the polity instead of in the name of the direct (would be) victims.  The 
answer to this lies in the idea that crimes – the types of actions that are criminalized and 
punished -- are public wrongs.17 A public wrong, as opposed to a private wrong, is a type of 
wrong that concerns all the members of the polity because it disrupts a good that is relevant 
to all those who coexist in society (for short, a public good).  Thus, the functions of the 
criminal law (coercion and condemnation) are performed in the name of all the members of 
the polity because these functions are meant to protect individuals from some form of public 
wrong.  Although this is sufficient to highlight the second element of the public dimension of 
the criminal law, it must be emphasised that even though crimes are public wrongs, not all 
public wrongs are (or should be) crimes.  In other words, the criminal law is to protect some 
forms of public goods only.18 
It is in these two senses – (i) crimes as wrongs that disrupt some relevant form of 
public good and (ii) crimes as wrongs responded to by the state in the name of the members 
of the polity – that the criminal law has a public dimension.  To articulate this in a more 
                                                
15 When I say that the state punishes in the name of its citizens I should also say that the state coerces in the name of 
the very same group of people.  In what follows, and only for stylistic reasons, I leave that last claim aside.  It must 
be clear, however, that my argument is that both elements – coercion and condemnation/punishment – are 
undertaken in the name of the citizens of the polity. 
16 “[P]unishment is regarded as containing the criminal’s right and hence by being punished he is honoured as a 
rational being” (Hegel 1967, p.71).  Dudley Knowles traces this idea back to Beccaria and Rousseau.  See 
Knowles 1999, p.38. 
17 The classical statement for the idea that crimes are public wrongs is Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England: “private wrongs, or civil injures, are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to 
individuals, considered merely as individuals; public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanours, are a breach and 
violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole community, considered as community, in its social 
aggregate capacity” (Blackstone 1770, vol.IV, p.5). 
18 Examples of public wrongs that are not crimes are all those actions that should be sanctioned by administrative 
law. 
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formal way: when an individual D acts against an individual V by doing φ and φ is a criminal 
act, then (ideally) D has committed an action that disrupts some form of public good (which 
does not negate, but is independent of, the fact that V is the victim of D’s act) and D, by φ-
ing, elicits a response by the state through the criminal law in the name of the members of the 
polity.  Independent of the compensations and/or any other type of legal or non-legal 
arrangements that need to be provided to V (by D or by another body) for having suffered 
from the action φ, what matters in the criminal law is that D is to be condemned for that 
public wrong (φ) by the state in the name of the members of the polity in which φ was 
committed.19 
Doubtless, there are a series of questions raised by this account of crimes.  One 
concerns the type of public good that needs to be disrupted in order to justify state action 
through the criminal law.  In other words: what types of public wrongs are to count as 
crimes?  This question correctly supposes that not all types of disruptions of public goods are 
crimes and that, therefore, the state ought to impose penal condemnation upon only some 
types of public wrongs.  Although the details of the relevant type of disruptions will be 
presented in chapters 5-7, at this point it is worth anticipating one general aspect of the 
argument to come. 
In Moral Dimensions, Thomas Scanlon presents an account of blame based on the 
distinction between the permissibility and the meaning of an action.  Whilst the former is 
determined by the considerations that count for and against an action, the latter depends on 
the significance of that action for the individuals involved and for their relationship.  
According to Scanlon, and to focus on what is relevant for our purposes here, blame is an 
attitude whose foundations are to be sought not in what determines the permissibility of 
actions, but rather in the meaning of actions within human relationships.  His proposal is 
that 
to claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is to claim that the action 
shows something about the agent’s attitudes toward others that impairs the 
relationship that others can have with him or her.  To blame a person is to judge 
him or her to be blameworthy and to take your relationship with him or her to 
be modified in a way that this judgment of impaired relations holds to be 
appropriate (Scanlon, 2008, pp.128-9). 
                                                
19 For a more elaborate articulation of crimes along lines similar to what I present here see Marshall & Duff 1998, 
Duff 2007 and Lamond 2007.  
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It is Scanlon’s focus on the connection between a blameworthy action and a given type of 
relationship between peoples that I take to be a particularly insightful element of this view in 
relation to the criminal law.  As will be argued in chapter 3, the criminal law is a function of 
social groups and, more specifically, a function of society.  A society is not a mere aggregate 
of individuals, but rather supposes the existence of a bond that extends across its different 
members.  The claim is then that to be a member of society is to exist with others in a special 
type of relationship.  From this I establish that criminal wrongs are actions that disrupt or 
impair the relationship that keeps us together as members of one society.  This 
understanding of crimes captures the core of the public dimension of the criminal law. 
 
3 .   Explaining the Present Condition of  the Criminal  Law 
The previous two sections have stated the regrettable condition of the criminal law and 
presented the specificity of this institution.  No other branch of the state or social institution 
existing in modern societies has the power to coerce and condemn individuals in the name of 
the citizens of the polity.  It is time now to consider why an institution so characterised has 
gone so wrong as to be deemed a “lost cause” (Ashworth 2000), “used for perverse and 
immoral ends” (Husak 2008, p.vii). 
There is, of course, no easy or simple answer to offer.  As with any social institution, 
the process of transformation of the criminal law cannot be explained without taking into 
account an array of different and complex factors linked to historical circumstances and 
processes, developments in political thought, economics, technology, social psychology and 
so on.20   
Reflecting on the importance of this complex and multidisciplinary approach, Nicola 
Lacey has criticised “the tendency to take punishment [and more generally, the criminal law] 
as a discrete object of philosophical enquiry”.  This tendency, she contends, “entails a relative 
insulation of the debate about the justification of punishment from broader questions of 
political theory which are integral to a proper analysis of punishment” (Lacey 1999, p.153).  
She concludes convincingly that “[o]nly if the philosophers can expand their view so as to 
theorise punishment not as an idea but as a social practice [...] will they be able to meet their 
ambition of explicating the (possibly limited) potential for making that social order less 
                                                
20 David Garland's trilogy (1985; 1990; 2001) represents the most comprehensive explanation of contemporary 
systems of criminal law and control.   
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unjust” (Lacey 1999, p.163).  Normative theories of the criminal law should not be separated 
from moral and political theory.  The answers we provide to questions within moral and 
political theory are crucial to the ways we respond to questions in the criminal law.   
My contribution in this thesis surely falls short of Lacey’s ambitions.  Still, it does 
represent an attempt to bridge part of the gap between the idea of the criminal law and its 
practice.  I do so by offering an account of the criminal law that confronts parts of its present 
injustices in the context of broader issues in political philosophy.  In this section, I present 
some of the causes or circumstances that theorists have put forward to explain the origin of 
these injustices. Once these elements have been presented it will become clearer why, as 
Lacey suggests and as I try to do throughout this thesis, it is important to address the 
injustices that take place within the institution of the criminal law by adopting an approach 
that questions broader issues in political philosophy. 
 
3.a Ill-Governance 
Almost 250 years ago, J.J. Rousseau made a claim that sheds light on the causes of the 
problems affecting the criminal law today.  While considering the legitimate limits of the 
sovereign power and the sovereign's rights to dispose of the life and death of citizens, 
Rousseau argued that “frequent harsh punishments are always a sign of weakness or laziness 
in the Government.  [...] In a well-governed State there are few punishments, not because 
many pardons are granted, but because there are few criminals” (Rousseau 1997, p.65). 
Rousseau provides insight into the idea that too much criminal law and too much 
punishment are due, at least to an important extent, to ill-governance.  As opposed to what a 
healthy state is supposed to do, weak and/or inefficient governance abandons the holistic 
conception of both the function and source of public policies to understand them reductively, 
as mere instances of penal regulation and control.  This is the penal state, a state that takes 
the functioning of the criminal law as its primary and, perhaps, only role.  
Much more recently, Jonathan Simon has provided an account of the current state of 
the criminal law along lines similar to Rousseau's.  In a series of influential publications 
Simon has coined the term ‘governing through crime’ (Simon 2002; 2007).  This terminology, 
although originally applied to the particular case and circumstances of the United States, 
illustrates well part of the concerns shared by Rousseau, Ashworth, and to some extent, 
Husak.  Simon's core idea is that some traditional and rather informal ways of social control 
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– like those that exist within the family, the education system and workplaces – have been 
reduced, making their influence less significant within society.  As a result, and given the 
increase of fear of crime and insecurity, the state has expanded its penal coercive power as a 
way to counterbalance the lack of control in other spheres.  As Simon notices, these two 
trends – an increase in the fear of crime and a reduction in non-criminal social control – feed 
each other, so,  
[d]eclining levels of informal social control increase fear of crime (and crime 
itself). The public's increasing fear of crime drives demands for higher levels of 
order and harsher measures to accomplish them, but such measures become less 
effective as their anchors in informal social control decline (Simon 2002, p.1415).    
As a consequence, Simon claims that the United States has become “less democratic and 
more racially polarized”, all of which is “exhausting [its] social capital and repressing [its] 
capacity for innovation”.  As part of this process, the government has reoriented resources 
toward the criminal justice system, which 
has resulted in a shift aptly described as a transformation from 'welfare state' to 
'penal state.' The result has not been less government, but a more authoritarian 
executive, a more passive legislature, and a more defensive judiciary than even 
the welfare state itself was accused of producing (Simon 2007, p.6. Footnote 
omitted). 
This way of accommodating power within the state is an example of ill-governance.  The 
executive augments its authoritative power to the detriment of the representative power of 
the legislatures.  In turn, this is accompanied by the increase of more discretionary practices 
within the judiciary.  Doubtless, Simon’s analysis needs to be qualified; he himself says that 
his terminology and what follows from it “is polemical, and perhaps overstated” (2007, p.4).  
However, Simon's account provides what I take to be a generally sound description of both 
our current penal situation and (an aspect of) the processes that have led us to it. 
Once we take seriously Rousseau’s and Simon’s accounts it becomes clear that the 
problems affecting the criminal law are, to an important extent, the result of the ways in 
which both the function and scope of action of the state and its institutions are articulated 
and exercised.  A weak state, unable to advance social policies without resorting to penal 
coercion, or a state that tries to amend, or even replace, social spheres traditionally 
understood as being separate from the criminal law, are good examples of how our account 
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of the state and its institutions may have a serious impact on the type of criminal law we have.  
From these reflections one is forced to conclude that an account of the criminal law that aims 
to provide a successful answer to the present predicaments of this institution must also offer, 
beyond considerations exclusively confined to the penal law, an account of the state and its 
institutions.21 
 
3.b From rehabilitation to incapacitation  
An author who has also provided deep insight into the causes of the current state of the 
criminal law is David Garland.  His celebrated trilogy on the history of crime and social 
control in the 20th century well complements Rousseau's and Simon's accounts.  For what 
matters here, and putting it in very simple terms, Garland shows that the turning point 
towards the current state of the criminal law occurred during the second half of the 70s, 
when the criminal law system was transformed from a penal welfare state model into a 
control state one. 
The criminologies of the welfare state (which comprises of the period between the 
end of the Second World War and the first half of the 70s) understood crime as the result of 
the conditions of social deprivation suffered by perfectible human beings.  By contrast, 
Garland argues, control theories of crime (which followed the welfare state penal theories 
and continue today) emerged from a more pessimistic conception of humankind.  Rather 
than responding through assistance and adjustment of social conditions, control theories saw 
crime as a normal fact of society resulting from the action of self-interested agents.  As a result 
of this normalisation of crime, the criminal law, rather than aiming to correct and rehabilitate 
– because there is nothing to correct or rehabilitate – became an instance of mere 
incapacitation.  The ultimate goal is to reduce the opportunities for agents to take advantage 
of their fellows in order to advance their own self-interested purposes. 
These different conceptions of the individual naturally brought about their own 
distinct ways of dealing with crime and criminals.  In the period before the mid 70s, the 
framework of the criminal law system spun around rehabilitation, the promotion of a system 
of indeterminate sentences and early releases, the reduction of oppressive control, and an 
                                                
21 As it is clear from Lacey’s analysis above, more than this needs to be offered if we are going to advance a genuinely 
comprehensive account of the criminal law and its predicaments.  However, and as I have indicated, my aim is to 
bridge part of the gap that Lacey mentions by grounding my account of the criminal law in an explicit account of 
the state, society and the individual. 
 33 
emphasis on the rights of suspects and prisoners.  The second part of the decade, in turn, saw 
a stricter enforcement of sentences and the spread of an emphasis on control as a response to 
the penal welfare model.  As a result, a new culture of crime control emerged, one which 
expanded its scope of action and influence and which, it was believed, was to be taken as the 
solution to many of the fears and anxieties that came up in the last part of the 20th century.22 
The idea that crime is an everyday factor of modern society, and thus not something 
to be overcome, brought about certain uneasiness – a dilemma – with regards to what the 
state can and needs to do against crime.23  This uneasiness, however, did not produce a 
retrieval of the state from criminalizing and punishing criminal behaviour.  Far from it: the 
state, besides recognising its inability to get rid of criminal behaviour, also realised that a 
withdrawal from the business of social control, criminalization and punishment would be 
disastrous (socially, but mainly politically).  As a result, the state shifted some of its 
institutional patterns and stopped attempting to correct or reform the offender.  Instead, it 
took the wrongdoer to be someone to control and incapacitate.  Consequently, from the mid-
70s onwards we have seen the development of two general phenomena.  On the one hand, a 
constant increase in the number of imprisonments.  On the other, an increase in the 
enactment of laws that seek to both reduce the emergence of opportunities for crime and play 
the role of expressing the outrage of 'us', the victim of crimes, against 'them', the wicked 
criminals who put at stake our security and way of living.  Although these policies may not 
really deliver security and order, they at least constitute a way to both reduce the opportunity 
for crime and function as a public catharsis that blames the criminal and reasserts a sense of 
community.  As opposed to the welfare penal policies, the criminal policies advanced by the 
penal state do not try to cure, rehabilitate or reform, but prevent, incapacitate and protect. 
Similar to ill-governance, this explanation based on the movement from 
rehabilitation to incapacitation reflects a switch that is largely related to the way we conceive 
of the state and the individuals that constitute society.  My claim is not that we should then 
                                                
22 I take too much punishment and too much criminalization to be amongst the main outcomes of the control penal 
state.  However, they are by no means the only contestable developments of the post-welfare penal model.  Just to 
mention others, which are more or less contentious and more or less connected to my concerns here: community-
based policing and crime prevention, mandatory sentencing (particularly for repeat offenders), community 
notifications of released offenders, victims movements.  The difficulty of finding a common rationale for these 
diverse policies and measures is evident and, as Garland puts it, they represent a rather “confusing maelstrom of 
developments” (2001, p.105).   
23 Consider the following passage describing the difficulties in which the officials in charge of crime control in the 
United States found themselves during the transitional time at the end of the 60’s and beginning of the 70’s: 
“Government today is caught in a policy dilemma, a dilemma in which constant and continuing demands for 
government services are matched by a growing recognition of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of much of what 
the government does” (Feeley & Sarat 1980, p.11.  Quoted in Garland 2001, p.244) 
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go back to the welfare state and thereby return to the welfare penal policies, but is simply to 
show the extent to which the current present condition of the criminal law has to do with our 
models, understandings and commitments with respect to the state and its function within 
society.   
 
3.c ‘Us’, ‘Them’ and Penal Populism   
A last point that I would like briefly to consider here refers to the current emphasis not on the 
causes, but on the consequences, of crime.  Rather than tackling the deeper sources of 
criminal behaviours, many penal policies focus on addressing the effects that crime has on 
victims and potential victims.  They do so by, first, implementing practices that are designed 
to diminish the sense of insecurity and fear that the everyday existence of crime produces, 
and, second, by marking out a stark distinction between victims and offenders.  This is an 
expression of ‘us-against-them’ rhetoric. 
This way of doing things in penal policy is aptly described by the idea of ‘populist 
punitiveness’: “the notion of politicians tapping into, and using for their own purposes, what 
they believe to be the public's generally punitive stance" (Bottoms 1995, p.40).  In addition to 
establishing an exclusionary logic of criminal justice in which 'we', the non-criminals, are 
distinguished from 'them', the criminals, the most obvious result of these policies is the 
increase in the use of imprisonment from the 70s onwards.  This becomes a particularly 
striking fact when we compare this period with what happened during the post-war welfare 
penal state.  During the latter period, despite the rise in crime rates, imprisonment rates were 
kept relatively constant.  After the 70s the trend was exactly the opposite: crime rate numbers 
saw a deceleration whilst the number of prisoners increased substantively.  To illustrate, in 
the United States in 1980 there were 12,064,000 property offences known to the police, and 
the number of prisoners were 315,974.  In 2000, there were 10,183,000 property offences 
known to the police, whilst the numbers of prisoners increased to 1,331,278 (U.S. Census 
Bureau No HS-23 (2003)).24 
A different way to illustrate this exclusionary logic – which I have linked to penal 
populism – is found in the notion of ‘enemy penal law’, as the German penal theorist Günter 
Jakobs has coined it (Jakobs 1985; 2003).  Jakobs realised that substantive parts of current 
                                                
24 This may seem misleading as I am contrasting an absolute number of prisoners with property offences only.  
However, the numbers for other types of offences also reflect this trend.    
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Western legislation are directed not towards citizens subject to the criminal law but against 
'enemies'.25 According to Jakobs’ account, these enemies are potentially dangerous 
individuals who do not recognise the authority of the legal system and, as a consequence, do 
not provide the minimum cognitive reassurance characteristic of law-abiding people. 
Of particular relevance for my purposes is Jakobs' identification of the characteristics 
of enemy penal law.  The first characteristic is that enemy penal law punishment tends to be 
applied prospectively hoping to prevent future harms; second, that enemy penal law punishes 
disproportionately in the name of security; and third, that it represents a serious undermining 
of procedural rights.  As I take it, enemy penal law represents a radical development in the 
control state model: the first characteristic expresses the idea that the foci of enemy penal law 
are the potential consequences of an action.  Second, the thought behind having harsher 
convictions is that incapacitation works: that in order to protect society the dangerous enemy 
should be separated from us, the law-abiding citizens.  And third, enemy penal law divides 
society into citizens and enemies, where the former benefits from all available procedural 
protections whereas the latter is a mere target that needs to be neutralised to protect us from 
the consequences of their actions. 
In conjunction with the other two accounts (ill-governance and the incapacitation 
model), this characterisation offers a general explanation of the current state of the criminal 
law.  Enemy penal law supposes a distinction between ‘we’ and ‘them’ that allows the state to 
pursue its own agenda by excluding those who do not fit.  Through this exclusivist approach, 
and shielded by the argument that such an approach aims at protecting citizens from their 
enemies, the state seeks both to put forward its own particular goals and to gain approval 
from scared voters.  This is penal populism at its worst, where the political body manipulates 
the public by appealing to the rhetoric of fear and insecurity. 
Although brief and general, these three different accounts – ill-governance, the 
incapacitation model, and penal populism – provide plausible explanations of the current 
regrettable condition of the criminal law.  As mentioned above, these explanations need to be 
qualified, as they do not apply uniformly to all penal jurisdictions.  Some societies are more 
responsive than others to the problems of populism, and some socio-political structures are 
more prone than others to ill-governance, enemy penal law, or incapacitation policies.  
Presenting a more precise explanatory framework of the current predicaments of the criminal 
law is well beyond the scope of this chapter.  Instead, I have presented some plausible 
                                                
25 On the general application of the enemy criminal law label see Gómez-Jara Díez 2008. 
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explanations that apply more or less adequately to most penal jurisdictions in modern liberal 
democracies.26  
A normative model of the criminal law that wants to succeed in amending this 
institution must not turn a blind eye to these explanations, and ought to take seriously both 
the idea that these problems go well beyond the internal structure of the criminal law and 
that their solution supposes answering general questions about the state, its function and 
scope of action.  Without answering those questions any attempt to amend the problems of 
the criminal law is doomed to fail.   
 
4 .  Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has done different things.  First, it has offered a brief account of 
the regrettable present condition of the criminal law, marked by too much punishment and 
too many penal prohibitions.  These conditions feed a system characterised by the 
overpopulation of prisons and the strengthening of the penal state and its policy of fear and 
control.  All this makes evident the need to reform this state institution. 
Second, it has introduced the specificity of the criminal law: its coercive, 
condemnatory, and public nature.  Put all these elements together and we obtain a general 
account of the object of study of this thesis.  Any amendment or re-articulation of the criminal 
law, like the one I shall propose in subsequent chapters, must be consistent with the idea that 
the criminal law is a set of coercive rules enforced by the state the violation of which requires 
an act of condemnation by officials in the name of the citizens of the polity. 
And third, the chapter has offered three different but complementary explanations of 
the causes of the criminal law having gone wrong.  Although surely incomplete, these 
explanatory factors – ill-governance, an emphasis on incapacitation, and penal populism – 
represent plausible and adequate accounts of what has contributed to the present condition 
of the criminal law.  More importantly, each of these explanations suggests that any attempt 
to reform our penal institutions must focus not only on the internal aspects of the criminal 
law, but also on our understanding of the state, its functions and spheres of action.  This is a 
central idea justifying most of the second part of this thesis (chs.3-5). 
                                                
26 For a good account of many of the different factors that explain the variances in penal dynamics in modern 
societies, see Lacey 2008.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
Overcriminalization: Definition, Forms and Problems 
 
[I]njustice is pervasive throughout the criminal domain. [...] 
Unfortunately, [...] contemporary decisions about criminalization 
conform to no normative principle whatever.  The criminal justice 
system that many commentators have worked so hard to improve 
is being used for perverse and immoral ends. 
Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization, p.vii 
 
The first chapter of this thesis suggested that the criminal law we have must be reconsidered 
and amended.  Each of the problems mentioned and each of the elements contributing to 
produce these problems deserve serious and careful consideration.  In effect, a successful 
amendment of our criminal law system must approach these realities in a comprehensive 
way; it is not simply naïve, but mistaken, to think that we can solve any of these difficulties 
without considering the others.  A successful reform of the criminal law system is indeed a 
complex multifactorial task. 
This thesis, however, has a much more modest aim.  Rather than offering a 
comprehensive account of, and response to, the different problems of the criminal law, this 
work aims to contribute to rethinking the criminal law by re-articulating this institution from 
the point of view of a moral and political model that takes individuals seriously and that, 
simultaneously, responds to one specific and central problem of the criminal law today.  
More concretely, my aim is to re-articulate the criminal law in a way consistent with values 
and principles of classical liberalism to minimise the predicament of overcriminalization.  It is 
the problem of overcriminalization that draws our attention in this chapter. 
Focusing on this specific problem is not arbitrary.  It is not the case that 
overcriminalization is only one among other predicaments faced by our systems of criminal 
law.  As we will see, the problem of overcriminalization is at the base of most of the 
difficulties faced by these systems; it permits strengthening the penal state by transforming 
and expanding the way in which criminal statutes are constructed and used.  In doing so, the 
criminal law becomes an almost limitless instance of state coercion that permits the 
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unprincipled criminalization of conduct.  These considerations are enough to make the 
problem of overcriminalization a central target of any liberal theory of the penal law. 
This chapter is divided into four main sections.  The first one introduces a 
preliminary definition of overcriminalization.  The second moves on to consider five different 
forms or instances of overcriminalization.  Sections three and four consider a series of 
problems that these instances of overcriminalization produce and that explain why this 
phenomenon should be a central target for theorists of the penal law. 
 
1 .  What is  Overcriminalization? 
At first glance, the notion of overcriminalization seems to be self-evident: it indicates the 
unprincipled extension of the practice of criminalizing conduct.  Although this 
understanding is surely correct, when considered more carefully, the term turns out to be 
more complex than we may think.  Indeed, the diversity of issues to which theorists and 
practitioners attach the label of overcriminalization suggests that the precise meaning and 
use of the term is more problematic and blurry than it may at first seem. 
To illustrate, consider the following two accounts of overcriminalization.  Erik Luna 
has argued that a definition of overcriminalization should include (1) untenable offences, (2) 
superfluous statutes, (3) doctrines that overextend culpability, (4) crimes without 
jurisdictional authority, (5) grossly disproportionate punishments, (6) excessive or pretextual 
enforcement of petty violations (Luna 2005, p.717).  From this one can plausibly conclude 
that the phenomenon of overcriminalization covers most of the different stages of the 
criminal justice system, including jurisdictional and legislative matters, use of power by the 
police, proportionality of sentencing, and punishment.  Compare now Luna’s account with 
Geraldine S. Moohr’s much less ambitious definition: “a law overcriminalizes when the costs 
of treating conduct as a crime exceed the benefits of the new criminal law” (Moohr 2005, 
p.785).   
What links these two accounts is the fact that both rightly confine the question of 
overcriminalization to matters primarily related to the system of the criminal law (so, for 
example, overcriminalization is not about the overexpansion of non-penal coercive systems of 
control).  Moreover, both see overcriminalization as emerging from issues that go well 
beyond penal statutes themselves to include other stages of the criminal system.  Although 
Luna is more explicit about this last point, Moohr’s definition seems to suggest (or at least 
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does not deny) that the cost/benefit ratio of treating conduct as a crime is to be reckoned by 
taking into account spheres of law, and spheres perhaps even beyond the law, that are 
different from mere criminalization.  In other words, Moohr (and to some extent Luna) 
seems to contend that we cannot determine when overcriminalization occurs by looking at 
statutes only, so a wider outlook is required.  In turn, the most evident difference between 
these two approaches results from the different normative strategies backing each position: 
whilst Moohr’s account leans towards some version of consequentialism – defined in 
cost/benefit terms – Luna’s seems to be keener on defining overcriminalization on grounds of 
some intrinsic feature of this phenomenon (see Moohr 2005, pp. 785-787 and Luna 2005, 
pp.712-719). 
Independent of the differences and resemblances between these two accounts, what 
they illustrate is that overcriminalization is a complex multifaceted concept that involves 
different emphases and considerations.  In the absence of a standard and unequivocal 
understanding of this phenomenon, it is therefore necessary to advance an account of the 
precise way in which I will use the term throughout this thesis.  Without it, the apparent self-
evident nature of overcriminalization may make us confused when asking what exactly we 
ought to address in an attempt to reform a system characterised by overcriminalization. 
For our purposes, overcriminalization refers to the abuse of coercive power by the 
state through the enactment of criminal statutes.  Although this is a preliminary definition to 
be completed through the course of this chapter, it is sufficiently determinate to differentiate 
my use of overcriminalization from the two accounts briefly presented above.  Unlike Luna’s 
and Moohr’s, this account establishes that overcriminalization, irrespective of its 
consequences in other institutional spheres, is a phenomenon primarily and mainly related to 
the enacting of criminal laws.  According to my definition, and independent of the likely 
effects that overcriminalization may bring about in other spheres of the law, we do not need 
to look anywhere else but to penal statutes themselves to determine whether or not we are 
facing overcriminalization.  As I see it, overcriminalization is a phenomenon confined 
specifically to the type of criminal statutes that constitute that system.  This is to say that, 
although a system of the criminal law may be characterized by overcriminalization, this term 
is ultimately and more adequately predicated of individual statutes only.  Put bluntly, 
overcriminalization is a phenomenon that blocks a decent society from having the type of 
penal statutes it ought to have. 
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2.  Five Forms of  Overcriminalization 
In this section I consider five forms of penal statutes that, under certain circumstances, 
qualify as instances of overcriminalization.  The following analysis, then, does not pretend to 
be an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of overcriminalization; it merely 
directs our attention to some penal developments where we might discover 
overcriminalization. 
 
2.1 Overlapping Offences 
These offences are a type of statute that criminalizes conduct that has already been 
criminalized by a different statute within the same jurisdiction.  William Stuntz, focusing on 
the United States, has pointed to this phenomenon by saying that codes “are filled with 
overlapping crimes, such that a single criminal incident typically violates a half dozen or more 
prohibitions”  (Stuntz 2001, p.507).  As a matter of fact, this phenomenon is getting more 
common, since “[l]egislatures regularly add to criminal codes, but rarely substract from them” 
(ibid). 
The United States is especially prone to enacting overlapping offences given the 
federal nature of its legal structure.  As one commentator emphatically puts it:  
Dual federal-state criminal jurisdiction is now the rule rather than the exception.  
Federal law reaches at least some instances of each of  the following state 
offenses: theft, fraud, extortion, bribery, assault, domestic violence, robbery, 
murder, weapons offense and drug offenses.  In many instances, federal law 
overlaps almost completely with state law, as is the case with drugs offenses 
(Beale 1995, p.997-8.  Footnotes ommitted).  
Although this may appear as an obvious violation of basic principles of the rule of law, the 
fact is that coexistence of state and federal legislatures makes the creation of statutes that 
focus on the same act likely which, given a ‘dual sovereignty doctrine’ (see Rudstein 2004, 
pp.84-92), permits double prosecution without violating double jeopardy prohibitions (e.g., 
Heath v. Alabama (1985) and United States v. Lara (2004)).27 
                                                
27 In Heath, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of the dual sovereignty (sovereignty of the Federation 
and the states) precludes the double jeopardy clause of the First Amendment from prohibiting one state from 
prosecuting and punishing an individual for an act of which he had already been convicted and sentenced in 
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But overlapping offences are not only the result of a peculiar legal structure.  They 
can emerge in different legal contexts and traditions, irrespective of whether the system 
where they exist is federal.  Douglas Husak, for example, ventures that this proliferation 
sometimes takes place “because legislators appear to be unaware of the prohibitions that 
already exist in their jurisdictions”, so they blindly and constantly recriminalize without resort 
to preexistent statutes (Husak 2008, p.37).  However, and irrespective of this epistemic 
problem, it seems that overlapping offences are the product of something more than mere 
ignorance.  For example, on many occasions, overlapping offences relate to penal populism 
(see ch.1, sec.2.c).  Governments use criminalization in order to satisfy the demands of the 
public, particularly after some criminal conduct has received great public attention.  Since 
duplicating statutes generally renders sentences harsher, overlapping offences make the state 
more popular with those voters who desire tough-on-crime type of policies (see Stuntz 2001, 
p.509).  Moreover, the mere fact that the executive and the legislative are doing something 
against crime – proposing bills and enacting law – makes them appear as responsive to the 
expectations of the citizens affected by the wrongs of criminal conduct. 
Besides cases of double sovereignty and penal populism, other typical cases of 
overlapping offences occur due to the further specification of other existing penal statutes 
(this is common in gender or hate crimes – see chapter 7 for an example).  But overlapping 
offences are not reduced to these specific matters either.  To illustrate, consider the Joint 
Committee for the Draft Bribery Bill Law in the UK.  In its first report on the Bill – a bill 
which the members of the Committee “strongly support” (Joint Committee 2009, p.5) – the 
Committee explicitly states that “[t]he criminal law includes a wide range of offences that are 
likely to overlap with the proposed bribery offences under the draft Bill” (ibid, p.23).  The 
Committee, in effect, identifies at least five different sources of law that overlap with the Bill 
under consideration: the common law offence of misconduct in public office, the Theft and 
Fraud Acts, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000, the Representation 
of the People Act 1983 (which explicitly includes the offence of bribery), and the Honours 
(Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925.  Nevertheless, the existence of all these statutes regulating 
similar conduct did not stop the Committee from showing its strong support for the Bill. 
Overlapping offences, we must conclude, have various causes and apply to different 
contexts and purposes.  They are a pervasive source of overcriminalization. 
                                                
another state. In Lara, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that both an Indian Native American group and the 
United States could prosecute an Indian for the same acts that constituted crimes in both jurisdictions. 
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2.2. Ancillary Offences 
Ancillary offences represent a second instance of overcriminalization.  These offences  
are characterized by group activity or conduct leading up to, or involved 
generally in, the commission of substantive offenses, or they define as criminal, 
conduct practiced in the aftermath of a primary harm crime. Because they 
typically bear some kind of direct or indirect auxiliary relationship to the primary 
harm offenses, they are described here as ancillary crimes (Abrams 1989, p.2).   
The main function of ancillary offences is to facilitate the role of the prosecutorial part, 
especially when the offence of which these offences are ancillary is for some reason difficult to 
prosecute.  Consider the following case.  While escaping from the police, an illegal drugs 
trafficker, T, throws a bag with thousands of British pounds into the backyard of his 
neighbour, D.  D knows that T is part of a gang and suspects, but does not know, that this 
money corresponds to the proceeds of T’s illegal activities and the money corresponds to T’s 
illegal proceeds.28  After getting this money, D decides to travel to France so D exchanges 
this money into Euros, buys a Eurostar ticket and goes away.  T succeeds in escaping and the 
police decide to track the money they knew was in T’s house.  Their investigation 
demonstrates that D has seized T’s money.  On his return from France, D is charged.  
According to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c.29), the mere fact that D suspects that this 
is ‘dirty’ money makes D indictable.  According to the Act, D could be indicted for 
concealing, disguising, converting, transferring and removing criminal property from 
England (Home Office 2002, sec.327 (1.a-1.e)).  In addition, D could also be indicted for 
using, and having possession of criminal property (sec.329 (1.b and 1.c)), and for not 
disclosing his suspicions (sec.330). 
In this example, the core offence that the prosecution is interested in – illegal drugs 
trafficking – cannot be prosecuted and the existence of these ancillary offences in the Act 
(criminalizing conduct that would otherwise be innocent – e.g., exchanging money, buying a 
train ticket, going abroad) allows the prosecution to allege some success in tackling the core 
offence. 
Ancillary offences also fulfil other functions.  They help to increase sentences, since 
defendants can be charged, prosecuted and sentenced for more types of offences (see D’s 
                                                
28 In Regina v. Montila and others (2004), the House of Lords decided that a person could not be convicted for 
money laundering if, although believing that his transaction was an act of money laundering because the property 
dealt was the result of illegal proceedings, the property dealt was actually not the result of illegal proceedings. 
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situation in the case just considered).  They are also useful to consolidate plea bargain 
practices, since a person charged with multiple offences is more likely to plea guilty than if he 
were charged with only one offence.  For various reasons, reasons briefly presented in 
chapter 1, these developments are judged positively by the penal state and the governing-
through-crime strategy.  As a consequence, ancillary offences have become a well-cemented 
instance of overcriminalization in current penal legislation. 
 
2.3 Inchoate Offences  
Overcriminalization may obtain also in statutes that incorporate inchoate offences.  “An 
offence is inchoate”, Douglas Husak has succinctly put it, “if it proscribes conduct that does 
not cause harm on each and every occasion in which it is performed.  More precisely, some 
act-tokens of the act-type proscribed by an inchoate offense do not produce harm or evil”  
(Husak 2008, p.160).29 Thus, attempts, conspiracy, posession, reckless behaviour or 
incitement are conducts generally covered by inchoate offences and that, in some 
circumstances, may represent an instance of overcriminalization. 
Inchoate offences, as Husak’s account suggests, do not depend on the commision of 
the actus reus that the statute ultimately aims to avoid; rather, they derive from the notion of 
a given complete offence, and not from the completed offence itself.  For example, under the 
provisions of a statute that criminalizes attempts to murder, I may be criminally liable if, 
while waiting on the platform, I try to push someone towards the tube line to kill him, even if 
I do not kill him and even if I do not actually succeed in pushing him.30 
This type of offences posits interesting theoretical and practical questions related, for 
example, to what counts as an attempt.  For example, does an impossible attempt count as an 
attempt if, say, I try to push someone on the platform when it is impossible for me to do so 
successfully given that he is more than 100 feet away from where I am? Or, does it count as an 
attempt to try to kill that person by blowing at him or trusting in telepathy in the mistaken 
belief that these techniques are enough to cause him to fall onto the line?  Similarly for 
incitement: would it count as incitement to express privately racial biases that include the 
promotion of violence in front of a very suggestable child or adult?  In effect, a crucial part of 
                                                
29 The Modern Penal Code has put it less succinctly: Inchoate offences “have in common the fact that they deal with 
conduct that is designed to culminate in the commission of a substantive offense, but has failed in the discrete case 
to do so or has not yet achieved its culmination because there is something that the actor or another still must do” 
(American Law Institute 1985, p.293).  
30 I use this case as an illustration of an inchoate offence, not as an illustration of overcriminalization. 
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what makes these offences instances of overcriminalization (or not) depends on the answers 
we offer to these queries.31 
The role these offences have within a system of criminal law varies, but as happens 
with most cases of overcriminalization, one of their central purposes is to serve the interests 
of prosecutors in achieving a condemnatory sentence.  For example, when offences include 
inchoate features, prosecutors do not need to demonstrate the completion of the criminalized 
act, but only intent on part of the defendant.  Although the latter may seem more difficult to 
demonstrate than the former, the underdeterminacy of what counts as relevant intent 
facilitates the task of the prosecution.  In addition, and complementing the previous point, 
the role of prosecutors is helped by inchoate offences to the point that legislatures may 
sentence some types of attempts with the same harshness as consummated crimes.  
Consider, for instance, the Model Penal Code which establishes that “attempt, solicitation 
and conspiracy [all types of inchoate offence] are crimes of the same degree as the most 
serious offense that is attempted or solicited or is an object of conspiracy” (American Law 
Institute 1985, vol.2, p.484).32 
It has also been argued that the function of inchoate criminal offences is to express 
repudiation of those who defy the law, even when their defiance does not produce a tangible 
or substantive harm.  George Fletcher has pointed to this idea (which he does not embrace) 
and explained that, according to it, “[t]he purpose of the criminal law should be to protect the 
rights of orderly citizens by moving swiftly against those who reveal themselves as enemies of 
the legal order”  (Fletcher 1998, p.179).33 
A third way to consider the role of inchoate offences is by pointing to the existence of 
some basic element of human welfare that is not adequately protected by standard penal law 
(harm-centred penal law that is) and that, consequently, demands the creation of alternative 
penal devices.  This position is defended by Claire Finkelstein.  She argues that when 
someone “inflicts a risk harm on another damages that interest [i.e., the legitimate interest 
agents have in avoiding unwanted risks], thus lowering the victim’s baseline welfare.”  She 
contends “that risk harm is a form of harm that is independent of outcome harm, on the 
grounds that minimising one’s risk exposure is an element of an agent’s welfare”  (Finkelstein 
                                                
31 As an illustration of the theoretical complexity involved in inchoate offences, see Antony Duff’s taxonomy of 
endangerment offences (an example of inchoate offences) in Duff 2005.  Examples of endangerment offences are 
careless driving, selling a gunfire to the mentally unstable, causing an explosion that put people’s lives at risk, 
carrying a grenade in a public space.       
32 For a position critical to this doctrine in the criminal law see Kadish 1994. 
33 Note that this language is reminiscent of penal populism and enemy penal law, as presented in ch.1. 
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2003, p.966).  According to this account, risk-of-harm inchoate offences are necessary to 
protect what standard harm-centred penal law fails to protect. 
Independent of the fact that there is something to Finkelstein’s proposal, whether or 
not laws of risk (or laws of orderly citizen protection, or any other type of inchoate offences) 
represent an instance of overcriminalization depends on the normative account of the 
criminal law and its functions.  Therefore, before concluding whether a specific inchoate 
offence is an instance of overcriminalization, we need to consider the details of that 
normative account.  That is what I offer in subsequent chapters.  In any case, and this is my 
point here, independent of what our best normative models establish, inchoate offences do 
represent a fertile ground for the improper expansion of the criminal law. 
 
2.4 Vicarious Liability Offences  
A fourth type of offence that may count as an instance of overcriminalization is vicarious 
liability offences. “We speak of vicarious liability when the law holds one person responsible 
for the misconduct of another, although he is himself free from personal blameworthiness or 
fault” (Fleming 1957, p.353).  As John Fleming’s definition suggests, vicarious liability offences 
have strict liability features, so that the prosecutor does not need to demonstrate fault on the 
side of the defendant, thereby leaving the state of mind of the latter in a secondary, 
sometimes irrelevant, place. 
The origins of vicarious liability are in non-penal areas of the law.  Indeed, it is most 
commonly applied in civil cases (see Leigh 1982, pp.11-26 and Fleming 1957, ch.17).  To 
illustrate with a recent and groundbreaking civil case: in Majrowski v. Guy's and St Thomas' 
NHS Trust (2006), the House of Lords unanimously dismissed an appeal by endorsing 
vicarious liability principles.  According to Lord Nicholls’ opinion in the case, “employers are 
to be held liable for wrongs committed by their employees in the course of their employment” 
(Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Trust (2006) §9).  Thus, given its non-penal 
genealogy and general application, it is helpful to begin an account of penal vicarious liability 
by resorting to its non-penal rationale.  Consider the following passage by Fleming:  
a person who employs others to advance his own economic interest should in 
fairness be placed under a corresponding liability for losses incurred in the 
course of the enterprise, that the master is better able to compensate the 
accident victim than the less pecunious employee, and that the rule advances the 
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policy of wide distribution of tort losses among that section of the public which 
benefits from the enterprise, the employer being the most suitable channel for 
passing on the loss through liability insurance and higher prices (Fleming 1957, 
p.354). 
Thus, the basic rationale of vicarious liability is to facilitate and make fairer the enforcement 
of some types of civil legislation by permitting an easier transfer of resources in the form of 
compensations. 
Despite its non-penal origin and general application, vicarious liability has found a 
place in penal statutes.  Examples of this are its use in corporate criminal liability34 and in the 
English Education Act 1996.  The latter establishes that “failure to secure regular attendance 
at school of registered pupil” is an offence (Education Act 1996, s.444), so responsibility is 
attributed to the defendant for the misconduct of another and independent of fault on the 
defendant.  Whereas in the civil sphere compensation is the aim of vicarious liability, within 
the criminal sphere this type of offence results in the facilitation of conviction.  By leaving 
fault as a secondary and non-necessary element of liability, vicarious criminal liability offences 
permit prosecuting and convicting agents simply for their link (loosely understood) with a 
wrong that is deemed criminal.   
This expansion of liability is well illustrated in a United States act of 2003, finally 
defeated by Congress.35  The so-called Clean-Up Act established that: 
[w]hoever, for a commercial purpose, knowingly promotes any rave, dance, 
music, or other entertainment event, that takes place under circumstances 
where the promoter knows or reasonably ought to know that a controlled 
substance will be used or distributed in violation of Federal law or the law of the 
place where the event is held, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, 
or imprisoned for not more than 9 years  (House of Representatives 834 (2003), 
s.305). 
                                                
34 For a general critical analysis of contemporary corporate criminal liability see Khanna 1996. See also The Queen v. 
Great North of England Railway Co. (1846) and State v. Morris and Essex Railroad Co. (1852) for landmark 
cases of prosecutions of private corporations.  For the historical development of corporate criminal liability see 
Bernard 1984.   
35 Husak mentions this act in 2008, p.43, but he confuses it with the Rave Act. 
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Thus, according to this act, the organisers of most (if not all!) rave parties should be 
prosecuted only because they know, or ought to know, that people use drugs during those 
events. 
As these examples show, vicarious criminal liability serves as a handy tool to impose 
coercive measures even if (a) the relevant causal agent of the wrong is not liable (e.g., 
children, the mentally ill) or (b) the principal agent in the criminalized action cannot be 
successfully prosecuted and convicted.  As with inchoate offences, whether or not an instance 
of vicarious criminal liability represents an instance of overcriminalization depends on the 
function and normative account of the criminal law.  However, independent of what that 
normative model establishes, it is clear that vicarious criminal liability represents a favourable 
development for the expansion of the criminal law in the form of overcriminalization. 
 
2.5 Jurisdictionally Mistaken Offences 
The last type of offence I shall consider here is what I call jurisdictionally mistaken offences.36  
This type of offences treats as a criminal offence what should either be a civil offence or not 
an offence at all.  This type of mistake connects neatly with what Jonathan Schonsheck has 
called a ‘topographic error’ (Schonsheck 1994).  This error, he says, “is committed when one, 
for example, assumes that showing ‘action a is not in the Sphere of Individual Liberty’ is 
indeed sufficient to prove ‘the state may criminalize (or private citizens interfere with) action 
a’” (Schonsheck 1994, p.16).  Part of the troublesomeness of these offences is that they emerge 
as a result of this ungrounded assumption and support the expansion of the criminal law into 
areas that should be beyond its jurisdiction. 
Examples of this type of offences are statutes that criminalize conduct that, all things 
equal, we cannot reasonable justify as being part of the business of the criminal law.  
Consider the hypothetical criminalization of the act of moving the king three spaces while 
playing chess, the (unfortunately less hypothetical) criminalization of same-sex sexual 
intercourse, or the criminalization of beliefs.  These cases are jurisdictionally mistaken 
offences because they criminalize conduct that is not part of what the criminal law should 
criminalize or of what the law should regulate at all.  Respectively, these actions pertain to 
                                                
36 This is a sympathetic label, as it is not clear that these developments are really mistakes, but rather intentional 
strategies within the penal state. 
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the spheres of the rules of chess, personal morality, and individual conscience, all of which are 
prima facie beyond the proper jurisdiction of the criminal law.37 
To illustrate jurisdictionally mistaken offences consider Anti-Social Behaviour 
Orders (ASBOs), civil orders that include a series of features characteristic of the criminal 
law.38  One commentator, when referring to these orders, has said that they are “the civil 
proceedings with the most severe potential consequences for the liberty of the defendant, 
consequences which will usually have punitive effect”  (Ramsay 2006, p.38 fn.42).  This claim, 
suggesting the mingling of the civil and the criminal, can hardly count as an exaggeration.  
The process for an order can be made on conviction in criminal proceedings (in a 
magistrates’ court or the Crown Court).  In those circumstances, “an agency concerned in the 
case, such as the police, may propose prohibitions or the court may draw them up of its own 
volition” (Home Office 2006, p.30).  The defendant’s fate is then left to the will of these 
agencies, whose prohibitions can include curfews, restriction of movement, restriction of 
action, and restriction of possession for at least two years (which is the minimum duration of 
an order). 
In addition, the Home Office has argued that agencies should be able to take action 
“before the anti-social behaviour takes place rather than waiting for a crime to be committed” 
(Home Office 2006, p.31).  Thus, 
If faced with a defendant who causes criminal damage by spraying graffiti, then 
the order should be aimed at facilitating action to be taken to prevent graffiti 
spraying by him before it takes place.  For example, the prohibition could 
prevent the offender from being in possession of a can of spray paint in a public 
space […]. This makes it clear to the defendant that he has lost the right to carry 
such a can for the duration of the order  (Home Office 2006, p.31).  
The consequence of this recommendation by the Home Office is that were the defendant 
carrying a can on the street within the following two years of the prohibition, he would be 
committing a criminal offence which is arrestable, recordable and ultimately, punishable.  
Insofar as they permit the criminalization of trifles, ASBOs, have features that plausibly 
count as jurisdictional mistakes.  Yet, the Home Office advises that these breaches be taken 
                                                
37 I am only stipulating these conclusions here by resorting to what I take to be well-grounded intuitions.  A 
principled argument grounding these claims is what I develop in part II of this thesis. 
38 These orders were introduced by section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
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seriously, so they recommend that “[a]gencies and courts should not treat the breach of an 
order as just a minor offence” (Home Office 2006, p.48).39 
What this example ultimately aims to show is how certain type of legislation lead to 
the intrusion of criminal elements into civil law spheres and of the criminal into areas of 
behaviour that should have nothing to do with penal commands and procedures.  When it 
takes place, such an intromission represents a case of mistaken jurisdiction and, thereby, an 
instance of overcriminalization. 
It is worth adding some brief remarks in concluding this section.  First, this analysis 
should not be seen as presenting an exhaustive picture of all possible instances of 
overcriminalization.  The five instances considered are certainly the most salient and 
pervasive forms of overcriminalization in present penal legislation, but we must be alert to 
other possible developments in the criminal law that could produce new forms of 
overcriminalization (preventive penal justice comes to my mind as an apt example). 
Second, it is worth noting that these types of offences do not necessarily exclude each 
other, so statutes may be hybrids.  For example, according to the English Knives Act 1997, it 
is an offence to market a knife while indicating that it is suitable for combat (s.1.1.a).  This 
offence is certainly an inchoate, ancillary and, under certain circumstances, a vicarious and 
jurisdictionally mistaken offence.  Similar conclusions can be derived from my examples of 
ASBOs and the Clean Up Act. 
Finally, I would like to re-emphasise that whether a given offence falls within one or 
many of the particular labels above is, on many occasions, a contestable matter.  In effect, 
some of the examples and conclusions provided may look too quick (see fn.37 above).  
Someone may reasonably object, for example, that there are circumstances in which the 
criminalization of beliefs and/or their expression do form part of the business of the criminal 
law and that, therefore, a statute criminalizing the expression of certain beliefs does not 
represent a jurisdictionally mistaken offence (Holocaust denial criminal laws come to mind as 
an apt example).  I do not deny that these are difficult and contestable matters.  However, 
and to make sure that I am not begging any question, I would like to recall that the aim of 
this section has only been to illustrate the sort of cases that may count as instances of 
                                                
39 Of course, what is criminalized in this example is not carrying the can of paint, but breaching the Order and, it may 
plausibly be argued that breaching judicial orders is something that is legitimately to do with the criminal law.  I 
cannot disagree, and that is why my language on this matter is rather qualified.  I am not claiming that any ASBO 
represents an instance of overcriminalization but rather that some elements of these Orders are prone to produce 
or contribute to overcriminalization. 
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overcriminalization.  Whether the examples are apt and convincing is a different matter that 
should be resolved in the following chapters.  It is only then that an argument is offered 
about the limits of criminalization.  
 
3 .  The Problems of  Overcriminalization 
In presenting five different forms of overcriminalization, the previous section has hinted at 
some of the elements that make overcriminalization worrisome.  This section further expands 
on these elements by considering a series of problematic consequences that may follow from 
this phenomenon.40 
 
3.1 Too Much Punishment 
Douglas Husak, in a recent important contribution to the question of overcriminalization, 
has argued “that overcriminalization is objectionable mainly because it produces too much 
punishment”  (Husak 2008, p.3).  He makes a convincing case for the connection between the 
expansion of the criminal law and the expansion of the infliction of punishment.  In order to 
cement this connection, he argues, one needs to look at the other stages of the criminal law 
process.  Hence, Husak focuses on those bodies “where power really is allocated in our 
criminal justice system today” (Husak 2008, p.21), namely the police and prosecutors.  The 
bottom line is that the powers these bodies enjoy are largely discretionary, and it is this 
discretion in the use of power which allows too much law to produce too much punishment 
(see Husak 2008, pp.21-32). 
For this argument to have adequate explanatory power one should establish, apart 
from showing the connection between too much criminal law and too much punishment, 
why and how the excessive application of punishment is objectionable.  This is not 
something I am going to do here.41 For our purposes it will suffice to say that punishment is 
the most coercive practice of social control in the modern state.  Under normal conditions – 
conditions different from those of the imposition of punishment – restricting freedom of 
movement, taking away civil, political and moral rights, terminating the life of an individual 
                                                
40 The following analysis – with the exception of the discussion of the normative problem in section 4 – draws heavily 
on other authors identified in the text. 
41 There is a massive literature on punishment and the moral problems it involves that discusses this issue.  See for 
example Duff and Garland 1994, Matravers 2000, Honderich 2006. 
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(in short, all those things that the state may do to those whom it convicts of criminal offences) 
represent a serious violation of people’s rights and dignity.  Then, if the practice of 
punishment is excessive – beyond the baseline defined by our best normative model – the 
practice itself becomes deeply objectionable and in need of urgent reform. 
 
3.2 Unequal Treatment 
A second problem emerging from the phenomenon of overcriminalization is that it may 
involve unequal treatment for similar cases.  If we combine, for example, overlapping 
offences (each of which has an associated penalty) and the existence of great levels of 
discretion on the side of the prosecutorial and judicial bodies, the result is, as one 
commentator has put it, that sentencing becomes “the rough equivalent of a penal lottery, 
where a few unlucky individuals ‘win’ a far harsher term than their fellows”  (Beale 2005, 
p.766).  Similarly, if we add to the existence of overlapping offences the enforcement of 
ancillary offences, we may end up with a state of affairs in which offenders can hardly know 
their fate before the prosecutors and court conclude their business.  To a large extent, it is up 
to these bodies to decide what is the crime that a given defendant has committed, even if that 
defendant has performed the same type of conduct as a different (and perhaps already 
punished) defendant. 
 Consider the New Jersey Comprehensive Drug Reform Act 0f 1986.  This Act 
mandated more severe sentences for those convicted of drug crimes committed within 1,000 
feet of school property.42 Under this Act, Theresa Ogar was convicted with possession with 
intent to distribute heroin.  What it is striking is that the acts for which she was convicted 
occurred while visiting an inmate at a county jail that happened to be less than 1,000 feet 
from school property (State v. Ogar (1989)).  This Act – an example of an inchoate offence – 
allows unequal treatment because it permits that a different defendant that commits the same 
type of action as Ogar – intent to distribute drugs – receives a more lenient sentence only 
because his action did not happen within 1,000 feet of school property.             
Unequal treatment for similar cases is an objectionable practice.  It is not only that it 
makes a system of law unpredictable, but that it makes it something seriously different to 
what the modern institution of law is meant to be.  At this point, it may be worth recalling 
                                                
42 The Assembly Bill No 2762/Senate Bill No 1866, passed in December 2009, amended this Act and established 
that the court may waive or reduce the minimum mandatory sentences for this type of offence. 
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the original rationale of the codification of our legal systems.  As J.M. Kelly put it, when the 
French Code civil came into force at the very beginning of the XIXth century “[t]he leading 
idea [was] to exclude uncertainty and arbitrariness in the administration of law, and for that 
purpose [the French codifiers] wished to reduce as far as possible the interpretative and 
creative function of judges, which they distrusted” (Kelly 1992, p.312).  Predictability, 
regularity, and clarity are all core features of what we generally understand by and take to be 
the law.  Indeed, they are at the very heart of the principle of ‘legality’ (see, for example, Fuller 
1969).  If the criminal law, where individuals are subject to coercion and condemnation by 
the state, is not characterised by these central features and, instead, we conclude that “the 
ultimately important influences in the decisions of any judge are the most obscure, and are 
the least easily discoverable [...]” (Frank 2009, p.123), then it is fair to say that something has 
gone seriously wrong with this institution.43 
 
3.3 Undermining of the Rule of Law 
Closely connected to this last worry is the idea that overcriminalization undermines the ideal 
of the rule of law.  To this respect, let us focus on two general principles of the rule of law: 
1. The state can coerce its members only through the enforcement of known, limited 
and certain laws. 
2. Law should apply equally to all. 
Consider the three components of the first principle (the knowledge, limitation, and certainty 
clauses).  On pain of violating the knowledge clause, the rule of law supposes that laws are 
not to be retrospective.  Similarly, laws should respect, and then not interfere in, certain 
private spheres of people’s lives; when the law is permitted to extend itself to cover any sphere 
of social reality, the limitation clause is infringed.  In turn, the certainty clause supposes that 
what results from following (or not) the law is the possibility of reasonably predicting the way 
in which the state and others will behave.  The object of the law, it has been argued, “is 
uniformity of action, so that one member of the society may know how, in certain 
circumstances, another is likely to behave […]” (Wade 1941, p.185).  Uncertain laws do not 
make reasonable  predictability possible and, thereby, violate the certainty clause that ought 
to shape the law. 
                                                
43 Of course, American legal realist à la Frank would not find this lack of predictability and certainty as problematic 
as I suggest here. 
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Consider now the second principle.  In this respect, I believe Friederich Hayek’s 
account is particularly insightful: “The ideal of equality of the law is aimed at equally 
improving the chances of yet unknown people but incompatible with benefiting or harming 
known persons in a predictable manner”  (Hayek 2009, p. 184).  Thus, the central idea of this 
principle is to limit arbitrariness and partiality and permit the equal enjoyment of the benefits 
that the law provides.  A law that, for example, is designed to favour some individuals and 
disadvantage others is, thus, a law that clearly contravenes this principle. 
Overcriminalization damages these principles in various ways.  A system of law that 
is left to the wishes of certain particular bodies is, as suggested above, one of the most 
obvious ways in which this damage takes place.  But there are others.  Consider 
jurisdictionally mistaken offences, in particular those that borrow elements from criminal 
standards and procedures to shape other branches of the law.  In these cases it looks as if 
legislators, in order to achieve governmental aims, make use of whatever means are available, 
regardless of whether this use trespasses on, and blurs, important distinctions between 
criminal and civil procedures and fails to pay proper attention to the limits of the law.  This 
strategy represents a violation of the limitation clause and, possibly, of the principles of 
certainty and equality that ought to govern a system of norms guided by the rule of law. 
Frederic W. Maitland provides a nice example of these problems when criticising 
the English Camera Stellata.  The Star Chamber, Maitland says, “was a court of politicians 
enforcing a policy, not a court of judges administering the law”  (Maitland 1948, p.263).  The 
Chamber, with its secret sessions, abuse of power, and unaccountable procedures, is an 
example of a court of law dedicated to the interests of a faction and not to the rightful 
application of the law.  Maitland’s critique of the Chamber correctly suggests (indirectly 
reminding us of the dangers of the penal state) that honouring the rule of law involves 
separating our partial interests from our commitment to the law, where the law is 
constructed as a principled system of rules.44 
Furthermore, when legislators create superfluous statutes (either in the form of 
overlapping offences or statutes that criminalize conduct that should not be the business of 
the criminal law at all), they contribute to the perception of the law as lacking in importance 
and dignity.  In the face of those who have an obligation to obey the law, this may amount to 
the weakening of the law’s authoritative power.  If we consider that the rule of law will only 
                                                
44 There is much to be unpacked in this last claim, which I cannot do here.  Instead, I simply refer to another passage 
by Hayek that, I think, illuminates this matter: “The rule of law is therefore not a rule of the law, but a rule 
concerning what the law ought to be, a meta-legal doctrine or a political ideal” (Hayek 2009, p.181). 
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remain in place if legislators and individuals subject to the law see it as a genuine source of 
authoritative binding commands, this weakening of the law’s authority is a serious problem. 
Finally, the overexpansion and unprincipled multiplication of the criminal law 
overcomplicates the system and makes it look as if it is something to be deciphered, as 
opposed to something to be clearly grasped.  The layman – and the criminal lawyer – may 
become subject of a criminal law that he does not know (and, even if he did know, could not 
be sure to understand), with the frightening result that he may become a criminal without 
even knowing it.  The knowledge and the certainty clauses of the rule of law are clearly 
violated by this aspect of overcriminalization. 
 
3.4 Waste of Resources 
A last consequence of overcriminalization I shall very briefly mention here relates to the 
waste of resources it involves.  The effective enforcement of the criminal law 
(overcriminalized or not) requires spending an extraordinary amount of time, money and 
infrastructure.  For example, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, prison 
expenditure in 2001 was U$ 29,5 billion, and the operating costs of state prisons per inmate 
averaged U$ 22,650  (U.S. Department of Justice 2004, pp.2-3). 
Of course, the state must spend important resources on the criminal law system.  
However, this does not mean that we should not criticize the fact that an overcriminalized 
criminal law forces the state to direct to this system more resources than it ought, only 
because the system cannot cope with its own unprincipled, unfair and unjustified nature.  In 
addition, an overcriminalized system demands not only more resources but also, given 
circumstances of scarcity, takes resources that could be allocated to other institutions and 
policies (e.g., health or education).  Although discussing the percentage of the state’s total 
resources that should be allocated in the criminal system is an empirical question that goes 
well beyond my purposes here, it is clear that transferring more resources to a system that 
faces the serious difficulties we have considered is problematic and must be questioned. 
  
4.  The Normative Problem of  Overcriminalization 
The previous section considered four different worrisome consequences of 
overcriminalization.  In this last section I shall address at length another problem that, unlike 
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the ones just discussed, inheres within the phenomenon of overcriminalization.  This 
problem, which I dub the normative problem of overcriminalization, distinguishes itself from 
those considered above in that the wrongness that it represents does not emerge as a 
consequence of overcriminalization, but is rather inherent in it. 
As a way to illustrate this distinction, consider two examples.  First, the idea “that 
overcriminalization is objectionable mainly because it produces too much punishment” 
(Husak 2008, p.3).  This is to say that, other things equal, were overcriminalization not to 
produce too much punishment, the case against overcriminalization would be undermined.  
Although under current circumstances, as is well explained by Husak (Husak 2008, ch.1), it 
is all too likely that overcriminalization does produce too much punishment, this is 
nevertheless a contingent claim.   
Second, consider the claim that overcriminalization undermines the rule of law.  In 
order for this to happen, overcriminalized statutes have to produce, for example, an 
unintelligible law, a law that is to be deciphered and whose effects cannot be anticipated by 
citizens.  However, this is another contingent claim, since we can surely think of an instance 
of overcriminalization that does not undermine the rule of law in the ways here considered.  
For example, think of a case of overlapping offences in which statutes A and B criminalize φ.  
There is nothing in this fact that requires that the overlapping prohibition of φ by both A and 
B is something unintelligible, undecipherable or unanticipatable.  Moreover, there is no 
conceptual connection either between the fact that A and B criminalize φ and the fact that 
this would suppose treating unequally two persons charged for φ.  I am not denying that 
overlapping offences do undermine the rule of law, but rather arguing that it is not necessary 
that they do so.  If this is correct, then the case against overcriminalization is the result of a 
contextual analysis that considers – and mainly focuses on – what overcriminalization brings 
about rather than on what overcriminalization is. 
This conclusion is problematic.  A critique of overcriminalization should not be left 
grounded only on the regrettable results it may (very likely) produce.  These negative 
consequences are of course important and any explanation of overcriminalization should 
consider them.  However, I think overcriminalization is not wrong or regrettable only for the 
bad consequences it brings about.  There is something inherently wrong about this 
phenomenon, and it is that wrongness – not fully captured by the difficulties considered in 
the previous section – that I shall now discuss. 
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The argument proceeds in different steps and it is important to lay them out from the 
outset.  The first two sections present the two elements that, in combination, explain the 
normative problem of overcriminalization.  Thus section 4.1 establishes that the penal law is 
a system of norms that provides reasons for action.  Following Joseph Raz’s influential 
account, I specify this claim by the idea that the penal law provides exclusionary practical 
reasons, that is, second-order reasons not to act on the balance of reasons.  I then move to 
section 4.2 to establish the second premise of my argument, that there is a jurisdictional limit 
that establishes the legitimate use of the criminal law.  Once it is defined, this limit represents 
what I call a penal jurisdiction, as opposed to a non-penal jurisdiction and a non-legal 
jurisdiction. 
The combination of these elements allows me to define in section 4.3 the normative 
problem of overcriminalization as the abuse of the exclusionary reason-giving power of the 
state through the criminal law.  In other words, overcriminalization leads to the provision of 
reasons for action by the criminal law where it should not provide them.  As I shall argue, the 
normative problem so described, and unlike the other problems of overcriminalization 
considered in the previous section, is capable of depicting the wrongness of 
overcriminalization without resorting to any contingent consequence of this phenomenon.  If 
we are going to make the most powerful case we can against this regrettable current feature 
of the criminal law, this development ought to count favourably.  
 
4.1 The Penal Law, Exclusionary Reasons, and the Service Conception 
The following account borrows – and takes for granted – a key claim in the literature on 
practical reasons and the normativity of law, namely, that the law provides reasons for 
actions.  Although I am going to offer a brief explanation of what I mean by this, I am not 
going to discuss and defend this claim, and I am going to assume it to be correct.  This may 
come as a surprise, mainly because the debate on the normativity of law, and on this claim in 
particular, is very much alive.  How could one seriously take for granted something that is in 
the middle of a serious, difficult and widespread controversy?  However, as will become 
clear, my account does not pretend to be an account of the normativity of law, but rather the 
basis of an explanation of the inherent wrongness of overcriminalization.  That said, and if 
this explanation does not suffice, I would be happy to qualify my argument and formulate my 
account in conditional terms: if the law provides reasons for action, then overcriminalization 
creates the normative problem I present here.  Let us begin by explaining the antecedent. 
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A way to explain the normative power of the law is by resorting to the idea that it 
provides reasons for actions.  This idea supposes that the law is a fact that influences our 
practical reasoning so, other things equal, a law prohibiting C is a reason for – that is, 
something that counts in favour of – not C-ing.  Now, there is of course a series of questions 
to be asked here mainly about what exactly it means to provide practical reasons and how it is 
possible that practical reasons can be the product of a fact.  In other words, a crucial question 
here is about the normativity of law: how it is that legal rules are norms that bind people. 
As I have said, this is not the place to sketch a theory of the normativity of law or of 
legal and political obligation.  Instead, and whatever one’s prefered theory on these matters, I 
shall assume that it is plausible to contend that the law, and more specifically the penal law, 
provides reasons for actions.  The specific details of the origin of this reason-providing 
capacity, the extent to which these reasons bind people, and the issue of whether the law 
creates new reasons or simply reactivates reasons that exist independently of the law, are 
different questions that do not concern us here. 
In any case, despite avoiding these questions on the normativity of law, I shall say a 
bit more about the nature of those reasons that the law provides.  I have already suggested 
that they are practical reasons but, are they practical reasons of a special kind?  Consider the 
following case: after learning that my best friend has become ill, I have acquired a reason for 
action: my knowledge that my friend has become ill counts in favour of, say, visiting him this 
afternoon.  However, although both the illness of my friend and the law are facts that provide 
reasons for action, each of these facts surely provide reasons of a different nature.  In the 
account I endorse here, the crucial difference between the reasons that these facts provide 
lies in the normative role that these reasons serve. 
When I get to know the fact that my friend is ill, that fact counts in favour of visiting 
him.  However, although that fact provides a reason, it does not provide a conclusive reason 
for action.  For example, in addition of knowing that my friend is ill, I may come to know 
other facts, like that his illness is very contagious or that if I visit him I will miss my favourite 
TV show.  These facts count as reasons against visiting my friend.  What one does in cases 
like this is to consider the reasons that may count in favour and against visiting my friend and 
make a decision on the balance of these reasons.  If I act out of reasons, that is, if I act as a 
rational agent, then my final decision about whether or not to visit my friend will be the result 
of the balance of these reasons. 
 58 
The case of the reasons provided by the law is different.  Through the pre-emptive 
thesis, at the core of which is the notion of exclusionary reasons, Joseph Raz has influentially 
argued that it is not the case that the law is merely one amongst other reasons counting in 
favour (or against) an action C.  This thesis establishes that   
the fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its 
performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when 
assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them 
(Raz 1986, p.46). 
A directive commanded by a legal authority “is not only a reason for behaving as it directs, 
but also an exclusionary reason, that is, a reason for not following (i.e., not acting for) reasons 
that conflict with the rule” (Raz 2006, p.1022).45 An exclusionary reason, as Raz puts it in a 
different place, “is a second-order reason to refrain from acting for some reason” (Raz 1990, 
p.39.  Italics omitted).  Thus, in practical reasoning, the role of the reasons given by the law, 
unlike the role of the reason given by things like the illness of my friend, is not to add weight 
to one side of the balance when determining whether or not I should C.  The law, insofar as 
it gives exclusionary practical reasons, excludes first-order reasons that count against the 
directives of the second-order reason and thus render its reasons conclusive for action.46  
To illustrate this point: Peter may have good reasons to smoke in the cinema – he likes 
smoking, he prefers watching movies while enjoying a cigarette, and so on – but the existence 
of a legal command that prohibits smoking in public spaces should preclude Peter from 
acting on the balance of those reasons.  According to the pre-emptive thesis, the existence of 
a legal directive is a conclusive reason for action that excludes acting on the balance of other 
reasons. 
Of course, there are some conditions that need to be satisfied for these reasons to be 
both conclusive and legitimate.  Raz presents these conditions by resorting to what he calls 
the service conception of authority, that is, the view that the role and primary normal 
function of authorities – including the authority of the law – is to serve the governed (see Raz 
1986, p.56).  The service conception establishes that two theses or conditions need to be met 
                                                
45 In some places Raz considers a wider scope of excluded reasons, so that not only reasons that conflict with the rule 
are excluded, but other first-order reasons that “the authority had power to pronounce” (Raz 1989, p.1194).  
46 But note that Raz allows that under certain circumstances these reasons may be defeated.  This is the result of his 
understanding of authority in terms of the service conception and its conformity to the normal justification thesis.  
See, for example, Raz 1986, p.46-7 and 2009, ch.2.  For a different argument explaining the circumstances in 
which the reasons provided by the criminal law may be defeated, see Horder 2000.   
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to ground the legitimacy of the law.  The first one is  “that the subject would better conform 
to reasons that apply to him anyway (that is, to reasons other than the directives of the 
authority) if he intends to be guided by the authority’s directives than if he does not.”  This is 
the normal justification thesis.  The second condition is “that the matters regarding which 
the first condition is met are such that with respect to them it is better to conform to reason 
than to decide for oneself, unaided by authority.”  This is the independence condition (Raz 
2006, p.1014).47 
From all of this it is possible to conclude that between an authority and the subject of 
that authority there ought to exist a particular relationship.  The point of this relationship is 
to make the subject of the authority likely better to comply with reasons that apply to her 
independently.  A disruption in this relationship means that the law does not serve the 
individual; this damages the legitimacy of the law and puts its authoritative status at stake.  
Such is the core of the service conception of authority that I endorse.48  
 
4.2 Penal Jurisdiction 
After having established the exclusionary reason-giving capacity of the law, and before 
moving on to the normative problem of overcriminalization, it is necessary to consider the 
existence of a jurisdiction distinguishable from both non-penal and a non-legal jurisdictions.  
We need to identify the existence of a penal jurisdiction. 
The jurisdiction of a branch X of a system of law refers to those areas of human 
conduct, relationships, and fields of action, within which X is legitimately to exercise its 
normative power.  The plausibility of the existence of a penal jurisdiction (as opposed to civil 
and non-penal jurisdictions) becomes evident by simply reflecting on the existence of wrongs 
that are civil and wrongs that are criminal.  The fact that certain wrongs belong to a certain 
sphere of the law rather than other suggests that the different branches of the law are to be 
understood as having specific content and procedures different from the content and 
                                                
47 Raz establishes other conditions that need to be met, like knowability.  For the purposes of my argument I am 
interested in the service conception only and, therefore, I only refer to the normal justification thesis and the 
independence condition without reference to other principles and conditions. 
48 Raz, of course, expands this thesis and builds up from it much more than what I need to do here.  If I am right, one 
can adopt Raz’s conception of exlusionary reasons without having to accept, for example, that there is no prima 
facie obligation to obey the law (see Raz 2009, ch.12 int.al.).  Contrary to Raz’s understanding, I believe that there 
are occassions in which we have an obligation to obey a law ordering X primarily because the order X is 
commanded by the law.  Inter alia, Raz objects to this idea in Raz 2006, p. 1022. For our purposes, this simplified 
explanation of the reason-providing role of the law suffices to make my point regarding the normative problem of 
overcriminalization. 
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procedures of other areas of the law: that is, as having a determinate authoritative 
jurisdiction distinct from other legal jurisdictions.  Put bluntly, this points to the truism that 
civil wrongs are not crimes, and that the criminal law has authority over the latter and not 
over the former.  In other words, the jurisdiction of an institution like the penal law is the 
sphere in which this institution enjoys the authority to regulate courses of actions, practices 
and other arrangements. 
It needs to be noted that my claim here is not about how or why a penal jurisdiction 
originates (and it is not about whether this jurisdiction is legitimate or justified either).  My 
point is only about the existence of this jurisdiction.  Indeed, the proper justificatory details of 
the penal jurisdiction is the central theme of following chapters, and I am not going to refer 
to them here.  Those details are not necessary at this point because what I aim at in this 
section is simply to assert that the notion of a penal law jurisdiction is intelligible.  
Independent of the difficulties and uncertainties we may have about the content, limits and 
origin of these jurisdictions, what matters for our purposes is that the idea of a penal 
jurisdiction is coherent and its existence has material effects in the way humans conduct 
themselves and their relationships. 
 
4.3 The Normative Problem 
We are finally in a position to account for the normative problem.  This problem arises from 
the combination of the two claims considered in the previous sections, that is, that the law 
provides exclusionary reasons for action (sec.4.1) and that there is a penal jurisdiction 
(sec.4.2).  Constructed this way, the normative problem of overcriminalization can be defined 
as the provision of penal reasons (that is, exclusionary reasons provided by the criminal law) 
in jurisdictions in which those reasons should not be provided.  In other words, 
overcriminalization is the provision of wrong or mistaken reasons for action. 
The provision of wrong exclusionary reasons may certainly have worrisome 
consequences, like those considered when looking at the other problems of 
overcriminalization in section 3.  However, my claim is that the value of the normative 
problem of overcriminalization lies in its capacity to explain why overcriminalization is to be 
resisted even if none of these pernicious consequences occurs.  I shall argue that to provide 
exclusionary penal reasons for action when and where they should not be provided is 
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something that agents and institutions ought to avoid, even if no further undesired 
consequence follows from it. 
To illustrate, consider some (more or less) hypothetical cases in which we can 
intuitively conclude that the criminal law provides the wrong type of reasons for action.  
Imagine that the final score of the World Cup final were decided by the criminal law, so, on 
pain of being prosecuted, players had to play in such a way as to satisfy the penal reasons for 
finishing the game with a specific score; or think of a criminal law that, on pain of 
prosecution, regulates the appropriate length of citizens’ hair or the kind of sexual practices 
in which individuals may engage.   These are cases where the penal law provides wrong or 
mistaken reasons for action, in the sense that it provides reasons in jurisdictions in which ex 
hypothesi those reasons should not apply.49 
As I have said, the exclusionary character of the reasons provided by the penal law to 
officials and the layperson alike makes the normative problem of overcriminalization a serious 
one.  The reasons that the criminal law provides do not simply tip the balance of reasons for 
action to one or another side; they exclude reasoning on grounds other than those they 
provide.  If to these considerations we add the specificity of the criminal law considered in 
chapter 1 and become aware that this institution provides reasons to officials to coerce and 
condemn people in the name of the citizens of the polity, the provision of wrong or mistaken 
reasons by the penal law gains extraordinary urgency.  Given the specificity of the penal law, 
providing wrong exclusionary practical reasons for action such that, if the agent ignores the 
reasons then he is liable to be coerced and condemned by others in the name of the members 
of the polity is not only inadequate, but it should count as a substantive wrong independent 
of its consequences.  Let us consider this claim in some further detail. 
 
The Normative Problem and the Specificity of the Criminal Law 
The claim I would like to defend is that, vis-à-vis the normative problem, overcriminalization 
destabilises the criminal law.  The normative problem threatens the very existence of this 
institution by – to use Scanlon’s expression quoted in chapter 150– impairing the type of 
relationship that ought to exist between an authoritative penal institution and its subjects.  
                                                
49 This is only a prima facie judgement grounded in what I take to be, as I said, well-grounded intuitions about the 
limits of the criminal law (my case on sexual behaviour may be more debatable).  A principled conclusion of the 
wrongness of these penal reasons is developed in parts II and III.  At this point I am not offering the material 
limits of the criminal law but establishing the existence of these limits and that trespassing them is wrong. 
50 And consistent with Raz’s account of the service conception of authority presented above. 
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As I argued in chapter 1, the relationship between the criminal law and those who are bound 
by its commands is determined by the specificity of this institution (its coercive, 
condemnatory, and public nature).  When this specificity is destabilised, as it happens when 
there is overcriminalization, the claim to authority of the criminal law is undermined.     
The first element of the specificity of the criminal law is its coercive nature (see sec. 
1.1).  Following Nozick’s model, we saw that coercion is threatening an individual with some 
consequences if she does φ.  This threat, in turn, gives the threatened individual reasons to 
not-φ.  In the light of the normative problem, overcriminalization is the provision of wrong 
exclusionary reasons within a scheme of coercion.  Ultimately, this amounts to illegitimate 
coercion.  Threatening someone with consequences that do not rightly relate to the action 
commanded represents an impairment of the type of relationship that ought to exist between 
a coercive authoritative reason-providing institution and its subjects.51 Under these 
circumstances, the criminal law moves away from the ‘service’ role that it ought to perform: in 
circumstances of overcriminalization, the subject of the law does not comply better with 
reasons that apply to him independently of the law (see sec.4.1 above).  When the criminal 
law falls short of serving the individual, the relationship that ought to exist between the two 
is impaired because the law becomes a bare system of oppression.  Overcriminalization, thus 
considered, undermines the law’s claim to be an authoritative institution, as well as the 
respect the individual should have towards the law. 
Overcriminalization also represents a serious normative problem from the point of 
view of the condemnatory nature of the criminal law (see ch.1 sec.1.2).  Acts of legitimate 
penal condemnation – the expression of condemnatory attitudes from the state to the 
offender in the name of the whole polity – are the result of a certain type of relationship 
between a past wrong and a present act of condemnation.  The past wrong gives the 
prosecution and courts – and, ultimately, the members of the whole polity – reasons to 
condemn those who violate the criminal law.  In the face of the normative problem, people 
are condemned for actions that do not warrant condemnation as a response by the state.  In 
other words, overcriminalization means that the criminal law claims to provide reasons to 
condemn people when, and/or in circumstances in which penal condemnation is not the 
adequate response.  When an instance of overcriminalization takes place, the criminal law 
becomes a system of unprincipled imposition of condemnatory power over the individual. 
                                                
51 This relationship, as considered in section 4.1, is articulated by the two different theses constituting Raz’s service 
conception of authority (the normal justification thesis and the independence condition). 
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Finally, overcriminalization destabilises the public dimension of the criminal law.  In 
chapter 1 section 1.3, I argued that the different stages of the criminal process are undertaken 
in the name of the whole polity.  This claim is grounded in the idea that crimes are a type of 
public wrong that disrupt a public good of the relevant type.  Under circumstances of 
overcriminalization, the criminal law provides reasons that either represent the interests of 
only a faction of society (so the penal law does not protect a public good) or address a public 
good of a non-relevant type (so the penal law protects a type of good not relevant to the penal 
law).  By providing exclusionary reasons when it ought not to do so, the overcriminalization 
impaires the relationship that ought to exist between individuals and the criminal law. 
The wrongness that inheres in the phenomenon of overcriminalization negatively 
effects each of the three elements of specificity that constitutes the criminal law.  If this is 
correct, overcriminalization, by providing reasons when it should not do so, puts at stake the 
very nature of the penal law even when the lamentable consequences that are likely to follow 
from this phenomenon do not take place.  This inappropriate use of reasons may be a less 
compelling argument for reforming the penal law than the idea that overlapping offences 
may be too costly or may impose too much punishment upon individuals (cf. sec.2.1).  
However, my argument here has not been about the most shocking consequence of 
overcriminalization, but about what is problematic with overcriminalization itself. 
 
5 .  Conclusion 
This chapter has developed at length the problem of overcriminalization – the abuse of the 
coercive power of the state through the enactment of criminal statutes – one of the most 
serious difficulties currently experienced by the criminal law.  As discussed in section 2, it 
adopts a variety of forms each of which is problematic.  In order to illustrate these problems, 
section 3 considered different worries generally associated with the phenomenon of 
overcriminalization.  Without denying that these difficulties emerge as a result of this 
phenomenon, I moved to present in section 4 what I called the normative problem of 
overcriminalization.  I take this to be a necessary step in making a stronger case against 
overcriminalization.  Unlike the other difficulties considered, the normative problem explains 
why overcriminalization is to be resisted even if none of its pernicious consequences follow. 
This chapter concludes the first part of the thesis.   Chapters 1 and 2 have set the 
scene of our object of study and presented in some detail the difficulties that the criminal law 
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faces today, with special emphasis on the problem of overcriminalization.  Up to this point, 
the analysis of the difficulties to be amended in the penal law system has appealed, in general, 
to what I take to be broadly shared intuitions.  When referring to the limits of the penal law, I 
have also appealed to these intuitions as if they were the touchstone of the criminal law we 
ought to have.  In order to ground an account of the criminal law that is capable of 
minimising the problem of overcriminalization we need to leave these intuitions and direct 
our analysis towards a different and more controversial arena, one in which an account of the 
free society and the basic interests of individuals coexisting in that society is presented and 
defended.  From these elements, the normative limits of a liberal criminal law will emerge.  
















Society and the Criminal Law 
 
In the words of Tony Honoré, “[t]he first question in descriptive legal theory is [...] not 'What 
is a rule?' but 'What is a group?'” (Honoré 1987, p.33).  This complements H.L.A. Hart’s 
influential understanding of the rules that concern the law as social rules ultimately grounded 
in social facts and conventions (Hart 1961).  Behind these reflections is the thought that the 
existence of a social group is a necessary and perhaps sufficient condition for the existence of 
rules, and that rules emerge, exist and command only within groups.52  A corollary of this idea 
is that to be part of a group is to be bound by certain rules that constitute that group.  
Indeed, a glance at any group we may belong to shows that a characteristic aspect of what it 
is to be a full member of that group is to be committed to the rules held by that group.   
These thoughts are important for the task of this chapter because they shed light on 
a central claim advanced in chapter 1, that is, that reforming the criminal law system demands 
reconsidering not only the penal law itself, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, our 
understanding of society, the state, and the institutions in which this system exists.  
Consequently, and as I mentioned in the conclusion of chapter 2, to adequately ground the 
normative limits of the penal law we need an account of society and the state from which the 
function and limits of the criminal law will emerge in a precise and principled manner.  If all 
this is correct, then, before engaging in the task of presenting a model of the criminal law that 
may overcome or minimise the present predicaments of that system we must advance an 
account of society and the state from which we can derive a normatively defensible account of 
the criminal law.  This chapter begins this task. 
The chapter is divided into three parts.  The first addresses and elaborates on the 
idea that a social group is an association of two or more individuals engaged in a common 
activity and that rules are a function of these associations.  This analysis prepares the ground 
for my account of the state and its institutions in chapter 4.  The second part illustrates the 
general idea that rules are a function of social groups through a discussion of Antony Duff’s 
prominent model of the criminal law; a model in which the connection between rules and 
social groups is particularly visible.  The last part of the chapter raises doubts about Duff’s 
                                                
52  Of course, in saying this I am not considering the laws of nature or the laws of the gods. 
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model and suggests that, if we are going to succeed in minimising overcriminalization, a 
different account of society is needed.     
 
1 .  Social  Groups 
1.1 Social Groups: A General Account 
The introduction to this chapter suggested that the penal law is a function of social groups.  
My reference to the notion of social group needs some preliminary clarification.  In part, this 
is because there are endless varieties of groups.  In a sense, we could make groups out of 
anything, simply by stipulating that such and such set of entities form a group.  For example, 
I could say that all the things on my desk, regardless of how different they are from one 
another, form a group; namely, the group of things on my desk.  But I could also stretch the 
understanding of groups further by saying that the lamp on my desk, the book I left this 
morning in the library and the car parked right now outside on my street form a group, 
namely, the groups of things I have right now in my mind.  There is nothing that makes this 
group nonsensical.  However, the groups that concern us here are of a more specific type, 
they are social groups.  What differentiates a group like the group of things on my desk from 
a social group is that the former lacks the specific type of relationship that the latter has.  I 
shall call this characteristic relationship a social relationship. 
A chess society is an example of a social group, as is an academic department in a 
university, a family, the British Army, or an entire society.  All these are social groups insofar 
as the individuals who constitute these groups are linked or related to each other by some 
type of bond.  Although interconnectedness is necessary to characterise any group, it is not 
sufficient to characterise a social group.  If Peter goes to drink coffee at the local coffee house 
and he sits next to a stranger so that both Peter and the stranger are in a situation in which 
they are somehow connected (both are in the local coffee shop drinking coffee), it would be 
inadequate to say that by virtue of being in the local coffee shop they form a social group.  
Instead, and according to the understanding of social groups that I endorse here, Peter and 
the stranger would form a social group if (i) they are in a coffee shop to, for example, 
participate in a literary group, and it is common knowledge between them that (ii) they are in 
the coffee shop to participate in a literary group and that (iii) they know what it is to 
participate in the literary group of that coffee shop.  More formally, social groups entail: 
(i) A shared enterprise; 
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(ii) The common knowledge of this enterprise (Peter knows that the stranger 
knows what the enterprise is and vice versa and both know that they share 
this knowledge). 
And 
(iii) The common knowledge of the means and procedures to pursue the ends of 
the enterprise (Peter knows that the stranger knows how things are to take 
place within the practice of the reading group and vice versa and both know 
that they share this knowledge). 
Some things need to be noted in relation to this specification of social groups.  My condition 
(i) requires that a social group entails a shared enterprise.  This is a fairly undemanding 
condition that only refers to the existence of a shared practice, (such as attending a literary 
group).  Thus, a shared enterprise does not involve sharing ends or reasons for engaging in 
the common enterprise, but only sharing the practices and procedures characteristic of the 
enterprise under consideration.  For example, Peter may take part in the reading group as a 
means to the end of socialising, whereas the stranger may do the same in order to achieve the 
end of learning about literature.  In the absence of other conditions, there is nothing in this 
example that should make us conclude that Peter and the stranger do not satisfy condition 
(i), even if their reasons for engaging in the practice differ. 
It is also worth noting that these criteria of social groups do not have an absolute 
character.  They are rather present in any social group as a matter of degree, and the 
cohesiveness of the social group is contingent on the degree to which these factors hold.  
This qualification undermines the plausible worry that the epistemic demands of my account 
(ii and iii) are excessive.  Thus, we may have closely tight groups where shared 
understandings and knowledge of the appropriate means to pursue the communal purpose 
are so clear that there is hardly any need of further discussion about how to do things within 
the group (perhaps an experienced orchestra of classical music is an example of this type of 
group).  And we may also have groups that are rather disunited so, for example, under 
certain circumstances it is not clear what the purposes of the group as a whole are and, 
consequently, there is uncertainty about the appropriate means available to the group (think 
of the members of a group facing the consequences of an unforeseen catastrophe: should they 
help each other? Should they save their leaders first? Should they comply with their ordinary 
obligations or adopt a state of emergency?).  What this tells us is that although a collection of 
individuals is a social group if and only if they satisfy some factual and epistemic condition, 
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the depth and realisation of these factors may vary without necessarily affecting the social 
character of the group.   
Finally, it is important to note that for our purposes the three features considered 
above are the necessary and sufficient conditions of a minimally plausible social group.  This 
characterisation of social groups may seem striking, mainly because it allows the inclusion of 
a very large number of entities under the ‘social group’ label.  Indeed, I have already given the 
examples of a literary group and a chess club, and mentioned cases as varied as a family, an 
army and a whole society.  However, I do not take this to be problematic or misleading.  
Because the purpose of this section is to consider the elements that make an aggregate of 
individuals a social group, my account does not depend on the size of the aggregate of 
individuals, the importance this aggregate may have, or how transient it is.  Those are not 
elements that I take to be necessary to a general understanding of social groups.  Instead, I 
have emphasised the idea that a common enterprise plus certain epistemic factors are 
necessary and sufficient for constituting a social group.   
In what follows, and drawing from the work of the social philosopher Margaret 
Gilbert, I shall further articulate this account by translating it into the idea that the mark of 
any social group is that those individuals that constitute it are engaged in a joint activity: to 
take part in a social group is to do something with others. 
 
1.2 Social Groups as Doing Things Together 
Margaret Gilbert has contributed to our understanding of social groups by developing the 
idea of social groups as a form of collective action in pursuit of a shared goal.  She illustrates 
this understanding of social groups by considering the following example: James and Paula 
go out for a stroll between their house and a park.  Their going together means that “it is 
‘common knowledge’ between them that they are out on a walk together” (Gilbert 2006, p.103 
fn.14).  Shared knowledge, and not spatial proximity or the number of participants engaged 
in the activity, is the first necessary condition of doing something together.53 
                                                
53 It is true that going together for a walk in the park is an activity that supposes spatial proximity.  However, this is 
different from asserting that a condition of any social group is spatial proximity.  In the example, proximity is 
necessary because of the nature of walking together, not because of the nature of doing something together. If we 
decided to emphasise proximity as the mark of doing something together, we could not explain many joint 
enterprises that do not involve spatial proximity.  For example, how could we explain that the parents of a family 
are doing something together when she goes to work abroad in order to assure the well-being of their children 
while he is at home looking after the children?  Or how could we make sense of the idea of a Christian community 
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Their walking together also means that both Paula and James have a special 
standing with respect to one another so that Paula can make demands on James and rebuke 
him if he fails, and vice versa.  This is the second necessary condition of joint activities.  If 
James walks fast and outpaces Paula, then she has the standing to ask him to walk more 
slowly.  If Paula suddenly changes direction and instead of heading to the park heads to the 
library, then James has the standing to question Paula's behaviour.  Both know that they can 
make demands and/or rebuke each other because they both know that they are walking 
together.  The standing of the participants of a joint activity (i.e., the standing of the 
members of a social group) is a function of doing something together, so the standing that 
emerges from walking together is both specific to those taking part in the walk (to Paula and 
James and not to those who are walking to the park in proximity to James and Paula) and 
distinctive of the specific circumstances of the joint activity (the circumstances under which 
Paula and James have gone out for a walk). 
Let us consider in further detail some central aspects of this account.  First, the 
common description reached ex ante by the participants of the joint activity is crucial in 
determining what exactly they are doing together and, therefore, in determining the standing 
participants have within the joint activity.  To illustrate this point, imagine that when James 
invites Paula to go out for a walk she responds: ‘yeah, I want to go, although I know I was 
supposed to be somewhere else today.  I just cannot remember’.  To this James replies, ‘no 
problem, if on the way you remember what it is, you can just go’.  Under those circumstances, 
the joint activity of walking together should be specified including the clause that Paula may 
have to leave without further ado.  Both know that they are walking together in 
circumstances in which Paula may have to end the joint activity without further explanations 
and both know that each has agreed to accept that Paula may put an end to the activity in 
case she remembers what she has to do. 
Second, in examining the conditions of joint activities and social groups, Gilbert’s 
central aim is to offer ground to her account of associative political obligations.  Thus, it is 
natural that her account ends up suggesting that joint activities and the standing they create 
in its participants give us reasons to believe that doing things together creates some kind of 
rights and obligations (2006, p.105).  I do not want to make much more of that claim here, 
but the central point seems clear: to do something together, as we do as members of a social 
                                                
working together in one and all encompassing opus all over the world?  Irrespective of the lack of spatial 
proximity, these are examples of people doing something together, namely, looking after the well-being of their 
children or working for the kingdom of god on earth. 
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group, gives rise to a particular standing in each member of the group that establishes the 
extent to which each of them can legitimately demand and rebuke other members of the 
group for what they do – insofar as what they do relates to the relevant joint activity.  This 
posits the idea that joint activities are common enterprises constituted by normative 
relationships among the participant individuals.54 
Third, an important feature of the standing held by the individuals that participate in 
a joint activity is the concurrence condition.  According to this condition, no one within a 
joint activity is in a position to decide unilaterally on the specific forms and details of the 
undertaken activity (Gilbert 2006, pp.106-15).  The other parties need to concur in order to 
settle these details.  Thus, if James wants to take a shortcut on the way to the park by walking 
through the parking lot and James and Paula are walking together, then Paula’s agreement is 
necessary.  Were Paula not to concur to James' suggestion, and he carries on with his new 
plan, they would not be walking together any more, all else being equal.  The details of the 
concurrence condition are the results of the specific standing acquired by those participating 
in a joint activity.  This, in turn, is a function of the common description of the joint activity.  
Gilbert puts it clearly:  “Absent special background understandings, any given party, A, has 
an obligation to any other party, B, to obtain B's concurrence in any new determination of 
the details of the joint activity” (Gilbert 2006, p.114).  Thus, joint activities give each 
participant some standing to concur, demand and rebuke each other’s determinations 
(determinations that are relevant to the joint activity), constrained by the existence of 
background understandings (i.e., shared understandings that specify the procedures 
accepted within the activity).  The legitimacy of any determination within a joint activity 
depends on the extent to which this structure is respected. 
Drawing from these different aspects of Gilbert’s account here considered, we are 
now in a position to specify further the three necessary and sufficient elements of social 
groups presented in the previous section. 
 A social group is:  
(i) A joint activity undertaken by two or more individuals; 
                                                
54 I must emphasise that I am using Margaret Gilbert’s account of social groups for specific purposes.  Thus, it 
should not be assumed that my account is committed to associative political obligations.  I borrow from her 
account because I find it suggestive of what is a correct description of social groups, but not (necessarily) of 
political obligations.  In effect, and as it will become clear, some elements of my own proposal are importantly 
different from what a supporter of associative political obligations would accept (in chapter 4 I will take more 
explicit distance from Gilbert’s model, particularly on the way I understand the concurrence on exit condition, a 
corollary of the concurrence condition considered in this paragraph). 
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(ii) Who have common knowledge of both (a) the common description of the 
activity and (b) the fact that, absent background understandings, no one is in 
a position to decide the details and more specific practices of the activity 
unilaterally. 
And (i) and (ii), in turn, gives rise to: 
(iii) A specific standing among the participants of the joint activity so that each of 
them can demand and rebuke other members according to the common 
description of the joint activity; 
(iv) The common knowledge of this standing. 
At the outset of the chapter, following Honoré and Hart, I said that rules are a function of 
groups.  The subsequent analysis has explained this claim by establishing the features of 
social groups and the way in which a certain standing among participants originate within 
social groups.  Following Gilbert, I have claimed that the standing among the members of a 
joint activity involves obligations and entitlements against others about the way things are to 
be done within the joint activity.  These obligations amount to a rule that exists within the 
group and that is to be respected by members of that group.  Put simply, rules are 
prescriptions that emerge within a joint activity, things that we ought to do and are expected 
to do when we relate to others in a social group.  They are a function of social groups.  
 
2. Criminal  Law and Society  
My intention in this chapter is not simply to focus on the general relationship between social 
groups and rules, but on the more specific type of connection that exist between society – a 
social group made up of a multitude of individuals – and the law (more specifically, the 
criminal law).  Influential recent philosophical accounts of the criminal law explicitly reflect 
this connection between rules and social groups.  These accounts not only describe the 
criminal law – a type of rule – as a function of society – a type of social group – but they go 
further and ground their normative claims in considerations of what a society is and should 
be.  In what follows I focus on some aspects of the work of Antony Duff in order to provide a 
telling illustration of the way in which this connection between the criminal law and society 
has been considered. 
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2.1 Antony Duff and Liberal-Communitarianism  
Since the publication of Trials & Punishments in 1986, Antony Duff has become, for good 
reasons, one of the most influential philosophers of the criminal law today.  The scope of his 
work is large and varied, and includes deep and original insight on matters covering most of 
the spectrum of the criminal law; from the nature of the criminal act, responsibility and 
liability to the very function of most of the different stages of the penal system.  For the 
purposes of this section, I focus on his understanding of community and its role in the 
construction of a theory of the criminal law. 
From the outset I should emphasise that, as opposed to a comprehensive analysis 
and assessment of his work, my aim is to establish how a given conception of society drives 
the analysis to some specific conclusions about the type of criminal law we should have.  In 
this sense, the present section does not try to be a critical account of what Duff has to say 
about society, but rather an illustration of how particular constructions of society commit us 
to specific conclusions about the criminal institutions we should have. 
One of the opening chapters of Punishment, Communication, and Community is 
devoted to articulating the conception of state and society that underpins Duff's theory of 
punishment and, ultimately, of the criminal law (Duff 2001a, ch.2).  This account appeals to a 
particular conception of the political, which draws elements and values from both liberal and 
communitarian political theories.  Thus, given this overlapping of perspectives, Duff dubs 
the political account upon which his theory of the criminal law rests a version of liberal-
communitarianism. 
The position he advances is liberal to the extent that it insists on the moral standing 
and rights of individual agents.  The values of autonomy and privacy and a commitment to 
support the capacity of individuals to choose and pursue their good life also have a central 
place in the theory.  Besides, the state must be committed to neutrality, so that the individual 
is not coerced into a specific conception of the good.  In effect, this state accepts a plurality of 
values and goods, and although it may encourage certain types of lives (an autonomous life, 
for example), it must leave people free to determine their beliefs and ways of living. 
But Duff's position is also communitarian.  This becomes clear in his suggestion that 
members of the normative community, despite the existence of plurality, take the value of 
autonomy, freedom and privacy as shared goods, which amounts to saying that “they count as 
goods only insofar as they are shared” (Duff 2001a, p.54).  If we are to understand and 
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exercise autonomy we must understand it as something that we conceive and exercise in 
society and with our fellow members of the community.  The claim is not that I may have to 
surrender my individual interests and values in favour of the social good or the good of 
others.  Rather, the claim is that I cannot conceive of these values in purely individualistic 
terms; they are, in so far as they are values of a liberal community, communal values that we 
all share and understand as our values. 
This is a normative ideal community that is required to assess and criticise our 
existing communities and institutions.  Of course, the distance between 'is' and 'ought' 
cannot be such as to make our current communities and institutions unrecognisable, but it 
cannot be null either, as if our present condition fits neatly with our normative aspirations.  In 
this sense, what Duff is accounting for is a normative and recognisable ideal towards which 
our own social condition should hopefully progress through time.  In effect, Duff illustrates 
this ideal by means of a community that, most probably, is very familiar to the reader: an 
academic community (Duff 2001a, pp.42-8).  According to him this community – and any 
community for this matter – should satisfy at least two basic conditions.55 
First, it should involve a shared commitment of the members of this community to 
certain values.  For example, in the case of the academic community we can perhaps 
summarise these as the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge and understanding (Duff 
2001a, p.43).  Let us call this element the shared values condition.  These shared values shape 
the community and establish its goals and goods: the good of pursuing and achieving 
knowledge and understanding.  Although members of the community can understand both 
goods and values as instruments serving something external to the academic community, 
they cannot be seen uniquely in those terms.  They must also be taken as intrinsic goods 
internal to academia and endorsed by the members of the community qua members of the 
academic community.  They are shared goods that contribute to the shared internal aims of 
the community. 
Second, those who belong to the academic community must have a regard for one 
another as fellow members that is structured by the community's defining values.  Let us call 
this element the integrity condition.   According to it, the members of the community must 
be committed to the shared values of academia and finding their own good in the pursuit and 
                                                
55 As a matter of terminological clarification: social groups are a sub-class of groups, whereas a society, a community, 
or any joint activity that falls under the account I have offered in section 1, is a sub-class of social groups.  Thus, in 
my account, when Duff talks about a community, he is talking about a social group.  Although it will become 
more important in the next chapter, the difference between a society and a community makes no difference for my 
purposes here. 
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achievement of those values (Duff 2001a, p.43).  A corollary of this requirement is that people 
within the community must not only regard each other in a given manner, but treat each 
other in ways consistent with those defining values of the community.  If the pursuit of 
knowledge is an aim internal to the academic practice, then I must not hinder others from 
pursuing that very end, and, instead, I must be ready to facilitate and encourage them to gain 
the good of knowledge. 
Duff's conditions of an appropriate community overlap neatly with most of the 
conditions considered in my account of social group and joint activity above.  There is a 
particularly telling line in this respect: “members of a liberal polity constitute a community 
insofar as they aspire, and know that they aspire, to share the defining values of the 
community and to hold an appropriate regard for one another in the light of those values”  
(Duff 2001a, p.68).  Where Duff refers to shared values that determine the goals and goods of 
the community, I refer to common understandings of what we are doing together.  Where 
Duff points to the idea that within a community members must both regard each other as 
fellows and treat each other in accordance with the values that define the community, I point 
to both the standing of the participants in a joint activity and the concurrence condition that 
derives from that particular standing. 
I shall now illustrate how this understanding of community determines, at least to a 
significant extent, Duff’s normative theory of the criminal law.  To do so I shall focus on some 
of Duff's preconditions of liability. 
 
2.2 Duff on Preconditions of Criminal Liability 
Let me begin with a couple of preliminaries.  First, the conditions of a given practice 
establish the justification of an instance of the practice.  Thus, a condition of the practice of 
inflicting state punishment is the violation of a criminal statute and/or the culpability of the 
offender.  Hence, if someone is going to be subject of state punishment, she must, all else 
equal, have violated a criminal statute and/or be a culpable offender.  Besides these 
conditions, Duff identifies other types of conditions required to have a practice.  These are 
what Duff calls preconditions, which are “conditions of engaging in the practice at all [...] 
[and] which must be met if the [practice] is to be possible, or legitimate” (Duff 2001a, p.68. 
See also pp.179-97 and Duff 2003, p.246).  Whereas the conditions of punishment are to be 
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satisfied in order to justify a token of the practice, the preconditions of punishment are to be 
satisfied to justify the system of punishment itself.56  
Second, my decision to focus on some of the preconditions of criminal liability may 
require some brief justification.57  The main motivation behind this choice is that criminal 
liability should count as the most basic element of the whole criminal law system.  Markus 
Dubber has put this point clearly in saying that “[t]he criminal law […] comes down to a 
single, basic, question: who is liable for what?”  (Dubber 2002, p.5).  In accepting Dubber’s 
claim we must conclude that – on pain of not taking seriously what preconditions are – if we 
do not satisfy the preconditions of criminal liability we cancel the possibility of legitimate 
trials, sentences and punishment, and make normatively inconsequential prosecutions, 
criminal procedures and ultimately the substantive criminal law itself (why would we want to 
pass criminal law – with all its associated costs – if we are not going to be held liable for our 
actions?). 
A last preliminary: as Duff puts it, the preconditions of criminal liability that I will 
consider below “reflect the conception of political community on which [his] account of 
criminal punishment depends” (Duff, 2001a, p.181).  Thus, if a jurisdiction X is going to have 
authority over Peter, and therefore, if Peter is going to be criminally liable to jurisdiction X, 
then, “some idea of [Duff’s ideal normative] community might figure in this context.  For one 
account of the moral conditions of the obligation to obey the law, and of being answerable 
through the courts, is expressed in terms of community” (Duff 1998a, p.197).  For Duff, this 
means that Peter 
is obligated to obey the law in virtue of his membership of a community whose 
law it is; and he is answerable through the courts to his fellow members of the 
community for his alleged breaches of that law.  On this account, our questions 
are questions about the conditions for the existence, and for membership, of a 
community of the appropriate kind (Duff 1998a, p.197).   
                                                
56 It is clear that there is room for debate about where to draw the line separating a condition from a precondition.  
Duff himself is well aware of this and suggests that the consequences of this distinction and the manner in which 
we make it will depend on the context in which it is to be drawn.  However, this issue should not stop us from 
inquiring a bit further on the preconditions of the criminal law in the way Duff considers it.  See generally Duff 
1998a, and also Duff 2001a, p.220 fn.5. 
57 As I say, these are only some of the preconditions of criminal liability that Duff considers throughout his work.  
Other significant examples are the precondition of the responsible citizen and the precondition of mental fitness.  
The latter supposes that the defendant has the “capacities necessary to answer the charge that he faces or to 
understand and respond appropriately to conviction and punishment” (Duff, 2001a, p.181).  Whereas the former 
includes the fitness precondition, it is not reduced to it.  It also supposes that the defendant has an obligation to 
obey the law and the two other preconditions considered in the following paragraphs.  
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We must then note that, according to Duff, not only is the existence of the community a 
precondition for the legitimate functioning of the criminal law, but also, the existence of a 
community of the appropriate type.  When these requirements are not in place, the very 
possibility of the criminal law is undermined. 
 Bearing these preliminaries in mind, I now turn to two of Duff’s preconditions of 
criminal liability.  
 
The Standing Precondition 
One of the preconditions of criminal liability to which Duff devotes some time is the standing 
precondition.  According to this precondition the law and the courts that call someone to 
trial “must have the standing to call her to answer” (Duff 1998a, pp.195-6.  See also Duff 
2001a, p. 184).  This precondition raises a series of questions concerning the institutions to 
which the defendant is supposed to answer and what characteristics these institutions must 
have when she is put on trial.  However, the main and most serious challenge it poses is to 
the possibility of criminal justice in an unjust society.58 
In the way Duff describes it, the standing precondition appears to be a cluster of 
preconditions.  Indeed, when one closely considers Duff's work, one notices that he does not 
offer a unitary account of what this precondition involves.  At a minimum, this precondition 
of criminal liability requires authority and moral standing on the part of both penal 
institutions and those whom these institutions represent: “the court which tries the defendant 
must have the authority to call her to account [...] [and it must also have the] conditions [that] 
must be satisfied for a court, and those in whose name it speaks, to have the moral standing 
to call such a person to account” (Duff 1998a, p.196).  Thus, the justice and legitimacy of 
penal practices is a function of the justice and legitimacy of the penal system and, in turn, the 
justice and legitimacy of this system depends on the moral standing of the members of society 
in which that system operates. 
                                                
58 Theorists have coined the term ‘rotten social background’ (RSB) defence to make a point similar to Duff’s.  
Consider, for example, the analysis of Richard Delgado who defends the RSB defence and also claims “that 
society may lack the warrant to punish” defendants coming from deprived backgrounds (Delgado 1985, p.68).  
“Evidence of a rotten social background […] is relevant in criminal trials because with this evidence, society can 
acknowledge blamelesness where appropriate, and avoid punishing those it does not have the right to punish” 
(ibid, pp.74-5).  An evident and not minor difference between Duff and Delgado is that, for the latter, the social 
injustices that have caused, determined or simply influenced criminal behaviour are not preconditions of criminal 
liability but rather bars to convictions or excuses.  For Duff, in turn, the lack of moral standing is a bar to trial.  
For a good collection of articles addressing this issue see  Heffernan, W., & Kleinig, J. (Eds.) 2000. 
 78 
A rather unproblematic way to illustrate (an aspect of) the standing precondition is 
to consider the following case: an English court calls Ruth – a Chilean national – to account 
for her having stolen a bicycle in Chile 20 years ago.  All things being equal, the English 
court lacks the standing to demand an answer from Ruth, and Ruth has no obligation to 
answer for her conduct to this English court.  As Duff clearly puts it, “[t]he defendant is 
obligated to obey the law in virtue of [her] membership of a community whose law it is; and 
[she] is answerable through the courts to [her] fellow members of the community for [her] 
alleged breaches of that law” (Duff 1998a, p.197).  As a consequence, Ruth has nothing to 
answer to the English court because that court does not have the required standing to call 
Ruth to account (whether she has anything to answer to a Chilean court is, of course, a 
different matter). 
The importance of an account of the required standing of criminal courts must be 
granted.  Duff is right in pointing to this matter and considering the consequences that 
follow from it.  Since in the third part of this chapter I dwell longer on this precondition (at 
least on a particular aspect of this precondition, namely, the moral standing precondition), I 
shall simply underline how fundamental the conception of social group is in establishing the 
legitimacy of the penal practice: without a community that embraces and acts upon the 
particular requirements of the standing precondition the possibility of a just system of 
criminal law becomes unstable.  The justice and legitimacy of the criminal law is a function of 
the justice and legitimacy of society, its practices and broader institutions.  
 
Common Language Precondition 
A second precondition of liability is “that there be an appropriate language in which the 
defendant is called to answer” (Duff 1998a, p.197).  This precondition is particularly 
important within Duff's project.  Without it we can meet neither the shared values nor the 
integrity condition, and we cannot make sense of Duff's communicative approach (see Duff 
1986, 2001, int.al.).  For Duff, a common language is needed to treat others as members of the 
community, to know that one is being treated as such, and ultimately to fulfil the required 
communicative role of the criminal law (see Duff 2001a, pp.188-93).59 To the question of 
which and whose is this language, Duff says that it is the language of the law as practised by 
                                                
59 For a dramatic example of lack of common language, see United States ex rel. Negron v. State of New York 
(1970).   
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legal professionals.  As far as possible, this language must also be accessible to those who 
without being legal professionals are still involved in the penal process and its institutions.  
The language of the law, therefore, is a language whose meaning ought to be accessible to all 
responsible members of the community (see Duff 1998a, p.198 and 2001, p.189).   
At first sight, this does not look like a very demanding precondition.  To speak 
roughly the same language should not be that difficult.  After all, lawyers and judges 
communicate to the lay public and the public do more or less get the message.  However, 
when we enquire into the type of understanding demanded by this precondition the matter 
becomes more problematic.  According to Duff’s account, the required understanding goes 
beyond the comprehension of facts to a more fully normative understanding:  
the defendant must not merely be able to understand that she is said to have 
acted in some factually specifiable way, which the law defines as criminal.  She 
must be able to understand the claim that the alleged conduct constituted 
criminal wrongdoing. She must therefore be able to understand the values in 
the light of which her conduct allegedly counts as wrong  (Duff 1998a, p.198). 
Thus, this precondition appeals both to the existence of a common understanding of the 
wrongness of certain types of conduct and to the recognition of that wrongness in the 
conduct prosecuted by the penal law. 
On top of this requirement, Duff says that the defendant must be able to speak the 
language of the law in a non-detached manner, “to speak it in an authentically first person 
voice”; it must be possible for her to make “first personal, committed normative statements 
which express her own acceptance of the law and its values” (Duff 1998a, pp.198-9).  In a 
word, the language of the law – which in turn is a language embedded in the legal and 
political institutions of the community – must be her own language, a language with which 
she identifies herself and that, to a large extent, speaks in her name. 
As with the standing precondition, the language precondition depends on, and is 
determined by, a very specific conception of community.  To speak a normative language in a 
non-detached manner and share that language and manner of speaking it with others 
supposes a background of rich communal cohesiveness that is well depicted by the 
aspirational community that Duff offers.  In other words, the normative model of community 
considered by Duff demands these preconditions in order to justify the penal practice itself.  
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If that is the social group we should have, then these are (some) of the preconditions of 
criminal liability that the criminal law ought to satisfy. 
 
3 .  Raising Doubts:  The Case of  the Moral  Standing Precondition 
The first part of this chapter argued that the type of rules we (ought to) have derives from the 
way we understand and articulate social groups.  The second part illustrated this claim by 
considering how important our understanding of society is in the determination of the 
criminal law we (ought to) have.  I did so by considering Antony Duff’s conception of 
community and the way it determines the preconditions of criminal liability.  In this third 
part I want to move to a more critical terrain and cast doubts on the extent to which a model 
like Duff’s can help us overcome or minimise the present regrettable features of the criminal 
law considered in chapters 1 and 2. 
Although I recognise the importance of Duff’s discussion of the preconditions of 
criminal liability, as well as the coherence of his account, my intention is to engage in this 
critical analysis to establish further the importance of the search for an alternative account of 
society and the state that responds more adequately to the present condition of the criminal 
law.  This account – which I present in chapters 4 and 5 – is not only at odds with the model 
of community defended by Duff, but also has the capacity to minimise the problem of 
overcriminalization faced by the penal institutions; something that, I will argue, Duff’s model 
is not likely to do. 
 
3.1 The Moral Standing Precondition 
To undertake this critical task I shall focus on an aspect of the preconditions of criminal 
liability considered above; the moral standing precondition.  Before proceeding, a brief 
elaboration of this precondition is in order.  This precondition is a condition of social and 
political justice, which is undermined by the “extent to which people are excluded – 
politically, materially, normatively – from the community whose law it is, since they can be 
bound by the law only insofar as they are, and are treated as, members of that community” 
(Duff 2001a, p.183). 
What backs this precondition is the moral idea that “one's prior conduct towards 
another person can undercut one's right to make what would otherwise have been a 
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legitimate demand on them, or to enforce duties that are nonetheless still binding on them” 
(Duff 2003, p.251).  When we translate this moral ideal into the sphere of the criminal law we 
can conclude that, according to Duff, the moral standing of the institutions upon which the 
criminal law depends determines, to an important extent, the legitimacy of the functioning of 
the system of criminal law itself.  The thought is that if these institutions fare badly in how 
they address or have addressed the members of the jurisdiction – that is, if they treat or have 
treated its members in a morally inappropriate manner – then they lack legitimacy to 
undertake their practices.  When the state acts in morally pernicious ways, it loses its moral 
standing and, thus, lacks one of the preconditions for calling people to account for their 
actions. 
As I have suggested, the claim that I will defend is that we should reject moral 
standing as a precondition of the criminal law.  To some this may seem an extreme move.  It 
may be objected that to raise doubts about, or to undermine, the moral requirements implied 
by this precondition would mean that any court, at any time, under any circumstances, may 
have what is needed legitimately to call someone to answer for her criminal conduct.  Thus, it 
may be argued, my position makes legitimate the orders commanded by a court of a wicked 
state, even though the state policies have not minimally respected either those who the court 
holds answerable or the values that the law banning the conduct in question is supposed to 
defend.  Given that this seems to go too far, it is important to be precise in my claim.   
We must notice, first, that I am referring only to intra jurisdictional standing.  That 
is, to the moral standing of a jurisdiction to call to account those who are members of that 
jurisdiction.  Thus, extra jurisdictional cases like the example of Ruth being called to account 
for her conduct to a foreign court are not part of my analysis here.  And second, my analysis 
refers to circumstances different from those of a society short of a state of nature, moral 
horror and/or ‘catastrophic exceptions’ (see Nozick 1974, p.30, and Husak 1987, p.72 fn.5.  On 
‘catastrophe exceptions’ see Dworkin 1977, p.191 and Husak 1979, p.127).  There is little to 
argue in favour of the standing to call to account people of a state that produces or embodies 
moral horror.  Similarly, if the political circumstances of a state develop in such a way as to 
make it incapable of minimally assuring the survival of society and its individuals – something 
that would amount to the return to a state of nature – it seems implausible to maintain that 
there is a standing institution to which people owe obedience and to which they should 
answer for their conduct.  Under those circumstances one may sensibly claim – and perhaps 
one should claim – that individuals are not bound to the laws of the jurisdiction and that 
consequently they are not liable to that jurisdiction.  Paraphrasing Hart, in circumstances 
 82 
short of a state of nature, or under circumstances of moral horror, one may be obliged to obey 
the criminal law and/or respond to a criminal court, but one does not have an obligation to 
do so (Hart 1994, pp.22, 82).  Since I do not see how genuine obligations would emerge from 
circumstances of complete normative dislocation in which people are merely obliged to act, I 
have nothing to argue against Duff's position under any of these circumstances. 
Instead, I want to consider those circumstances in which we do have a general 
obligation to obey the laws of the state and its institutions but where certain unmet 
conditions (for example, some degree of social or political exclusion and injustice) may 
suggest that the standing of penal institutions has been undermined to the point that we do 
not have an obligation to account to those institutions for our criminal wrongs.  It is in this 
context (which is surely a familiar one) that I want to cast doubts on Duff's account of the 
moral standing precondition of criminal liability. 
 
3.2 Against Moral Standing as a Precondition of Criminal Liability  
In what follows I argue that we should not embrace the moral standing of our penal 
institutions as a precondition of calling people to account for their alleged criminal acts.  I 
defend this stance for two different reasons, and I consider them separately by referring to 
what I call the Non-Workability and the Moral Demandingness problems. 
1. The Non-Workability Problem: if we accept Duff's account of the moral standing 
precondition of liability one may plausibly conclude that under certain circumstances either 
no one is properly held to answer for their alleged criminal liability – because injustices affect 
everyone – or we do not know with respect to whom the courts lack standing – because we 
do not know enough about the effects and impacts of current injustices.  In short, at least on 
occasions, this precondition seems to be unworkable.  This, in effect, would be the 
conclusion that may emerge under present circumstances where social and political injustices 
are widespread and where most members of society are affected by some type of these 
injustices.60 
                                                
60 For a similar conclusion see Jeffrie Murphy’s “Marxism and Retribution”.  He claims: “the only morally defensible 
theory of punishment [namely retribution] is largely inapplicable in modern societies. The consequence: modern 
societies largely lack the moral right to punish. […] Institutions of punishment constitute what Bernard Harrison 
has called structural injustices and are, in the absence of a major social change, to be resisted by all who take 
human rights to be morally serious-i.e., regard them as genuine action guides and not merely as rhetorical devices 
which allow people to morally sanctify institutions which in fact can only be defended on grounds of social 
expediency” (Murphy 1973, pp.221-2). 
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This connects to an argument developed by Matt Matravers, which focuses on 
Duff's moral standing precondition of criminal liability and asks who is still standing to meet 
this precondition.  Matravers' conclusion is that the institutional standing precondition is an 
all or nothing matter that – contrary to what Duff seems to suggest – does and should remain 
in place in current social and political circumstances (i.e., the standing of institutions should 
be granted in circumstances with more or less widespread serious social and political 
injustice).  His answer lies importantly in two ideas: first, that we need to distinguish clearly 
individual from institutional standing  (Matravers 2006, p.325), and second, that under 
normal circumstances the moral standing of institutions can be compartmentalised, as it 
were, so that losing some standing in one area of the institution does not entail losing it in 
another (Matravers 2006, p.325-6).61  Thus, with respect to the first idea, a judge may well be 
a flawed human being in many ways, but that fact per se does not entail that the institution he 
represents does not have what it needs to call people to account.  And regarding the second 
point: the injustices that may be committed within, say, the distributive sphere do not entail 
that our penal institutions are equally tinted.  Retributive injustice does not necessarily derive 
from the fact of distributive injustice.62 
Matravers’ main critique is of the application or workability of Duff’s precondition.  
As he sees it, the point is not about the validity of the moral standing precondition itself, but 
about the way in which we can establish the limits of application of that precondition.  In 
other words, Duff’s specifications of what it is to lose moral standing are too loose.  In this 
sense, making the moral standing precondition workable depends on the possibility of 
drawing a clearer line that establishes what is sufficiently just from what is not.  Only then, 
when that line is established, can we attain workable criteria of application for what counts as 
a satisfactory moral standing. 
I think Matravers is right in pointing to these difficulties.  If the workability of the 
precondition is unstable, certain undesired things will follow in the area of criminalization 
and punishment.  These consequences have to do with the instability that would affect the 
criminal law, which ultimately represents a strong presumption against the application of the 
moral standing precondition in criminal liability.  The problem of workability is serious 
because it supposes that whether or not the preconditions are met is left undetermined and 
                                                
61 Duff considers this criticism but, in my opinion, he simply bypasses it by claiming that “we must ask how far the 
political community and its institutions have respected these values [those values in which the community may 
still have a standing] in their dealings with this person or the group or community to which he belongs” (Duff  
2001, p.187). 
62 For an illustration of this idea see Morse 2000. 
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open to partial – that is, non-neutral – interpretations.  In turn, this indeterminacy permits 
discretionary use of the criminal law which, as was seen in chapter 1 and 2, is a characteristic 
feature of a criminal law prone to the abuse of its coercive power.   The ultimate expression of 
this abuse is the emergence of instances of under and/or overcriminalization, as well as 
excessive and lenient punishments.  These are undesired possible outcomes of taking the 
moral standing as a criterion of legitimacy of the criminal law.  Consequently, given this 
uncertain workability, the moral standing criterion must be resisted.    
2. The Moral Demandingness Problem: although I endorse Matravers’ analysis, I 
believe the argument needs to be pushed a bit further to cast doubt not only on the 
workability of Duff's construction and application of the precondition, but on the moral 
standing precondition itself.  In other terms, I not only want to contest the use of the 
precondition, but also and more importantly, the idea that the moral standing of a given 
jurisdiction (and more generally, the values and commitments of the jurisdiction) should be a 
criterion to consider at all when establishing the preconditions of the criminal law. 
As I insisted in the first part of this chapter, the criminal law is a function of social 
groups.  In this respect, Duff’s model is not an exception.  In his account, the lack of standing 
of the criminal law to call to account members of the community is explained by an 
institutional and/or social break with the shared values that (should) characterise the 
community and its institutions.  This conception of community is characterised by the 
cohesion between the values and goods of the members of the community and its 
institutions.  On the one hand, this amounts to the requirement that there is a deeply unified 
community, where individuals embrace similar values and understand them in a fairly 
homogenous manner.  On the other hand, it amounts to demanding that the institutions of 
the community embrace those very values and transfer them into public policies in a way that 
reflects the understanding members of the community have of those same values (see the 
common language precondition above).  As I have suggested, this way of putting things is 
problematic.  In what follows I will argue that this is the case because a theory that relies on 
that conception of community falls short of adequately amending the criminal law vis-à-vis 
the problem of overcriminalization and, what it is worse, makes this institution prone to the 
abuse of its own coercive power. 
As we have seen, when the basic requirements of morality are met, Duff contends 
that penal institutions have, all else equal, what they need to call people to account.  If we 
accept this, then the question we need to answer is whose morality is the morality that is in 
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place?  Whose are those moral standards that would in principle permit the practice of 
calling people to account for their conduct?  Duff suggests an answer in different steps.  The 
first step is that to be answerable is to be answerable to someone or something, and in turn, I 
am answerable to that someone or something only if she/it has the standing to call me to 
account.  The second step is then to establish that in criminal matters we are generally 
answerable to a court, and that “[t]he law and the courts speak and act in the name of the 
political community.  They call a defendant to answer to the community for an offence 
against its public values as expressed, interpreted, and applied by its law”  (Duff, 2001, p.186). 
Thus, the values that need to be in place are the public values of the community.  If my 
reading of Duff is correct, then his answer to our question is that it is the morality of the 
community that needs to be in place for people to be legitimately called to account for their 
conduct. 
I take this to be an unsatisfactory answer for different reasons.  Let me begin with a 
familiar objection and combine it with a further problem that follows from it.  What we 
realise when looking out into our societies – as opposed to looking into an idealised society – 
is that communities are far from having the levels of cohesion suggested in the previous 
paragraph: members of these communities disagree about values, conceptions of the good, 
morality, principles of justice, and so on.63 Since modern societies are made up of a large 
cluster of views about how things should go, we must conclude that disagreement about 
what should count as the appropriate standing of the criminal law, and what should count as 
criminal law at all, is inevitable.  Furthermore, this is not to be taken as a circumstantial 
aspect of a free society, but as an integral part of it: diversity and disagreement are inherent 
aspects of the modern societies in which the criminal law exists.  Thus, to say that the moral 
standing is constituted and established by the morality of the community does not bring us 
far. 
A possible consequence of taking seriously the combination of the fact of diversity 
and disagreement and the existence of genuine obligations to obey the law is that some 
members of the political community may not be bound to the criminal law, even if we treat 
them as if they were bound to these laws.  This is the case because, according to Duff, the 
criminal law is the criminal law of the community and of its members in whose name the law 
speaks (recall the shared values and the integrity conditions above).  This means that the 
                                                
63 Nicola Lacey expresses similar concerns when she says that “[i]n the context of pluralistic modern societies, 
contemporary theories of punishment which seek to strengthen the moral case for punishment by emphasising its 
role as a form of communication among members of a political society [...] raise intractable questions about who 
or what constitutes the body with the authority to punish” (Lacey 1999, p.153). 
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criminal law is to reflect – in its practices and institutions – the values of the individuals that 
make up the community and that are bound to its laws.  By extension, individuals are 
supposed to speak the normative language of the criminal law in “first-person, committed 
normative statements that express their own acceptance of the law and its values” (Duff 
2001a, p.190).  However, given circumstances of diversity and disagreement, some people – 
those who cannot speak in that first-person normative language – are surely going to be left 
at some point, to some extent, and with more or less intensity, out of the legitimate scope of 
the criminal law. 
My worry on this point lies, first, in the idea that to expect the criminal law to speak 
with the voice of the people and, in turn, expect people to embrace the criminal law in a ‘first 
person’ manner is extremely demanding, especially (but not uniquely) in circumstances of 
freedom and diversity where at least some will remain reasonably unconvinced by the 
conception of morality that shapes the criminal law.  This is problematic because those who 
are not committed to that conception of morality may still be taken as subjects of the criminal 
law.  Under those circumstances they would become passive recipients of a pre-existing 
morality (the morality that is in place and that satisfies the moral standing requirement), and 
the criminal law, rather than acting with genuine authority, would become a tool serving the 
values and moral commitments of only some of the members of the community.  
Second, this model cannot appropriately deal with those individuals who do not fit 
with what is presumed to be the moral core of the community.  Since membership of the 
community supposes the recognition and acceptance of the obligations emanating from the 
communal life, those who do not satisfy this requirement of membership (for example, those 
who do not and perhaps cannot recognise or accept the communal obligations for reasons of 
conscience) might be seen as lawless aliens not liable under the proper protection of the 
criminal law.  When this condition obtains two things may happen.  On the one hand, these 
individuals may become criminally lawless, which means that they are not liable to the 
criminal law.  The outcome of this is that these individuals either ought to be expelled from 
the community (which represents an unjustifiable oppressive policy) or their actions, 
whatever they are, cannot be deemed criminal (leaving the criminal system incapable of 
fulfilling its expected function within the community). On the other hand, these individuals 
may be left outside of the procedural protections of the criminal law.  Consequently, when 
any of these criminally lawless individuals commits what under normal circumstances is a 
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crime, the limits and nature of the response to the 'offender' is left up to the will of the 
'punisher'.64 These are not acceptable conclusions of a principled model of the criminal law. 
So, what are the alternatives?  In order to avoid the exclusion that derives from the 
prior analysis we can maintain – with Duff – that the criminal law has to deal with 
disagreement by persuading those who are reasonably at odds with the principles of morality 
that guide or constitute the penal practices.  Thus, the criminal law will speak to the 
reasonable dissident with a different ‘tone’.  It may portray the wrongfulness of the dissident’s 
action as derived from the circumstances of the community65 and contend that even he ought 
to obey the law as a matter of his duty as a citizen  (see Duff 2001a, pp.121-5). 
This response, although more plausible, workable and appropriate than simply 
excluding dissenters from the boundaries of the criminal law, brings us to my last critical 
point.  If we adopt this strategy, and contend that the criminal law ought to be enforced 
despite the existence of deep disagreement about what morality requires, we will not get any 
closer to minimising the present problematic condition of this institution.  A criminal law 
that is linked in this way to the demands of morality makes criminalization contingent on the 
moral beliefs of the members of the community.  This may or may not have pernicious effects 
depending on the type of community we are considering.  However, whatever the 
community, the worry remains since criminalization becomes a function of morality, and the 
principles and content of the criminal law as a whole turn out to be contingent on the 
requirements of the dominant morality of the community.   
This conclusion is objectionable.  It renders the criminal law a mere mechanism of 
support of the moral doctrine of the community or, in a worse scenario, a method of 
indoctrination.  Instead, we should seek a model of the criminal law that depends not on 
people’s specific moral beliefs, but that rather addresses any member of society qua member 
of society, independent of the comprehensive moral commitments individuals may have.  If a 
common penal law – the basis of any legitimate penal law – is possible at all, it needs to be 
consistent with the deep commitments of all those who are bound to the law (not only a 
faction of them).  To do otherwise is to pretend, mistakenly, that we can build up a criminal 
                                                
64 Famously, John Locke expressed similar concerns in his Second Treatise: “[...] it is unreasonable for men to be 
judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and, on the other 
side, that ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but 
confusion and disorder will follow [...]”  (Locke, 2003, p.105). 
65 Duff presents this idea in a subtler more sophisticated way.  The law now portrays the wrongfulness of the 
reasonable dissenter to that offender “more like a mala prohibitum than a straightforward malum in se” (Duff 
2001a, p.122).  The central point, however, remains the same. 
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system from an Archimedean point by the use of reasons that are not genuinely appealing to, 
at least, some members of society.  This construction and application of the criminal law 
should count as an instance of illegitimate coercion. 
Moreover, as it stands, this model remains too indeterminate to satisfy the demand 
for specific limits of the criminal law’s scope of action (see ch.1).  Thus, even if we succeeded 
in establishing uncontroversial and generally accepted principles of morality, the problem of 
scope would remain.  On the one hand, if morality determines the limits of what it is to be 
criminalized we may end up with a system of criminal law that leaves unaddressed types of 
conduct that, although morally irrelevant, we reasonably think should be tackled by the 
criminal law.  On the other hand, if morality suggests the criminalization of Φ, this model 
would criminalize it even if we reasonably believe that Φ is none of the criminal law’s 
business. 
Duff may respond to this last undesirable possibility by showing his liberal 
credentials, which preclude his model from allowing an unlimited intrusion of the state in 
matters that we generally consider beyond its business.  I am sympathetic to the spirit of this 
response, in the sense that I do believe that (some) liberal principles should guide our 
principles of criminalization.  However, my objection is about the indeterminacy of those 
liberal principles within the model we are considering.  As I see it, further specification of the 
type of liberalism that the criminal law should embody is crucial if we are to offer a successful 
account against inappropriate criminalization.  We should not use liberalism as a trump 
against the uncertainties of our models of the criminal law.  Instead, we need to advance a 
sufficient account of the liberal political philosophy backing the penal model we embrace. 
Last, but not least, this model permits inappropriate punishment.  This is the case 
because it allows the condemnation of people for things that they would not understand as 
legitimately condemnable.  For the reasonable and committed dissenter who cannot 
embrace the criminalization of Φ in a ‘first person’ manner, to be punished for Φ on grounds 
that it is morally demanded is simply an expression of oppression on the part of that section 
of the community that holds the values that justify criminalizing and punishing Φ.  Under 
those circumstances we seem to be using or manipulating the offender to express support for 
a particular morality – the morality of the dominant community – rather than trying to convey 
a message that we know he can understand and embrace.  Justifying what we do to others 
through penal practices on grounds of what morality demands is an example of what the 
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criminal law (at least a liberal criminal law) should not do, or attempt to do, if it wants to 
avoid inappropriate punishment. 
Perhaps, someone could respond to all this – as at some point Duff does – that 
insofar as the criminal law is a common law (which I accept) “it must claim to embody values 
that are widely, if not universally, shared in the community whose law it is”  (Duff 2001a, p.210 
fn.40).  For the moment I will only respond to this that although a common law must 
suppose something shared by all the members of the community whose law it is, that 
common element neither needs, nor should, be put in moral terms: it is not a shared morality 
that is needed in order to have a common criminal law.  Rather than grounding the criminal 
law in a rich notion of community with strong bonds of values and goods, we should direct 
our efforts to designing a model that does not require such a demanding and idealistic type of 
group, but which nevertheless can still explain our obligations and commitments within 
society. 
 
4 .  Conclusion 
This chapter has defended the general claim that rules are a function of social groups and 
that any account of the criminal law must begin by offering an account of society.  I further 
specified this last claim by resorting to an understanding of social groups as joint activities in 
which people engage with others.  The second part of the chapter illustrated the claims of the 
first part by considering some aspects of Antony Duff’s important account of the criminal 
law.  I focused mainly on his ideal normative community and on how this ideal determines a 
fundamental aspect of the criminal law: criminal liability and its preconditions.  After 
presenting the basic structure of Duff’s model, I moved to criticise it.  More specifically, I 
have contested the claim that we should embrace something like moral standing as a 
precondition of the criminal law. 
When concluding Punishment, Communication, and Community, Duff suggests a 
criticism of his own model in terms that are similar to the argument above.  He says that 
someone may reject the theory he presents there “on the grounds that however attractive it 
might seem as an ideal, a theory that sets such demanding preconditions for criminal liability 
and punishment is too remote from human life to serve as a guide or goal for our human 
practices”  (Duff 2001a, p.198).  However, he claims any respectable normative theory of 
punishment (and the criminal law) will have to spell out the preconditions of its appropriately 
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calling people to account in terms similar to his, and ultimately, any plausible theory of the 
criminal law may see “its legitimacy seriously undermined by their nonsatisfaction in our 
existing societies” (Duff 2001a, p198). 
To a large extent I accept Duff’s contention.  However, I think there is an important 
difference between his theory and some possible alternatives – like the one I shall develop in 
this thesis – and that this difference is in favour of the latter.  My point is that we should 
dedicate time to depict social groups that are sensitive to the lack of agreement and harmony 
that characterises the societies we actually live in and derive from that theoretical picture an 
account of the kind of criminal law that we ought to have.  This task is different from 
depicting an ideal normative social group with the characteristics of the one Duff develops.  
From such idealised and aspirational communities we inevitably obtain principles and 
institutions that appear to be too morally demanding, or alien, to be plausible responses to 
the present regrettable condition of the criminal law.  Instead, I believe we would do better 
by offering an account of society that starts from social bonds that appeal not to an ideal but 
to a more recognisable human situation, that of conflict and disagreement, and from there 
build a genuine common law that appeals to all members of society.  To derive a criminal law 
from an account of the good society along those lines is the aim of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Individuals and the Free Society 
 
Human society is a society of persons; and persons do not view 
themselves or each other merely as so many bodies moving in ways 
which are sometimes harmful and have to be prevented or altered.  
Instead persons interpret each other’s movements as 
manifestations of intentions and choices, and these subjective 
factors are often more important to their social relations than the 
movements by which they are manifested or their effects.  
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, p.182 
 
In this chapter, I defend an account of the free society underwritten by liberal theory in which 
the value of liberty prevails and persons can live the lives they think fit without more 
restrictions than those imposed by the equal enjoyment of this liberty for all.  From this it 
follows that the free society I will defend is not a society without restrictions or obligations: 
“though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence” (Locke 2003, p102).66  
However, unlike the restrictions and obligations existing in other socio-political 
arrangements, in a free society these limitations and constraints should be conceived, or so I 
will argue, as the result of individuals’ internal commitment to a life in association with 
others.   
Given this commitment to the free society, it might seem as if there would be no 
place for the criminal law: how could a coercive and condemnatory system of social rules 
result from individuals’ internal commitments?  The ultimate aim of this chapter is to offer an 
answer to this question and, in doing so, prepare the ground for an account of the general 
function of the criminal law of the free society in the following chapter. 
                                                
66 Despite all my references to Locke and the influence that the Second Treatise has in the construction of the free 
society, one must not overdo the link.  The Lockean laws of nature are laws the content of many of which could 
hardly count as liberal in the sense purported in this work.  Thus, for example, a clause of the line that 
immediately follows the text quoted – i.e., “though man in that state have an uncontrollabe liberty to dispose of his 
person or possessions, yet he has no liberty to destroy himself […]” – is not something that I take as being part of 
the constitution of the free society. 
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From the very outset it is important to set out the different steps of the argument 
clearly.  The chapter has two parts.  The first one introduces a basic aspect of human nature, 
namely, the purposive nature of individuals and the intimate connection between this feature 
and individuals’ subjective identities.  Individuals have life purposes that significantly 
influence both their subjective identities – how they define themselves – and the way in which 
they conduct their lives.  From the fact that individuals assign deep value to both these life 
purposes and to a life lived in close connection to these life purposes, I derive the core of 
what makes societal coexistence plausible, namely, the subjective benefits that associating 
with others contribute to a life lived according to their life purposes.  Were those subjective 
benefits absent, there would be no reason to engage with, or remain in, a given joint activity.  
In light of these conclusions about human nature, in the second part I present the 
general function of the state institutions of the free society.  This general function derives 
from the importance we should assign to human’s purposive natures and their capacity to live 
a life as they think fit.  In its most general formulation, it will be argued that the function of 
these institutions is to serve individuals’ capacity to live their lives as they think fit according 
to their purposive ends, not to serve those ends themselves.  More precisely, I will maintain 
that the function of state institutions is expressed in their commitment to the principle of 
freedom of association.  The mark of the free society is the existence of state institutions that 
leave individuals free to live the lives they think fit in association with others.  Thus, and 
following the analysis in chapter 3 of social groups as joint activities, I present the free society 
as an association of purposive individuals engaged in the activity of free coexistence.  
 
1 .  The Free Society  and Purposive Individuals  
1.1 Individuals, Subjective Identity & Life Purposes 
Philosophical traditions diverge on the issue of what properly defines humanity, and this is 
not the place to embark on an examination of those different accounts.  Instead, I would like 
to point to a rather uncontroversial aspect of what is to be human; uncontroversial, that is, 
within the liberal tradition.  Any state institution that genuinely serves the individual must 
take this factor seriously into account. 
Human beings are agents.  Roughly, this means not only that humans are able to act, 
as opposed to being merely the subject of events or happenings, but also that they are able to 
act from motives and reasons.  An agent is an individual many of whose actions are explicable 
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to her and others in terms of reasons and motives.  An account that overlooks this internal 
aspect of human agency is an account that misses the point of what it is to be an agent.  For 
what is of interest here, I shall underline a particular aspect of individual agency, namely, its 
purposiveness.  An agent’s action is purposive if her action has meaning; if it has a direction 
that explains it in a way that goes beyond the mere description of the movements involved in 
the action.  The purposive actions of an individual, in the sense relevant here, are actions that 
must be explained in terms of the values and fundamental commitments held by that 
individual.  In this sense, they are central to the way the individual defines herself.  In other 
words, purposive actions are actions that an individual performs as a result of the values she 
holds and that determine how she understands and conceives of herself. 
This understanding of purposive actions is influenced by, and can be further 
explained in reference to, what Loren Lomasky has called directive ends (Lomasky 1987, 
ch.4).  These ends (unlike non-directive ones) make coherent, and shape, a person’s life in 
significant ways: “In the absence of such ends […] bodies could continue to endure in the way 
that bodies do and memory might still exert cohesive force.  What would be absent, though, 
is continued identity as the selfsame purposive being”  (Lomasky 1987, pp.31-2).  In my 
account, directive ends are intimately connected with certain types of actions (purposive 
actions) that are required, from a subjective point of view, to provide the individual with a 
sense of coherence, direction, and meaning in life.   
An example of a purposive action may be the act of looking after my family by 
providing security, affection, and so on.  These actions express my commitment to particular 
values (e.g., loyalty, reciprocity, and care), all of which define me as someone who cares for 
his family (something that could be phrased as being a good son or father).  So understood, 
my commitment to those values of loyalty and reciprocity within the context of my family 
represents a directive end, and my purposive actions are actions directed towards the 
fulfilment of those ends. 
My example suggests that the connection between purposive actions and directive 
ends is that both are central in providing an account of the subjective identity of the 
individual.  A subjective identity (i) defines the individual in a morally relevant sense (call this 
the relevance condition); and (ii) is a self-determined identity in the sense of not being 
determined only by external determinations (call this the condition of self-determination).  In 
order to provide a more articulated account of the individual and her purposiveness, let us 
consider these two conditions more closely. 
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(i) Relevance Condition: Consider my action of typing these words with the fingers 
of my hands.  This action, other things equal, does not make any moral difference in terms of 
who I am or how I conceive of myself.  Whether I type with two hands rather than with one, 
or whether I intentionally type faster or slower are actions irrelevant when I am defining 
myself from a moral point of view.  However, there are other types of actions that do have 
sufficient gravity to determine who I am in a morally relevant sense.  That is, actions that 
shape my self-understanding and the way I guide my life.67 This is what I call purposive 
actions.  Think of the life of a good Christian.  Suppose that the action of attending mass 
every Sunday is necessary to be a good Christian. Since one of my fundamental goals in life, 
let us also suppose, is to be a good Christian, then attending mass every Sunday is a 
purposive action, an integral part of what it takes to attain one of my life purposes.  In effect, 
if I had to define myself – that is, if I had to give an account of my subjective identity – the 
action of attending mass every Sunday would take a central place in how I represent myself.  
This is because attending mass every Sunday is a central element of what constitutes my 
good life. 
What explains the crucial difference between the action of typing these words and 
the action of attending mass every Sunday is that the latter, unlike the former, is an 
expression of a fundamental commitment.  Fundamental commitments are expressed in 
certain actions, which by virtue of being the expression of fundamental commitments, 
acquire a deep significance for an individual’s self-understanding.  Indeed, insofar as they are 
the expression of fundamental commitments, these actions are central to individuals’ self-
understandings and subjective identities.  In other words, they are purposive actions.  Akeel 
Bilgrami provides a helpful explanation of the importance of these commitments: “A 
[commitment] is a fundamental commitment at a given time if at that time one wants it 
fulfilled at a future time, even if one believes that at the future time one may not have that 
[commitment]”  (Bilgrami 1997, p.2529).68 Bilgrami’s appeal to a counterfactual seeks to 
emphasise the great depth of our present fundamental commitments.  Individuals’ subjective 
identities are constructed from commitments that are so deeply rooted in their present moral 
                                                
67 I am not implying that we can determine a priori which actions have or not a sufficient gravity.  As I take it, this 
distinction is context-dependent and consequently, in order to determine whether an action has enough 
importance to contribute to a morally relevant definition of the individual, we need to consider thoroughly a series 
of factors whose specification goes beyond the scope of the point I am making.  Ultimately, what I am asserting is 
simply that there are actions that have a sufficient gravity for the individual as to determine who she is and how 
she leads her life. 
68 For stylistic reasons I have amended the original quote.  Bilgrami uses ‘desires’ instead of ‘commitments’, but 
earlier in his paper he clarifies that in this context this variation is inmaterial.  He says that he will “use a single 
term desires to cover all those motivating states of agents which [people] variously refer to as values, 
commitments, preferences, subjective utilities, interests, inclinations, motives, etc” (Bilgrami 1997, p.2527). 
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psychology that they want to remain loyal to them in a possible future even if in that future 
they happen not to be loyal to those very commitments.69 
These considerations about individuals’ fundamental commitments and their 
expression in purposive actions explain the first feature of the subjective identity of the 
individual.  Let us now consider the second feature.    
(ii) Self-Determination: the intimate connection between our subjective identity and 
the way we guide our life according to fundamental commitments (or, as I have also put it, 
according to our life purposes) leads us to the second feature of an individual’s subjective 
identity, namely, that it is self-determined.   
In the account defended here, an individual’s subjective identity is self-determined 
not in the sense of being autonomously or otherwise chosen (for example, through 
deliberation or rational choice), but in the sense that it is an identity determined by the 
demands of the life the individual thinks fit.  This life is different from a life we think best, or 
wisest, or closest to sainthood.  More importantly, a life lived as we think fit is also different 
from an autonomous life or a life we choose among the available alternatives.  The individual 
may well aim or want to live any of these types of lives, but neither these aims and wantings, 
nor the availability of these types of life, are conditions of living a life as the individual thinks 
fit.  Instead, to live a life that one thinks fit is to live a life that, in good faith, one does not 
reject.   
Of course, many important life purposes happen to be autonomously chosen, and 
many of these purposes happen to acquire part of their value precisely because they are 
autonomously chosen.  However, there are many other life purposes that we do not come to 
embrace autonomously and there are many ways of living that do not take autonomy as a 
relevant value.  For example, Peter may define himself as a Christian, a person who takes 
Christian beliefs and practices as fundamental commitments.  This may happen not because 
Peter has become such an individual through the exercise of his autonomy, but because his 
                                                
69 As an example of fundamental commitments, Bilgrami mentions members of the Iranian government who argue 
that increasingly modernising influences around them may have the effect that in the future they will lose their 
desire to live by Islamic principles.   However, what they desire now is to live (now and in the future) by Islamic 
principles, even if they do not have that desire to do so in the future.  Thus, for these Iranians, to live by Islamic 
principles is a fundamental commitment.  Other commitments that may plausibly count as fundamental include 
being a vegetarian, being a Christian, being an atheist, being a teacher (I would also say, perhaps more 
contentiously, that being a woman or a man could also count as fundamental commitment for some people).  For 
example, I know that in the future I may be persuaded to leave vegetarianism.  However, at this moment (t1) I 
want to remain being a vegetarian in the future (t2), even if at that moment in time (t2) I am persuaded to leave 
vegetarianism. 
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circumstances have presented him with no other ‘visible’ alternative.  Peter may have been 
born in a Christian nation where his fellow nationals have a deep sense of commitment to 
Christianity, and perhaps the values of his family, friends and school revolve around the 
fundamental value of being committed to the Christian church and so on.  Had Peter been 
born in a corner of the Himalayas, he would have perhaps professed the beliefs of Buddha.  
But such was not the case and, given the circumstances just mentioned, Peter could not ‘see’ 
any other alternative but that of waving the flag of Christianity, a flag that he did not choose 
or reflect about before waving it.   
As I understand it, becoming a Christian is not Peter’s autonomous choice.  As it 
happens, Peter did not realistically consider an alternative to being a Christian; he did not 
choose Christianity; he did not ‘see’ any other alternative to it; he just became a Christian and 
did not object to having done so.  Nevertheless, and this is my point here, the lack of choice 
and autonomy does not mean that Peter’s subjective identity and way of living is not self-
determined and/or an instance of oppression.  Insofar as the Christian life is a form of life to 
which he does not reject, my claim of self-determination remains. 
The anti-perfectionist leanings shaping this account of human nature owe much to 
the influence of Chandran Kukathas’ account (an account in this respect influenced by David 
Hume).70  As Kukathas puts it, an individual “is free because she may live a life she has not 
rejected and is not forced to live a life she cannot accept.  She is, in a sense, free because she 
enjoys a certain ‘inner freedom’; however, that inner freedom is not autonomy or self-
direction.  It is liberty of conscience”  (Kukathas 2003, p.113).  A subjective identity is a 
genuine identity insofar as liberty of conscience remains in place. 
However, in a language that Kukathas would surely not adopt, I understand an 
individual’s subjective identity as being self-determined because in some weak but significant 
sense not to object to a life purpose and its commitments is to allow them to shape one’s 
identity.  This is not a claim about how we become identified with, say, a certain religion and 
the fundamental commitments it entails, but a claim about what we do once we identify 
ourselves as members of that religion and we do not object to this fundamental commitment 
or to the purposive actions that are involved in it.  What we do under these circumstances is 
to live that life, which is an action in which we invest ourselves.  Indeed, not to object to the 
life we live is to embrace the content of that life and reject the alternatives – reject them in the 
                                                
70 For an account of Hume’s understanding of human nature see David Miller 1981, ch.5. 
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weak sense of not making these alternatives part of our subjective identity.  I see this as an act 
of self-determination.     
These ideas point towards an important premise of my argument, namely, that no 
matter what, there are alternatives to our ways of living.  We may not see them but, on 
reflection, they are always there; not being aware of alternatives is not tantamount to a lack of 
alternatives.  To claim otherwise is, to my mind, an overstatement.  There is always a 
different way to go and, therefore, there is always an alternative option to follow, even if that 
alternative may have a very high cost or have dramatic consequences.71  It is because there is 
always at least one alternative to the way we live, and because despite that alternative we opt 
to keep going in our own way, that I see an individual’s subjective identity as a weak form 
(but a form anyway) of self-determination. 
 
1.2 The Value of the Capacity to Live a Life as We Think Fit  
As I said in the previous section, purposive actions are actions performed by purposive 
individuals as a result of their fundamental commitments.  Purposive individuals are 
individuals capable of performing actions that, they believe, are both required to live the life 
they think fit and that provide them with a sense of subjective identity and integrity through 
time.  Now, given the significance of an individual’s subjective identity, we could plausibly 
conclude that both an individual’s life purposes and what it takes to live according to these 
purposes are things of great value to the individual. 
The idea that purposive individuals value their life purposes ought to be 
uncontroversial.  However, to affirm that individuals value what it takes to live a life 
according to these purposes is more contentious.  In effect, this conclusion looks more like a 
stipulation than a claim resulting from an argument.  Although there is some true in this, I do 
not believe it to be a serious problem.  Let me briefly recast my argument to explain why I 
think we should accept the idea that individuals value what it takes to live a life according to 
their life purposes: 
 
                                                
71 Hume’s famous thought in the Treatise that “Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole 
world to the scratching of my finger.  Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least 
uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me” (Hume 1975, p.416) can be understood here as an 
extreme representation of the different plausible and not necessarily unreasonable ways for which an individual 
might opt. 
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(i) Individuals value their life purposes. 
(ii) Life purposes are such as to require that individuals live according to what these 
purposes require from them.  
Therefore, 
(iii) Individuals value what it takes to live a life according to their life purposes. 
As I said, this needs clarification because (iii) does not follow from the conjunction of (i) and 
(ii).  We cannot conclude that all that it takes to live a life according to certain purposes has 
value simply from the value of those purposes.  For example, the classical dancer does not 
need to value the physical pain it takes for her to become a gracious dancer, even though she 
values being a gracious dancer.  However, I think this difficulty can be avoided by a 
clarification of one aspect of my account and further specification of another.   
The clarification is that life purposes require thinking through not only the ends at 
which they aim but also the means required for them to be attained.  Thus, unlike the case of 
other types of purposes, the magnitude of value we assign to life purposes takes account of 
the means (and therefore the costs) necessary to live according to these purposes.  Thus, if 
my life purpose is E, then, all else equal, I should be prepared to accept what it takes to attain 
E.72 
The further specification is that my account should be understood as pointing to the 
value of one specific element of what it takes to live according to one’s life purposes, namely, 
the value of the capacity necessary to live that life.  This further specification of the conclusion 
in (iii) makes the argument much less contentious.  Consider again the case of the ballet 
dancer: in order to become a gracious dancer she needs to experience years of exhausting and 
painful exercise.  To make my point, I only need to say that, as part of what it takes to live the 
life of a gracious dancer, the dancer values the capacity to exercise her body and not 
necessarily the pain that exercising this capacity involves.73 
Keeping this in mind, let me now rephrase the central claims of my argument: 
human beings are purposive individuals who can direct and shape significant parts of their 
                                                
72 Lomasky offers a response to this problem along similar lines.  See Lomasky 1987, p.57. 
73 That said, I believe one can think of circumstances and cases in which the pain or effort undegone as part of 
pursuing of a life purpose may be valued.  Perhaps the purpose of successfully raising one’s children may count as 
a case in which the effort it takes is to be valued, as this effort represents an expression of care for one’s offspring.  
Also, there are activities that are achieved immediately by their very exercise.  Certain forms of artistic expression 
are of this last type. 
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lives in accordance with their life purposes.  That is, they can live their lives as they think fit.  
Since individuals cannot live their lives according to their life purposes except by exercising 
their capacity to live as they think fit, we ought to grant that individuals value the capacity 
required to live their lives as they think fit.  These different elements are at the core of both 
the understanding of human nature that I endorse and the conception of the free society 
presented in the next section.74  
 
1.3 The Free Society 
The purpose of these brief reflections on human nature is to underpin a political account of 
society.  Given the purposive nature of individuals, the idea is to determine the general 
function of state institutions in a free society.  As a first step, it is worth recalling the liberal 
commitment to state neutrality.  John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have influentially argued 
that the liberal state, and more specifically, the institutions that furnish it, should be neutral 
with respect to individuals’ conceptions of the good (Rawls 1971, 1993a and Dworkin 1977).  
The central idea is that what the state is to do, and what it may commend to its citizens to 
do, cannot be justified in a way that relies on a substantive conception of the good (or 
combination of such conceptions).  Were the state and its institutions to act in ways that 
could only be justified by appeal to some or other comprehensive doctrine, their commands 
and policies would lack the legitimacy required in the context of a modern complex society. 
Rawls describes the peril of a lack of neutrality emphatically when in Political 
Liberalism he argues that  
If we think of political society as a community united in affirming one and the 
same comprehensive doctrine, then the oppressive use of state power is 
necessary for a political community. […] A society united on a reasonable form of 
utilitarianism, or on the reasonable liberalisms of Kant or Mill, would likewise 
require the sanctions of state power to remain so.  Call this “the fact of 
oppression” (Rawls 1993a, p.37).75   
                                                
74 There are, of course, other values relevant to liberalism.  In my view those values are derived from the value 
individuals assign to their life purposes and to the capacity to live their lives according to these purposes.  
However, that is not an argument that I pursue here. 
75 See also Rawls 1993b, p.246: “only the oppressive use of state power can maintain a common affirmation of one 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine.  If we think of political society as a community when it 
is united in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, then the oppressive use of state power is 
necessary to maintain a political community”. 
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To avoid the dangers of ‘the fact of oppression’, political liberalism “hopes to satisfy neutrality 
of aim in the sense that basic institutions and public policy are not to be designed to favor any 
particular comprehensive doctrine” (Rawls 1993a, p.194).  The institutions of the free society, 
on pain of falling into the fact of oppression, must avoid relying on any comprehensive 
conception of the good. 
However, this anti-perfectionist approach to the role of the state and its institutions 
does not mean that the state should not protect and honour the capacity required to live a life 
as we think fit.  In effect, my account of the function of the state institutions of the free 
society will defend the claim that these institutions ought to be neutral with respect to 
individuals’ life purposes, but ought to serve individuals’ capacities to live their lives as 
demanded by their life purposes.  This service, more specifically, is to be expressed by the 
commitment of the state institutions to the principle of freedom of association. 
 
1.4 Shared Interests & Society 
At different points I have expressed some scepticism about the possibility of putting forth a 
conception of human beings and/or social groups that is grounded in a rich or 
comprehensive account of individuals’ purposes and values (see, for example, ch.3).  
However, this scepticism does not deny, nor preclude us from asserting, the existence of a 
basic interest shared by those individuals who coexist in society.  There are, at the very least, 
two elements pointing in this direction.  
Before referring to them, a brief word of clarification about my use of the notion of 
‘interest’ is in order.  I use the term in a wide sense to refer to all those things that motivate 
the individual to act and lead a life in the ways demanded by their life purposes and 
fundamental commitments.  Thus, interests comprise not only strict self-interests, but also, 
for example, interests grounded in affection for others or in moral principles.  This triad 
parallels Hume’s account of human motivation, which in his language is constituted by 
interests, affection and principle  (see “Of Parties in General” in Hume 1951).76 
The first of the elements pointing to a common interest shared by citizens has 
already been mentioned; namely, that individuals value – i.e., have an interest in – their own 
life purposes and their capacity to live their lives according to these purposes.  This is 
                                                
76 Here I am following Kukathas 2003, pp.42-50. 
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something that I take to be fairly uncontroversial.  The second element, which I address in 
this section, is that individuals have a shared interest in associating with others and entering 
and/or remaining in associations.  This is a contentious claim and requires the following 
caveat: individuals value associating with others in so far as the value they assign to both their 
life purposes and their general capacity to live according to these purposes is not relevantly 
undermined by this association.77 It is in this sense that purposive individuals share an 
interest in engaging and/or remaining in different social groups, such as chess societies, 
communities, or the society of a whole nation.  In this account, then, societal coexistence 
does not have intrinsic value.  The claim I defend is much more qualified, mainly because of 
my commitment to the idea that the value of a given social arrangement is a function of the 
value individuals assign to it in accordance with their life purposes.  Thus, a life in association 
with others is valuable for a given individual if and only if she believes it contributes to living 
the life demanded by her life purposes.78  
Clearly, this account has something in common with that offered by Thomas 
Hobbes.  Like Hobbes’ position, my account takes the origin and/or the persistence of an 
association between purposive individuals to be the result of self-interested considerations 
and the advancement of mutually advantageous states of affairs.  Following the line of 
argument of the previous chapter, individuals enter and/or remain in their joint activities as 
long as those activities are, from their own point of view, beneficial to their own interests.  
However, unlike Hobbes, I do not take self-preservation or individual security (the fear of 
violent death) to be the only relevant interest or the ultimate rationale for the move from a 
state of nature to a civil society.79 Instead, the fundamental value of a life lived in society is the 
benefits individuals obtain for the advancement of their interest in living a life according to 
their life purposes, whatever these purposes are.  In my account, an individual may well have 
reasons to value a life with others – in effect, most of us do – but the interest an individual 
may have in a life with others is a function of the advancement of her interest in living a life 
that fits her life purposes.  This would be true even if, pace Hobbes, that life is at odds with 
self-preservation or security. 
                                                
77 There are, evidently, some types of life that necessarily involve living in community with others.  In these cases, the 
interest individuals have in living with others overlaps with their life purposes.  However, this does not represent 
an objection to my position as these individuals still have an interest in living in a society that allows them to live in 
the particular association relevant to their life purpose. 
78 This account, then, is immune to the unencumbered-self type of objection.  This is because I am not offering an 
ontology of human nature but an account of the source of the value individuals may find in society. 
79 For a similar idea see Kukathas 2003, pp.50-6. 
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These considerations help in establishing what the state institutions of a free society 
must provide to citizens if those citizens are to have reasons to be part, and/or remain as 
members, of the association (the next section examines what happens when these reasons are 
lacking – see sec.2.3).  The subjective benefits individuals may obtain are at the basis of what 
makes each individual engage in and/or remain in society.  These benefits are of various kinds 
and types, but ultimately, in their most basic form, all of them relate to the advancement of 
individuals’ interests in living a life that fits their life purposes and the protection of what they 
take to be necessary to live that life.   
 
2 .  The General  Function of  the State  Institutions of  the Free Society  
 
To be happy, men need only to be left in perfect independence in 
all that concerns their occupations, their undertakings, their sphere 
of activity, their fantasies. 
Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, p.104 
2.1 Freedom of Association and Minimalism 
The discussion of the subjective benefits of associations brings us to a central question of this 
chapter: how does this subjective point of view – grounded in individuals’ interests – translate 
into the general role of state institutions?  This is the question I answer in this part of the 
chapter.  Given that one of the starting points of this analysis is the fact of diversity and 
conflict characteristic of modern complex societies, there is no simple answer.  If we exist in a 
society characterised by pervasive plurality, any answer to the question of the general role of 
the state institutions turns out to be as difficult as it is critical. 
 Bearing in mind what Rawls dubbed ‘the fact of oppression’, our efforts to answer 
the question of the general function of state institutions need to be advanced in minimalist 
terms.  This is not only to say that the role of the state institutions should not be articulated 
in terms of comprehensive values and practices, but also that the functions of state 
institutions must be such as to appeal to all those purposive individuals who coexist in 
society.  Given circumstances of politics characterised by conflict and disagreement, this 
common ground will surely be minimal.  The account I defend satisfies this minimalist 
requirement by defending the following two claims: (i) that a basic function of the state 
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institutions of a free society is to serve individuals’ capacity to live their life as they think fit – 
independent of the life purposes these individuals may have but consistent with the 
enjoyment of this capacity for all.  And, (ii) that this function is to be fulfilled by the 
commitment of state institutions to honouring the classical liberal principle of freedom of 
association. 
Robert Nozick has nicely captured the background motivational of my proposal.  He 
argues that “[t]here is no reason to think that there is one community which will serve as ideal 
for all people and much reason to think that there is not”  (Nozick 1974, p.310).  I do not see 
how we can seriously resist this claim.  Thus, I take it that in circumstances of politics 
characterised by diversity and conflict about the good, a non-intrusive minimalist state 
comitted to protecting and honouring individuals’ freedom of association will provide the 
framework in which citizens can live according to their various, conflicting, life purposes.  It 
is not the state or any other form of association that is to determine how individuals should 
conduct their lives.  Instead, in the free society it is only the individual who is entitled to 
establish the limits, conditions, and forms of the life that is to be lived. 
My account proposes that what needs to be maintained as a strong and fundamental 
principle of political morality is individuals’ liberty to guide their lives as they think fit, and 
that this principle is best honoured by the state’s commitment to freedom of association.  
This is the rationale for my emphasis on freedom of association.  Given the implausibility of 
one ideal association that is good for all, in a free society the state is to leave individuals free 
to decide both what types of associations to join and to determine the conditions and 
practices maintained within those associations.  To do otherwise, I believe, is to fall short of 
avoiding the fact of oppression. 
What supports this proposal is the basic purposive nature of human beings 
developed in the first part of this chapter.  If people are purposive beings with fundamental 
commitments that arise from their life purposes, and these life purposes are various and 
complex so no single type of community ‘will serve as ideal for all people’, then, for the state to 
avoid the fact of oppression and to serve all its citizens, it has to create conditions that allow 
everyone to go their own ways.  As I see it, this can only be achieved by the protection of 
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individuals’ liberty to associate; were they not at liberty to associate with others they could 
not go their own ways in life.80   
To not protect the freedom to associate and to then promote other non-neutral, 
richer and/or more comprehensive principles and practices, would amount to acting on 
grounds of a particular conception of the good which, in light of the principle of neutrality, is 
an unacceptable option for the liberal state.81  By contrast, to adopt a thinner liberal principle, 
like freedom of conscience, would make the limits of the state too narrow.  It matters that 
individuals are protected in freely living their lives according to their life purposes, not merely 
that they can believe or embrace that form of life in the privacy of their minds.  On the one 
hand, freedom of association is thicker than freedom of conscience because the conditions 
required for the latter are less demanding than the conditions required for the former.  On 
the other hand, freedom of association is ‘more basic’ than freedom of conscience because, in 
a non-trivial sense, for freedom of conscience to be genuinely respected we need freedom of 
association.82 As Rawls himself puts it: “for unless we are at liberty to associate with other 
like-minded citizens, the exercise of liberty of conscience is denied” (Rawls 1993a, p.313). 
These central tenets of freedom of association and the restrictions and obligations it 
imposes upon state institutions are captured in the principle of freedom of association (FA): 
Principle of Freedom of Association: A purposive individual has a liberty-right 
to enter into associations with others for whatever purposes and duration in 
time, compatible with the same liberty for all, and with no constraints 
whatsoever on the voluntary benefits and obligations that may emerge from this 
association. 
FA is the kernel of my account of the free society.  Its strength is neither the result of 
agreements reached within associations nor of some patterned standard of the good imposed 
upon everyone.  Instead, and following Kukathas’ apt terminology, FA can be well 
                                                
80 This is not a conceptual truth.  We may well conceive of a good lonely life lived in the woods.  However, this does 
not count as an objection because here I am only interested in the life of those purposive individuals that live with 
others in some form of association. 
81 This does not deny that there may be values and rights other than the freedom to associate that can be defended 
without being non-neutral.  In the following section I consider this possibility in relation to the issues of education 
and health care. 
82 I borrow the idea that a freedom is basic from Henry Shue’s analysis of rights.  He states that “the substance of a 
basic right is something the deprivation of which is one standard threat to rights generally.  The fulfillment of a 
basic right is a successful defense against a standard threat to rights generally.  This is precisely why basic rights 
are basic.  That to which they are rights is needed for the fulfilment of all other rights” (Shue 1996, p.34).   
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understood as a principle of liberal indifference (Kukathas 1998).83  Given both circumstances 
of politics and the unlimited variety of ways in which people may lead their lives, the free 
society lets individuals go their own way, associating with others as they think fit – as their 
consciences dictate – and not imposing or endorsing any particular standard of association.   
In Hohfeldian terms, FA grants a liberty-right to individuals to associate with 
others.  From this it follows that the right holder is under no duty to associate with others or 
to associate in pre-determined ways.  The role of the state is both to protect this liberty-right 
and to respect it, which means that the state has a duty not to impede the exercise of freedom 
of association and it has a duty to restrain others from impeding the exercise of this freedom.  
Thus, although liberal indifference tells us not to hinder freedom of association, it does not 
command the state to remain indifferent to actions that impede the exercise of this freedom.  
When such actions or practices take place, the state has an obligation to act.  In a nutshell, 
FA involves a negative right held by an individual against other individuals and the state.  
But FA also involves a positive right held by the individual against the state to be provided 
with protection from interference with her right to associate (or not) with others. 
At this point it is worth emphasising the liberal nature of this principle.  FA is part of 
a tradition whose intellectual sources can be traced to the work of the founders of liberalism.  
John Locke is perhaps the most apt example.84 
To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must 
consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect 
freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons, as 
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature; without asking leave, or 
depending upon the will of any other man (Locke 2003, p.101). 
Locke’s reflections are at the basis of my account of FA.  In a free society, the state has a 
stringent obligation to respect individuals’ basic freedom to associate with others.  This 
freedom, in turn, is only limited by the common descriptions of the joint activities in which 
                                                
83 Liberalism “is indifferent to particular human affairs or to the particular pursuits of individuals and groups.  
Liberalism might well be described as the politics of indifference” (Kukathas 1998, p.691).  The way I understand 
liberal indifference links closely to Constant’s idea in the epigraph of this section.  
84 J.S. Mill advanced what counts as a standard liberal defence of freedom of association: “With individuals and 
voluntary associations […] there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience.  What the State can 
usefully do, is to make itself a central depository, and active circulator and diffuser, of the experience resulting 
from many trials.  Its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others; instead of 
tolerating no experiments but its own”  (Mill 1989, p.110).  See also Locke’s Second Treatise: a tacit consenter is 
“at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth; or to agree with others to begin a new 
one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world they can find free and unpossessed” (Locke 2003, p.153). 
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individuals participate.  Consequently, in accordance with the idea of liberal indifference, the 
basic functions of the state and its institutions are, firstly, to allow these activities to unfold in 
accordance with the dictates of individuals’ consciences – without more restrictions than 
those determined by FA – and, secondly, to rectify infringements on FA.  To genuinely serve 
the individual, state institutions of the free society must abide by the constraints that FA 
imposes upon them and express this principle in public policy. 
Part of the strength of this account is that it takes seriously the pervasive fact of 
diversity and disagreement in modern complex society.  This account only considers the 
necessary minimum of any workable account of human nature and society.  In doing so, it 
does not need to enter into intractable discussions about the good life and the hierarchisation 
of values.  Instead, this account only takes for granted the fact that individuals value their 
capacity to live a life as they think fit – a life to which in good faith they do not reject.  In 
granting this point, and no more than this point, this account talks to anyone, no matter what 
life purposes she has, what type of association she decides to live in, and no matter what type 
of life she pursues.  In adopting this minimalist form, FA shapes the functions of state 
institutions in a way that impedes the fact of oppression in spite of the circumstances of 
politics. 
 
2.2 Two Plausible Objections 
The Objection of Instability 
Despite its strengths, my account of the free society faces some serious objections.  One of 
them results from my emphasis on the idea that the interests individuals have in their life 
purposes determine both how people guide their lives and the extent to which they will 
engage in, and commit to, some form of association.  This emphasis may seem problematic.  
Because of the large array of different projects that individuals may pursue in life, and given 
that individuals will have life purposes that are incompatible with the life purposes of others 
(or worse, are abhorred by them), my model does not have the power to keep social groups 
together.  This difficulty may seem the natural outcome of emphasising individuals’ interests 
and avoiding the discussion of the types of life purposes and social groups that are 
appropriate, just, or permissible and thus that should be promoted and/or protected in 
society.  In leaving these considerations aside, my model allows any type of life, even one that 
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is detrimental to other life purposes.  In allowing this, the objection goes, the model is prone 
to serious disharmony, conflict and, ultimately, instability. 
To respond, I should begin by emphasising a distinction that first appeared in the 
previous chapter.  When talking about a free society I refer to a social group of a special kind.  
A free society is constituted by a multitude of different associations or social groups.  When 
considering FA and the constraints it imposes upon state institutions, we need to keep in 
mind this distinction to avoid confusing the free society with a social group simpliciter.  
When we keep these two types of association apart, we realise that the objection of instability 
needs to be answered in two parts.  First, social groups simpliciter (religious groups, chess 
associations, political parties, fraternities, and any joint activity falling under the description 
advanced in chapter 3) are certainly prone to volatility; people’s life purposes are not set once 
and for all, and for a whole variety of reasons individuals will opt for different types of 
associations at different times.  The outcome of this is that the possibility of a social group 
simpliciter disappearing or becoming weaker or stronger is part of what characterises the 
existence of different groups in a society committed to FA.  Instability of social groups 
simpliciter in the free society cannot be avoided.  
Second, although FA makes possible this fluidity of some associations, it ultimately 
represents a way to increase the stability of the free society (as opposed to the stability of 
social groups simpliciter).  This is the case because in the free society people are free to find, 
despite diversity and disagreement, their own ways to group and regroup according to what 
they think serves their own life purposes better.  Ultimately, all this amounts to the idea that 
a free society is not a society that looks for the maximization of group cohesion, or increasing 
adherence to certain values.  Instead, a free society is an association in which individuals 
engage and/or remain in the activity of living together because they believe that living 
together contributes to their being able to live their lives as they think fit.   
In his Letter Concerning Toleration Locke writes that “there is one thing only which 
gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is oppression” (Locke 2003, p.248).  My 
response to the objection of instability is motivated by the idea expressed by Locke in this 
passage, according to which instability is the son of oppression.  The free society with its 
commitment to FA is a social arrangement designed against the perils of oppression, and 
thus, favourable to sufficient levels of stability (sufficient for social coexistence).  Although the 
volatility of social groups simpliciter is a consequence of our commitment to FA, at a more 
general level, this commitment provides society with stable foundations. 
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The Objection of Social Voluntarism 
However, coexistence in a society committed to FA may still seem quite troublesome for a 
different and important reason that can be called ‘social voluntarism’.  According to this 
objection, individuals are bound by whatever obligations exist within the social groups to 
which they belong.  This is problematic because, given my emphasis on the overriding 
character of the right to freedom of association, it might be argued that my account permits 
and makes legitimate any type of association within society.  In effect, there is nothing in FA 
or the free society as a whole that prevents obligations within a group being distributed 
unequally, so some may obtain more benefits than others and some may have to endure more 
burdens than others.  My emphasis on the right to freedom of association does not impede 
the existence of ways of life that are at odds with traditional liberal values such as, for 
example, equality or autonomy (racist, sexist, and social groups based on class are examples).  
This is the case because FA does not set as a standard of legitimate association that social 
groups must promote autonomous or egalitarian ways of life.  Or to put it more strongly, FA 
allows the existence of social groups that undermine equality and/or autonomy.  In the end, 
the objection goes, a society built around a strong account of FA is fertile land for individual 
oppression by the powerful. 
I believe that this objection is in part due to confusion.  It is certainly true that FA 
allows the existence of social groups that may be at odds with autonomy, and it is also true 
that there is nothing in FA that impedes the creation of social groups that distribute benefits 
and burdens unequally.  Indeed, the free society I defend here permits joint activities that 
impose costs upon some people such that equality and/or autonomy are undermined.  
However, I do not take this to be a fatal objection.  I rather consider the possibility of 
inequality and heteronomy as part of the cost we need to pay if we value human freedom – 
whose minimally plausible specification I understand as the human capacity to live a life to 
which in good faith we do not object.  These costs, as I said, may be distributed unequally, 
but that is the inevitable outcome of human diversity in circumstances of freedom.   
However, this does not mean that my account permits and makes legitimate any type 
of social group.  Only those groups that abide by the requirements of FA are allowed and 
legitimate in a free society and, therefore, under the standards of political morality that guide 
the free society, any type of association that does not live up to the requirements of FA is at 
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serious fault.  To discuss this point and its implications for the objection of social 
voluntarism, consider now a central corollary of FA: the right to dissociate. 
 
2.3 The Right to Dissociate 
The right to dissociate – the logical corollary of FA – is crucial both to avoid individual 
oppression by the powerful and to face those circumstances in which the burdens an 
individual must endure within an association are more extensive than the subjective benefits 
the same individual may gain from that association. 
Remember that the normative sine qua non of associations in a free society is that the 
costs and burdens of associating with others do not surpass the subjective benefits that this 
association provides to the individual.  If the value that individuals assign to their life 
purposes and their capacity to live a life according to these purposes is going to be honoured, 
the final and subjective cost/benefit calculation of living in society must be positive.  That is 
the mark of an association of purposive individuals.  However, in circumstances in which the 
subjective benefits are surpassed by costs – which, we must note, is different from whether 
these costs are distributed equally or justly – the individual lacks sufficient reason to remain 
in that association.  When that is the case, the liberal position I endorse establishes that the 
individual should be let free to deliberate and exercise either his right to remain – in order, for 
example, to try to change those aspects of the social group with which he disagrees – or 
exercise his right to dissociate and attempt to engage in a different type of association with 
others.  This is the way in which the free society must face many of the turbulences and 
difficulties – like those posed by social voluntarism – that may almost certainly emerge when 
individuals freely associate with others.   
Of course, this is easier said than done, but this practical worry does not undermine 
the point that under ideal conditions, the right to dissociate should work as (part of) a 
response to oppression and/or the dissatisfaction of members of a given association.  In order 
for this right to gain more practical plausibility further institutional arrangements would have 
to be implemented, and this is something to which the free society would have to devote time 
and effort. 
In what follows, I would like to briefly explain the importance of the right to 
dissociate by differentiating my position from an aspect of Margaret Gilbert’s account 
presented in chapter 3 (see sec.3.1).  This aspect refers to what she calls the concurrence 
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condition on exit (Gilbert 2006, p.109): 
Absent special background understandings, any given party, A, has an 
obligation to any other party, B, to obtain B’s concurrence in any new 
determination of the details of the joint activity.  This includes A’s exit from the 
joint activity (Gilbert 2006, p.114). 
Thus, according to Gilbert, there is a concurrence condition on exit to be satisfied if 
dissociation is going to be legitimate.  The concurrence necessary to legitimate dissociation 
must take place either in advance (by prior agreement or convention) or on the occasion on 
which an individual presents his intention to stop his engagement in the joint activity.  
Following Lomasky, I shall call this understanding of the right to dissociate a weak form of 
freedom of dissociation (Lomasky 2008).   
Although I believe that Gilbert correctly accounts for the conditions of adequacy of 
some joint activities, I am less convinced that freedom of dissociation should adopt this weak 
shape in a free society.  My main reason for doubt about this form of dissociation is that its 
application would make it legitimate for associations to retain dissident members against 
their will.  In order to dissociate from a group, the dissident or unsatisfied member would 
have to wait for the concurrence of all the other members of the association.85  Because such 
an outcome is not consistent with FA, I conclude that a stronger freedom is needed.  To be 
fair, Gilbert suggests in passim that this concurrence condition on exit may be given a 
stronger, more liberal, tone.  She asks whether there could be “a society with the convention 
that one’s merely wanting to break away from any joint activity always suffices to free one of 
the constraints of that activity” (Gilbert 2006, p.113).  And her answer is that, in effect, there 
would be nothing wrong with that society.  However, despite the sympathy I have for this 
answer, I think we would do better to adopt a different – stronger – strategy in response to 
the issue of exit in the context of a free society. 
What I have in mind is that, rather than adopting a condition of adequacy of 
disassociation from a joint activity grounded in conventions, positive agreements or 
                                                
85 This difficulty is analogous to the difficulty that classical liberalism finds in the idea of common property – the 
difficulties it finds in what G.A. Cohen has called “joint ownership of the external world” (Cohen 1986b, p.80).  If 
I own nothing other than myself and external things are common property, all I can do must require the 
agreement – the concurrence – of others (those who own what I require to lead a life).  This, in turn, renders a 
system of common property a system prone to unfreedom since I cannot lead a life without the 
agreement/concurrence of others.  Of course, in a free society a social group may arrange things so that it creates 
an association of joint ownership in external things.  However, this association would have to have a much weaker 
character, as weak as to allow the individual to exercise is liberty-right of association without the concurrence of 
anyone else but herself.          
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background understandings, we should adopt the right to dissociate as a right as 
fundamental as the liberty-right to associate.  We should understand the right to dissociate as 
the logical corollary of the right to associate.  This results in a strong right to dissociate that 
follows from the value individuals assign both to their life projects and to their capacity to live 
according to those projects.86 This right supposes that individuals are at liberty to 
disassociate and others have no right to infringe this liberty.  Similarly, individuals enjoy a 
robust claim-right held against other members of society not to be forced to stay within a 
given association.87   
All of this means that, in my account, freedom of association provides reasons that 
always override the original requirements of the joint activity and, therefore, can always 
legitimately bring this activity to an end.88 In support of this claim is the idea that, pace 
Gilbert, concurrence conditions are conditions of doing things together, not conditions for 
the persistence or termination of joint activities (or social groups).  Thus, concurrence 
conditions are conditions that establish the legitimate standing of the participants within the 
joint activity, but they do not delimit individuals’ right to freedom of association.  They are 
internal elements relevant to what is entailed by joint activities – they describe what we are 
doing together – but they do not underwrite the joint activity itself.  Thus, violating a 
concurrence condition means that things have gone wrong, not because we are not justified 
in doing what we do (e.g., leaving the association), but because we are not doing what the 
common description of the joint activity commends us to do.  Instead, it is the individual and 
the subjective benefits she gains from associating with others that justifies her remaining in 
and/or leaving an association (this is what justifies the association in the way that matters; 
that is, it justifies it in her eyes). 
Of course, a comprehensive account of the scope of the right to dissociate would 
need to be thought out much more carefully.  Here, I can only narrow down this issue by 
emphasising two things.  The first one counts as a response to general critical appraisals of 
                                                
86 Chandran Kukathas has argued along similar lines in saying that “if there are any fundamental rights, [the right to 
exit] has to be that right.  It is an inalienable right, and one which holds regardless of whether the community 
recognizes it as such”  (Kukathas 2003, p.96).  See also Kukathas 1995, p.238.  
87 A traditional objection against this liberal right focuses on the costs that exercising the right to dissociate may 
involve.  However, this objection will not do, because the general cost that exercising the right to exit may involve 
does not represent an infringment or violation of this right.  Whether there are higher or lower costs, what counts 
as honouring the right to exit is not to be forced to remain in an association. 
88 Within the literature of international justice and secession, Christopher Wellman defends a right similar—
although slightly more qualified—to this.  He “argues that any group has a moral right to secede as long as its 
political divorce will leave it and the remainder state in a position to perform the requisite political functions” 
(Wellman 2005, p.1).  I leave for a different time establishing the descriptive and normative similarities and 
differences between this primary right of secession and the right to exit within the framework of the free society.   
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this right coming from some of the literature on cultural diversity.  Contrary to the worries 
expressed by some of these theorists, the right to exit is not to count necessarily as “enough of 
a protection against cultural pressures” (Phillips 2006, p.137) or as “an adequate substitute for 
the basic liberties” (Green 1998, p.167.  See also Okin 2002).  The right to exit is only one of 
the protections available to dissidents or unsatisfied members of associations and it is one of 
the basic liberties to be respected in a free society.  As pointed above, another protection is 
the right to remain in an association, were the dissident interested in bringing change to her 
association.  In turn, a fuller consideration of this right to remain would require additional 
reflection on the competing entitlements non-dissidents and/or satisfied members may have 
to expel others from an association (the right to permit entrance into the association should 
also be considered).   
This is not an exhaustive list, but it suggests some of the issues to be considered in a 
more complete account of the right to dissociate.  Considering the precise limits of these 
different entitlements and constraints is something that goes well beyond the purpose of this 
chapter.  In any case, what needs to be emphasised, and what represents a central protection 
of the individual against oppressive associations in the free society, is the right to freedom of 
association and its corollary, the right to dissociate.  In the face of diversity and 
disagreement, such principles fare better than the imposition of patterned ways to lead a life 
within the free society: if things do not go well for a portion of the members of a given social 
group, they are to be free to leave and to seek or create more beneficial associations.89 
The second emphasis is that what is being discussed here is the right to leave 
associations, not the right to nullify obligations and duties.  Thus, although according to my 
account an individual is to be free to exit society or other type of association, such a 
fundamental right does not necessarily nullify the obligations she may have contracted as a 
result of her membership of the association she now leaves.  Of course, leaving an association 
means that some obligations – for example, those created by virtue of entering and/or 
remaining in the joint activity – will no longer be relevant, but others may remain (for 
example, it does not follow from my account that all the obligations a partner may incur 
when entering into a marriage contract are released when he or she wants to dissociate from 
                                                
89 As mentioned above, I believe that the protection of the right to dissociate would involve the creation of some state 
institutions that may not currently exist in an adequate form.  I imagine something like the agencies and 
programmes of protection of witnesses and their relatives but applied to all type of voluntary associations.  This 
programmes have been successful in minimising the risk of injury or death of those who provide testimony against 
members of organised criminal groups (on witness protection in some European countries see Council of Europe 
2004, pp.15-42)  This proposal, however, does not deny that the state institutions of the free society would 
presumably be less substantial than those of current liberal states. 
 113 
the common activity of marriage or that all type of debts one may have as result of one’s 
membership in a given association become null when one unilaterally decides to exit).  Again, 
the precise extent and nature of the obligations from which an individual exiting an 
association is released needs more analysis than I can offer here.90 
In conclusion, the principle of freedom of association with its corollary, the right to 
dissociate, and a couple of ancillary constraints (rights to remain in, and rights to enter, 
associations) are adequate mechanisms to protect individuals from the danger of oppression.  
Insofar as these conditions are honoured by social groups and enforced by state institutions, 
society remains as a genuine expression of the free society. 
 
2.4 A Final Rejoinder in Defence of FA 
Nothing I have said here should make us conclude that there are no other principles and 
functions that the state and institutions of the free society may adopt.  Such principles and 
purposes may well be legitimate and justified under certain circumstances.  What I am 
presenting is the ideal towards which a liberal society should aspire.   
As I have emphasised, the free society exists in the circumstances of politics.  It is a 
society that, like ours, is characterised by deep diversity and profound disagreement.  This 
fact is insurmountable.  But in this society, unlike ours, state institutions are committed to 
FA, a principle that honours the basic liberal idea that individuals are to be left free to live 
their lives as they think fit.  Given diversity and disagreement about the ways to go in life, the 
state should not intervene in – in fact, it should remain indifferent to – how these different 
associations originate and to the comprehensive doctrines they adopt.  The state is not there 
to impose a particular conception of the good or life purpose, but simply to protect 
individuals’ liberty to live their lives as they think fit.  This ‘liberal indifference’ of the state to 
the types of lives individuals live in association with others is what FA captures.  To the 
extent that the free society diverts from this ideal, it moves in a less liberal direction on the 
liberal continuum. 
I accept that this strong endorsement of FA as the basis of the general role of the 
state institutions is controversial.  What about the state provision of health? Or education? 
                                                
90 It would also be necessary to consider the obligations the association has towards the individual exiting.  For an 
illustration (not favourable to those leaving the association), see Hofer et.al. v. Hofer et.al. (1970), in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada ruled against two Hutterites who, having been expelled from the Hutterian colony, 
sued for a share of the communal assets.  
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These are goods that we now take to be basic and, we may think, their provision should also 
be part of the general function of the state of the free society.  But again, although under 
certain circumstances the state may adopt the active role of educating and providing health 
care to its members, in the ideal free society, on pain of making this society a less liberal 
association, this is not the case. 
The prima facie problem of assigning functions such as the provision of health care 
and education to the state is that it involves the state in endorsing non-neutral commitments 
and imposing these commitments on others even if those others in good faith object.  Indeed, 
even if these commitments are at odds with the subjective identity of those who object.  To 
pretend that our systems of education or health are neutral is to not take seriously the 
different possible ways people may direct their lives.  Some of the groups coexisting under 
the overall umbrella of the state of the free society may simply want to be left alone with 
respect to health and education – think of Jehovah's Witnesses and Amish – while other 
groups – think of conservative Christian and supremacist groups – may wish to impose 
health and education policies.91 To the extent that we accept the circumstances of politics 
and we favour a non-oppressive state, let alone the state of the free society, the minimal 
workable alternative is to articulate the function of the state and its institutions around the 
constraints imposed by FA.  This is the principle that best represents the neutrality the state 
of the free society ought to have.92 
A final qualifying word is in order.  Perhaps there are other functions of the state that 
respect the principle of neutrality.  In effect, it may be that a certain system of universal access 
to public education and public health could be implemented without being necessarily 
oppressive or partial.  The cost of creating these neutral services may well be part of the cost 
of living with others and, therefore, part of what legitimately we may be asked to endure.  I 
do not deny these possibilities and, were they effectively conceived of as neutral institutions, 
they could be part of the function of the state of the free society.  In any case, and keeping this 
qualification in place, whatever other functions the state of the free society may have, 
                                                
91 For illustrations see West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), ruling that the Free Speech clause 
of the First Amendment prohibits public schools from forcing students (Jehovah’s Witnesses or not) to salute the 
American flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance. Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), ruling that compulsory school-
attendance laws violate the right of Amish parents to decide about their children’s education under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  Takeda v. The State (2000), where the Supreme Court of Japan ruled 
that a hospital violates the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses patients by administering blood transfusion without their 
knowledge or consent.  
92 This is not to say that we should give people full-control over their children.  There are serious controversies about 
this issue and before applying the model I defend we would have to dwell longer on the peculiar circumstances of 
children. 
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honouring FA is the minimum the state must do. 
 
3 .  Conclusion 
In closing, I shall briefly refer to a couple of questions that result from my account of the free 
society.  If the basic general function of state institutions is to honour FA we may wonder, 
first, what are those institutions and, second, how these institutions honour this principle.  
My answer to the first question will surely be disappointing: those institutions are whatever 
institutions we need to serve individuals as project pursuers in consistency with FA.  My aim 
here is not to provide a full account of the institutions of the free society, but simply to lay the 
ground for the analysis of the institution that concerns us in this thesis; the criminal law.  The 
argument I am pursuing in this chapter and the next proceeds in several steps, from the 
purposive nature of individuals to the function of the state institutions that are to serve these 
individuals, and from these state institutions to the criminal law of the free society.  In this 
sense, what these other institutions may be is not a central concern here.93 
However, and to underline what I have argued in previous paragraphs, in 
establishing that the general function of the state is to honour FA, one may expect that the 
state institutions that may furnish the free society will be minimal – not only in their function 
but in their number.  Since individuals are let free to associate as they think fit, the 
institutions that may legitimately exist in that society ought not to interfere in any substantive 
way with individuals’ purposive natures, but only to serve the capacity individuals have to live 
their lives as they think fit.  In addition, since the state institutions’ main and primary function 
is to honour this liberty-right, it seems plausible to think that the institutions required to fulfil 
this task are fewer in number than those that actually constitute modern liberal states.94 
This answer connects with the second question of how these institutions may 
honour FA.  There is certainly not one unique way to honour this principle.  In effect, what 
differentiates one state institution from another is the specific way in which each of them 
contributes to serving individuals and, thereby, the specific way in which each institution 
                                                
93 There is certainly a question to be asked here.  Is this methodological move possible?  Does it make sense to talk 
about the criminal law without considering the more general picture of the state and society?  In a sense, that is 
what I considered in the previous chapter when analysing Antony Duff’s preconditions of liability: to what extent 
can we hold people subject to the criminal law if other institutional arrangements are not in place or are simply 
unjust? My answer was that from a conceptual point of view these are different matters that involve different 
questions.  Hence, they can be considered separately.  Perhaps a more pressing question is whether we should 
treat them as such. 
94 But see fn.89 above. 
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translates into policy the respect owed to FA.  As I said above, this thesis is meant to focus 
on one institution only and therefore, interesting and important as it may be, the way in 
which these other institutions honour FA is not within the scope of this work.  How the 
criminal law honours its general function – the general function it has as an institution of the 
state – is the central concern of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
On the General  Function of the Criminal Law in a Free Society 
 
The interest involved is that of security, to everyone’s feelings the 
most vital of all interests. Nearly all other earthly benefits are 
needed by one person, not needed by another; and many of them 
can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone, or replaced by something 
else; but security no human being can possibly do without; on it 
we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value 
of all and every good, beyond the passing moment; since nothing 
but the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us, if 
we could be deprived of anything the next instant by whoever was 
momentarily stronger than ourselves.   
J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, V, p.98 
 
Four of the central claims of chapter 4 were: (a) individuals value their life purposes and their 
capacity to live a life according to these purposes. (b) The value of associating with others 
depends on the extent to which this association provides subjective benefits to a life lived 
according to individuals’ life purposes. (c) The general function of the state institutions of a 
free society is not to protect a given life purpose but to protect the individual capacity to live a 
life according to her life purposes – this is done by honouring the principle of freedom of 
association.  And (d) the reasons an individual has to enter, remain in, or leave, an association 
are a function of the subjective benefits the individual finds in that association. 
From these claims this chapter derives the general role and scope of action of the 
criminal law in a free society.  This enterprise needs to take into account at least two aspects 
of the analysis undertaken in the previous chapters.  First, it needs to consider the specificity 
of the criminal law considered in chapter 1, that is, its coercive and condemnatory character 
and its public dimension.  The function of the criminal law of a free society must be limited 
by these elements.  Second, this analysis must remain true to the general function of the state 
institutions of the free society as stated in (c) above.  The combination of these elements 
together with some further specifications will give us an account of the general function of 
the criminal law of the free society.  The importance of this task cannot be overemphasised: 
getting the general function of the criminal law right is a first and crucial step if we are going 
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to make any improvement in the current condition of this institution. 
 
1 .  The Criminal  Law and Stabil ity  of  Expectations 
What is the role of the institution of the criminal law in a free society?  What are the limits 
that this institution should not trespass?  What is the precise protection that the criminal law 
provides to purposive individuals vis-à-vis the principle of freedom of association?  Although 
each of these questions is slightly different, I shall try to provide a common answer by 
focusing on what I take to be the most fundamental contribution of the institution of the 
criminal law to the individuals it serves.  This contribution, in turn, provides the key to the 
general function of the criminal law.  
The analysis in the previous chapter considered a couple of objections to my model 
of the free society and the central place it assigns to the principle of freedom of association.  
The problem of stability was at the centre of these difficulties.  Part of my response was that 
conflict and instability are certainly a consequence that may follow from this model since 
freedom, and not stability, is the primary mark of a free society.  That may be the cost we 
have to pay for living in a society that takes freedom and diversity seriously.  However, the 
degree of conflict and instability a society endures for the sake of liberty cannot be such as to 
destroy society or to cause it to regress to a condition of nature in which no common 
enterprise and association is possible.  This raises the following question: how does the free 
society, despite the possibility of instability, remain a free society – i.e., an association that 
enjoys the minimal levels of cohesion or joint commitments intrinsic to any social group (see 
ch.3)? At the centre of my answer to this question is the criminal law and the contribution it 
makes to individuals’ stability of expectations. 
 
1.1 Stability of Expectations 
According to Hobbes, stability is what the state of nature lacks and what Hobbesian 
individuals fear so much that they are led to the creation of the Leviathan. 
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power 
to keep them all in awe, they are in the condition which is called Warre […] For 
as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an 
inclination thereto of many days together: So the nature of War, consisteth not 
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in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there 
is no assurance to the contrary  (Hobbes 1985, pp.185f.  My Italics).   
In a Hobbesian key, the problem of instability refers to the existence of conditions in which 
conflict is the result of rational calculation and in which conflict undermines our interests in 
living a life according to plan (or, as I put it above, according to our life purposes and 
fundamental commitments).  A life lived under unlimited or unconstrained conflict is a life 
where the prospect of a life with others, and more importantly, the prospect of a life where 
individuals’ interests are advanced, is radically undermined.   
Similarly, instability is what the Federalists made strong efforts to avoid whilst 
promoting the ratification of the Constitution of the United States.  Let me quote at length 
some illustrative passages by James Madison: 
An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry 
on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once by all prudent people as a 
speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly.  
[…] 
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous.  It poisons the 
blessing of liberty itself.  It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are 
made by men of their own choice if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot 
be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or 
revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no 
man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow.  
Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little 
known, and less fixed? 
[…] 
But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and 
reverence which steals into the hearts of the people towards a political system 
which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their 
flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual, will long be 
respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable without 
possessing a certain portion of order and stability  (Madison 1987, pp.367-9). 
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As with the individual who swiftly and without apparent reason changes plans and projects, 
instability damages state institutions and the way others perceive their authority.  Instability 
precludes individuals from knowing what lawful actions are and what they can expect from 
their fellow members of society and from the state itself.  Instability is, in effect, the first step 
towards the collapse of any possible association.  It undermines both the plausibility of 
common goals and their knowledge, and the recognition of the status of others within the 
joint activity of living together, all of which, ultimately, puts the existence of society at stake.  
What these illustrations show – both Hobbes’s and Madison’s – is that a life without stability 
makes societal coexistence impossible and, with it, a life led with others in ways that are 
beneficial for all. 
In the following sections I will defend and further specify the claim that the 
contribution of the criminal law to the minimisation of instability in individuals’ lives is 
realised by honouring the principle of freedom of association (FA).  As I argued in chapter 4, 
respecting the right to freedom of association is the response of the free society to instability 
in the face of diversity and disagreement.  When stability is undermined and individuals think 
the conditions of coexistence have been reduced to an unacceptable degree, the importance 
of the right to associate (and dissociate) emerges with all its force.  This right, at the core of 
FA, allows dissenters and unsatisfied members of society to dissociate to pursue their life 
projects as they think fit, should they deem it to be in their interests to do so. 
What we need to look at now is the specific way in which the criminal law – as 
opposed to other state institutions – honours this principle.   
 
1.2 The Criminal Law and Stability of Expectations 
To begin our task we need to recall the specificity of the criminal law as considered in 
chapter 1.  According to the argument there, the criminal law threatens an individual with 
some condemnatory consequences imposed in the name of the whole polity whenever the 
individual performs an action that has been deemed criminal within that jurisdiction.  
Because we can reasonably expect that people will in general avoid performing actions that 
invoke such condemnation, then if the criminal law holds an action φ to be a criminal act, 
members of that jurisdiction may expect φ-ing to occur less frequently than if φ were not 
prohibited.  Additionally, if a member of that jurisdiction performs φ, she may expect certain 
consequences on part of the state – prosecution, conviction and punishment – as a result of 
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her doing φ.  By the same token, if she does not do φ, she may expect the absence of certain 
course of actions from the state as a result of her not doing φ – she may, at the very least, 
expect not to be prosecuted, convicted or punished (at least, not for φ-ing).95  
The criminal law, because of its capacity to guide human actions within the 
boundaries of the polity, contributes to individuals’ stability of expectations.  It does so by 
establishing intended consequences that individuals can expect when others within the polity 
act (or fail to act) in certain relevant ways.  In turn, this contribution enhances the stability of 
expectations needed by individuals to live their lives as they think fit in association with 
others.  So articulated, the criminal law plays an important role in the maintenance and 
enhancement of levels of stability that, in turn, make the individual value her association with 
others.  This is the crucial contribution of the criminal law: to make a life lived with others a 
beneficial association.  By contrast, instability removes the very condition of advantage in 
living together, by reducing each person’s ability to plan her life and trust others. 
A way to explain the importance of stability in living a life with others according to 
plan is that our life purposes demand some substantive degree of anticipation of what is to 
come; they require present reliance on the existence of a future state of affairs that will be 
consistent with our life plans.  Without this degree of anticipation, our life purposes lose their 
meaning and depth.  If I cannot have a reasonable degree of assurance that others will act in 
certain ways – for example, that they will do what they promise, that they will not change 
their minds about the business we began, that they will behave according to our well-
cemented conventions – my ability to project my life and pursue my goals with others is 
seriously undermined.  A life lived with others without a basic level of stability of 
expectations about how they will act in relevant matters is not a life we can live according to 
our life purposes.  This is not the life of a purposive individual. 
This role of the criminal law in a free society fits neatly with H.L.A Hart’s 
conception – in the epigraph of chapter 4 – of a human society as a ‘society of persons’.  In the 
                                                
95 Some may rebut these claims on empirical grounds.  It may be said – and it has been said – that criminalizing 
certain types of actions does not contribute to reducing the recurrence of those specific types of behaviour.  Or 
that even if a criminal law does not have preventive effects, it still would be a good idea to have that law.  To 
illustrate, consider the words of Charles Krauthammer: “The assault weapons ban […] will have no ultimate effect 
on the crime rate or on personal security.  Nevertheless, it is a good idea. […]Passing a law like the assault 
weapons ban is a symbolic – purely symbolic – move in that direction.  Its only real justification is not to reduce 
crime but to desensitize the public to regulation of weapons in preparation for their ultimate confiscation” 
(Krauthammer quoted in Nisbet 2001, p.23).  Whatever answer we provide to these rebutals, what needs to be 
clear here is that even if these responses do not succeed, empirical evidence in this respect cannot really touch the 
claim that the criminal law in a free society ought to enhance stability of expectations among the individuals of 
that society. 
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account defended in this thesis, as in Hart’s work, persons see themselves as purposive 
individuals, guided by their intentions and choices.96 This understanding reinforces the idea 
that the criminal law and its coercive power ought to be exercised in a way consistent with 
the “recognition that a man’s fate should depend upon his choice”; in doing so, the criminal 
law of the free society becomes what it ought to be: “a mechanism for […] maximizing […] the 
efficacy of the individual’s informed and considered choice in determining the future and also 
his power to predict that future” (Hart 2008, pp.182, 46).  It is the enhancement of the 
freedom of individuals to determine their futures in the light of their present actions and 
commitments that constitutes the most important contribution of the criminal law to a free 
society. 
 
1.3 Bodily Ownership and Ownership in External Things 
Yet, of course, the criminal law cannot contribute to individuals’ stability of expectations 
across all aspects of their lives.  Because the criminal law has only a specific scope of 
legitimate action (see ch.2), we need to ask: which expectations is it that the criminal law is 
meant to protect and to make more stable in a free society?; In what way does the criminal 
law serve individuals’ capacity to live their lives as they think fit?   The argument I shall make 
in this section is that the only type of expectations to be reassured and/or made more stable 
by the criminal law are certain basic expectations that relate to, and are necessary for, the 
capacity to live a life as one thinks fit in association with others.  They are, put differently, the 
preconditions of freedom of association, that is, conditions that need to be in place in order 
for us to exercise our capacity to engage in any type of free association. 
 
Bodily Ownership Precondition 
In determining the preconditions of freedom of association a natural place to begin is by 
thinking about the importance of one’s bodily integrity.  Indeed – leaving aside contentious 
metaphysics – without a body the notion of associating with others is nonsensical.  Freedom 
of association supposes that we are entitled to do as we want with ourselves in order to 
associate with others, and this is possible only if we are entitled to use our bodies however we 
                                                
96 Hart’s reference to choices is consistent with my account insofar as we understand ‘persons’, and their respective 
‘choices’ and ‘intentions’ as a language framed within some form of humanistic compatibilism or, more clearly, as a 
language devoid of a scientificist understanding of personhood, choice and intent.  As I take it, this is the correct 
reading of Hart’s position. 
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see fit (subject to the constraints of others being able to do so too, and to those constraints 
we take on as associative beings).  Thus, what is relevant in this respect is something that 
goes beyond possessing a body or having one ‘on loan’.  Although having a body may be 
enough to associate with others, free associations require more than this.  What matters as a 
precondition of freedom of association is that individuals own their bodies so that the 
exercise of their capacity to associate is not dependant on someone else.97  Thus, my view is 
that the very possibility of exercising our capacity to associate freely with others depends on 
owning one’s body and, without bodily ownership being in place, the exercise of one’s right 
to associate and dissociate would not depend on oneself but would be contingent on 
someone else (and this would be contrary to FA).  In this I am appealing to a reasonably 
common view that “if a human being has any just, prior claim to anything at all, he has a just, 
prior claim to his own body” (Thomson 1986, p.44).98  I call this individual claim to an 
individual’s own body, the bodily ownership precondition of freedom of association. 
But, what does owning one’s body mean?  The beginning of an answer should 
consider that, unlike mere possession, ownership supposes a strong entitlement to use and 
control our bodies as we think fit.  Thus, my account grants that the most basic of the 
preconditions of an individual’s capacity to associate with and dissociate from others refers to 
the ownership entitlement – the property right – of the individual upon her own body.  This 
entitlement is to the unconstrained moral control and use of one’s body, compatible with the 
same entitlement for all.  Nozick’s explanation of a right to property is helpful in further 
unpacking the bodily ownership precondition:   
The central core of the notion of a property right in X [for our purposes, the 
property right in one’s body] [...], is the right to determine what shall be done 
with [one’s body]; the right to choose which of the constrained set of options 
concerning [one’s body] shall be realized or attempted  (Nozick 1974, p.171). 
From the point of view of the criminal law, the bodily ownership precondition is understood 
as the most fundamental claim individuals hold against each other.  The right to bodily 
ownership held by A is understood here as A’s ownership over A’s body, so that A is the only 
                                                
97 If my use of ‘ownership’ in this context sounds inadequate to some ears, I am happy to replace the term with the 
specific entitlements that constitute the ownership of something.  In the next paragraph I specify these 
entitlements. 
98 It is interesting to note that even (some) Marxists would find this persuasive.  G.A. Cohen, for example, when 
referring to Nozick’s theory says that “Nozick’s political philosophy gains much of its polemical power from the 
attractive thought that [...] constitutes its foundation.  That thought is that each person is the morally rightful 
owner of himself” (Cohen 1986a, p.109). 
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individual legitimately entitled to determine ‘what shall be done’ with A’s body.  This 
entitlement, in turn, imposes obligations on others as to what they can do to A’s body.  In 
Hohfeldian terms, this entitlement is a claim-right held by A against others who, thereby 
acquire duties in relation to what they can legitimately do (or not) to A’s body.  Thus, when 
an individual B violates A’s bodily ownership, B does not fulfil B’s duty owed to A.  But this 
entitlement is also a liberty-right so A has no duty to use her body in any specific way and, all 
else equal, no one has a right to limit the use A makes of A’s body, when that use is 
compatible with the same claim-right for all. Thus, when B limits the ways in which A can 
use A’s body, B acts illegitimately and against A’s liberty. 
For our purposes, it is also important to note that although the fundamental claim 
held by individuals over their own body imposes constraints on other individuals, it also 
establishes limits on what the criminal law can legitimately do.  Thus, when translated into 
the discussion of the general function and limits of the criminal law, I refer to this 
fundamental right as the bodily ownership condition of the criminal law.  This condition sets 
the first general limit on the function of this institution.   
The bodily ownership condition demands that the criminal law is to protect 
individuals’ ownership over their own bodies from other people’s and institutions’ illegitimate 
incursions (including incursions by the criminal law).  The criminal law fulfils this condition 
in various ways.  It does so when it limits its own function according to what this right 
demands; when it coerces others to refrain from acting in ways incompatible with this right; 
and when it condemns those who violate this right.  Thus, the bodily ownership condition 
does not only have a negative function but also establishes more precisely the role of the 
criminal law as a state institution.  On the one hand, this condition establishes a jurisdictional 
limit not to be trespassed on by the criminal law and, on the other hand, it sets positively 
what the criminal law is meant to do.  Thus, the bodily ownership condition has a twofold 
role in determining the function of the criminal law: it presents both the aim and limits of the 
general function of this institution. 
 
Ownership in External Things Precondition 
In a free society bodily ownership is not the only condition of the criminal law that needs to 
be in place.  This follows if we accept that a fundamental complement – if not a logical 
corollary – of the right to bodily ownership is the right to ownership in external things.  
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There is, of course, an intense debate in the literature about the inadequacy of the Lockean 
argument of deriving rights in external things from self-ownership and/or bodily ownership 
rights, but this is not the place to engage in such a discussion.99 Instead, I will clarify my 
claim on this point and present two arguments supporting it.   
The clarification is that my claim is not about whether it is possible to derive 
ownership in external things from bodily ownership.  In other words, the point that matters 
here is not about the acquisition of property.  Indeed, my proposal may allow, for example, a 
Lockean model of appropriation or a semi-Lockean one, à la Nozick.  Or perhaps, instead, 
one may think that we would do better adopting a more leftist model, along the lines 
proposed by Hillel Steiner or Michael Otsuka.100  My model, in principle, does not rule out 
any of these possibilities. Rather, what my proposal requires is simply to establish that 
whenever and however we establish a right to ownership in external things, ownership 
should count as a matter of concern for the criminal law. 
This clarification is complemented by the following two arguments in support of my 
suggestion that ownership in external things is a precondition of freedom of association.  
First, were bodily ownership not followed by some form of ownership in external things, 
bodily ownership would be devoid of meaning and/or all exercisability.  This is explained by 
the idea that in order to exercise the right to bodily ownership we need something in and on 
which to exercise such a right.  Rights of property, as Nozick’s passage quoted above 
suggests, are entitlements to do things with what is owned.  In this sense, if it is going to be a 
meaningful right at all, the right to own one’s body, and therefore, the right to decide what to 
do to and with one’s body, requires the existence of a right to ownership in external things.  
By contrast, consider instead a social arrangement that accepts bodily ownership but that 
does not permit any other type of property.  In that context, the expression of the right to 
ownership in one’s body would become fully dependant on the will of those who have control 
over external things, something like an independent overarching power – God or a politburo 
– or the common will of all.  These bodies would have to decide not only if and when one 
could use one’s body to manipulate non-bodily bits of the world, but also if and when one can 
remain in a place and/or move from one position in space to another.  These are unacceptable 
conditions of coexistence in a free society.101  
                                                
99 G.A. Cohen is perhaps one of the most influential contemporary opponents of that Lockean argument.  See 
Cohen 1986a, 1986b and 1995.  
100 Locke 2003; Nozick 1974; Otsuka 2003; Steiner 1994. 
101 This line of argument derives from Cohen 1986b. 
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As a counterargument it might be said that a decent use of state power would not 
allow the imposition of unreasonable constraints on people’s movements and use of external 
things and, therefore, that the right to ownership in external things is not necessary for 
people to exercise their bodily ownership.  The success of this objection can be minimised – if 
not ruled out – by resorting to a second argument in support of the ownership in external 
things precondition.  We must remember that the ultimate rationale of the general function 
of the criminal law is to serve individuals’ capacity to live a life as they think fit.  As I 
emphasised in chapter 4, this capacity is a fundamental aspect of people’s nature and, 
thereby, the possibility to exercise it should not be dependant on the good will of external 
bodies or, in the case of a general will, dependant on the good will of something different 
from the particular will of the individual.  In this context, ownership in external things 
rightfully maximizes the possibility of exercising our right to bodily ownership (because we 
are entitled to use and dispose of our bodies without resorting to anyone else’s will), and, 
ultimately, allows us freely to pursue our lives as we think fit.   
The logic of the right to ownership in external things entails that when A owns a 
worldly thing X, A has a claim-right against individual B so B has a duty not to interfere with 
A’s use and control of X as A pleases.  In addition, this is also a liberty-right held by A, so A is 
at liberty to use and control X as A pleases and B has no right to limit A’s uses of X. 
When translated into the context of the function of the criminal law, the right of 
ownership in external things represents the ownership in external things condition of the 
criminal law.  This is the second condition of the function of the criminal law in a free society: 
when A owns X, the ownership in external things condition is satisfied only if the criminal 
law both limits its function within the boundaries of this right, commands others not to act in 
ways at odds with this right, and condemns those who violate this right.  Thus, like the 
bodily ownership condition, this condition is also twofold: it establishes the limits that the 
criminal law cannot legitimately trespass and presents an account of what the criminal law 
ought to do. 
As I have argued, the reason why this right should also determine the limits of the 
criminal law of the free society is that ownership in external things is a crucial complement of 
bodily integrity as a precondition of freedom of association.  Were we not minimally assured 
of our entitlements to those external things that we legitimately own, the exercise of our right 
to bodily ownership would be undermined if not nil.  If the criminal law is genuinely to 
advance the interest of individuals in living a life as they think fit, then the first precondition 
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of freedom of association needs the second one. 
To sum up: bodily ownership and ownership in external things are the preconditions 
of freedom of association that the criminal law of the free society is to protect.  Together, they 
represent the two necessary and sufficient conditions of the general function of the criminal 
law in a free society.  When the criminal law exceeds the scope of action established by these 
two conditions it becomes – or we have reasons to believe that it has become – a less liberal 
and justified institution; one that abuses its coercive power and threatens individuals with 
condemnation for actions that ought not to be condemned by the liberal state.  
Instead, the free society ought to use the criminal law – the state’s most extensive 
coercive institution – only to protect and advance the basic common interests of the 
individuals subject to its authority.  As I have argued before, under the circumstances of 
conflict and diversity characteristic of the free society, these basic common interests should 
not be presented in a form more extensive than the shared interest we have in both our life 
purposes and the general capacities that allow us to live our lives as we see fit.  Given the 
liberal commitment to neutrality (see ch.4 sec.1.3), to use the criminal law to protect or 
promote other types of interest amounts to using coercive measures to advance views more 
comprehensive than those that appeal to all: to allow this is to defend a criminal law that is 
illegitimately coercive.  Such is the ‘fact of oppression’ that a free society must avoid.  
Respecting the two conditions of the criminal law advanced here is crucial in impeding this 
undesirable state of affairs; a criminal law that confines itself to these limits impedes the 
expansion of its coercive power into spheres that do not relate to the preconditions required 
for an individual to associate with others. 
Of course, what I have said here does not mean that the criminal law is the only part 
of a system of law that contributes to the stability of expectations.  Civil and administrative 
branches of the law may also play a role in contributing to stability.  Furthermore, the law 
itself is not the only institution that may contribute to individuals’ stability of expectations in 
a free society.  Although I shall not refer to other social institutions and practices that may 
plausibly contribute to stability it is important to keep this in mind in order to avoid falling 
into the perils of the reductive and oppressive penal state considered in chapter 1.  In a free 
society, the criminal law has a role in achieving peace and stability, but that role is minimal 
and very specific.  In other words, stability is not something to be fully provided by the 
criminal law and, in effect, other legal, social and political institutions may have to be in place 
in order to obtain sufficient levels of stability.  The criminal law – and this is the core of my 
 128 
point here – only has a partial role in the task of achieving the required stability of 
expectations of individuals in the free society; it crucially contributes to this stability of 
expectations, but it does not provide it entirely. 
 
2 .  A Misunderstanding:  A Monistic  vs.  A Plural ist ic  Criminal  Law 
To close this chapter, I would like to consider a difficulty that results from my emphasis on 
stability of expectations.  Because stability is valued differently depending on the 
expectations people may have, what counts as an unstable life for an individual depends on 
the life she lives or expects to live.  For example, the stability of expectations about what 
others can do to other people’s property may be valued more by the rich than by the poor; the 
stability of expectations about the life-saving medical treatment that one should be provided 
in case of an accident may be valued more by the atheist and the Catholic than by the 
Jehovah Witness; the stability of expectations about not being injured in one’s body may be 
less valued by a Cartesian mystic than by the mundane individual. 
What these examples show is not that stability of expectations is unimportant or 
unnecessary for some and necessary and important for others, but that adequate degrees of 
stability vary across persons.  The fact that people expect different things, and thus, that they 
may require different types of stability, suggests that there is not a type of protection that the 
criminal law must provide that is sufficient to achieve stability of expectations for all the 
members of a free society.  Whatever levels of stability the criminal law may advance, they will 
always be inadequate for some. 
This conclusion raises the question of how we can determine the type and extent of 
stability that the criminal law of a free society should be ready to provide.  In other words, 
how do we determine what the precise function of the free society’s criminal law is? 
Before offering an answer, let us recap the steps of the argument that have prompted 
these questions:  
(i) The general function of the criminal law of the free society is to 
contribute to enhancing the stability of expectations of purposive 
individuals. 
(ii) Purposive individuals in a free society have different and conflicting life 
purposes. 
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(iii) What counts as sufficient stability of expectations of a purposive 
individual depends on, and varies according to, the life purposes of the 
individual. 
Then: 
(iv) The criminal law cannot contribute equally to the stability of 
expectations of all the participants of the free society. 
This conclusion suggests that the criminal law of the free society is not capable of doing the 
job it is supposed to do.  The problem is that it leaves us with the following dilemmatic 
alternatives: either we adopt an interpersonal standard of value and make the criminal law 
enforce what that standard demands, or we adopt different standards of adequate stability 
for different people.  If we opt for the former – let us call it the monistic alternative – then it 
seems that we renounce the project of giving an account of the criminal law of a free society, 
since we simply stop taking seriously the existence of diversity and disagreement.  If we opt 
for the latter – the pluralistic alternative – we seem to undermine the very possibility of a free 
society because we multiply criminal law jurisdictions.  This would in turn render the system 
of law unable to provide the protection that it is supposed to deliver to all the different 
purposive members of the free society.102  Let us expand briefly on each of these alternatives. 
The monistic alternative envisages a system of criminal law that embraces a specific 
standard of value which determines the interpersonal standard of adequate stability of 
expectations that the criminal law is to serve.  This would be the case of a criminal law that, 
say, takes the project of pursuing a good Catholic life as the interpersonal standard to 
determine what counts as a sufficient level of stability of expectation.  Under this monistic 
penal law it would be assumed that sufficient levels of stability of expectations are attained if 
social facts are arranged in such a way as to assure that people can, say, go to mass on 
Sundays, obtain special dietary provisions during Easter, and be assured that life is taken as 
                                                
102 This dilemma was also perceived by Madison: “Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very 
important one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in government with the inviolable 
attention due to liberty and to the republican form. […] Energy in government is essential to that security against 
external and internal danger and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very 
definition of good government.  Stability in government is essential to national character and to the advantages 
annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which are among the chief 
blessings of civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself than it is odious to the 
people; and it may be pronounced with assurance that the people of this country, enlightened as they are with 
regard to the nature, and interested, as the great body of them are, in the effects of good government, will never be 
satisfied till some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and uncertainties which characterize the State 
administrations. On comparing, however, these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we must 
perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them together in their due proportions” (Madison 1987, p.243.  See also 
§63). 
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sacred from conception.  Contributing to the stability of the good Catholic life does not 
necessarily mean that the criminal law will coerce people to do these types of things.  Instead, 
what the criminal law would do under these circumstances is to contribute to the conditions 
that make a society guided by good Catholic life standards possible – this may involve, for 
example, regulating and criminalizing things like work duties on Sundays, abortion and 
euthanasia, and supermarkets that only sell meat.  In doing so, this monistic criminal law 
would adopt a specific standard and apply it generally, independent of the existence of other 
standards within society that are not compatible with the specific standard adopted.  As a 
result, we would obtain an oppressive criminal law that, in the end, cannot provide 
authoritative commands to all the participants of society. 
The pluralistic alternative, in turn, would recognise different standards of adequacy 
for individuals’ stability of expectations and would thus involve the creation of multiple 
criminal law jurisdictions depending on the specific demands of the groups and/or individual 
subjects of the penal law.  The problem is that, in doing so, the criminal law – and the system 
of law itself – would become unworkable because under circumstances of diversity and 
conflict these different types of criminal law would clash.  The ultimate consequence of this 
alternative is that the criminal law becomes subject-dependant in a way that radically 
undermines the possibility of society as a joint activity in which participants live together.  
We must note that what it is objectionable in the pluralistic alternative is not the emergence 
of clashes between different individual outlooks, but the transformation of the criminal law 
into an institution whose social dimension is compartmentalised in such a way as to make it 
unable to undertake its condemnatory role (and any role) in a socially coordinated fashion.  
Rather than having the criminal law of a society we have different criminal standards 
applying to different people within the same society, all of which is at odds with the social 
condemnatory dimension established by the specificity of the criminal law.103 
As I said, this difficulty seems to leave us facing a dilemma: either we opt for the 
pluralistic alternative and its recognition of diversity and the importance of freedom, but we 
undermine the very possibility of the criminal law as serving society, or we opt for the 
monistic alternative and its unitary account of stability of expectations, but we turn a blind 
eye to individuals’ differences. 
                                                
103 In conversation, Professor Chandran Kukathas has suggested to me that the criminal law of the ‘liberal 
archipelago’ would be something along the lines of the pluralistic alternative.  This marks a central difference 
between his conception of the institutions of the free society and mine. 
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However, in fact this is a false (although illustrative) dilemma that arises from a 
mistaken understanding of what the criminal law of the free society is supposed to do.  The 
dilemma is produced by an understanding of the criminal law as promoting and/or 
protecting  (a) specific substantive conception(s) of the good life.  It views the criminal law as 
embracing principles that are the result of translating into the sphere of the penal institutions 
substantive standards of how a life should be led.  As I have argued – and accordingly to a 
rather standard version of liberalism committed to state neutrality – the criminal law of the 
free society should not be articulated in such a way.  Instead, what the penal institutions of a 
free society are to do is to serve the capacity that purposive individuals have to track their life 
purposes by honouring the principle of freedom of association – and more precisely, by 
respecting the two conditions of the criminal law, bodily ownership and ownership in 
external things.  Since this human capacity is internal to what it is to be a purposive 
individual – and thereby it is a capacity shared by everyone subject to the penal law – my 
account does not fall into the difficulties of having to opt for either a monistic or a pluralistic 
account and, thus, serves everyone living within the association of the free society equally. 
The account of the criminal law defended here is not supposed to endorse and/or 
promote any particular conception of the good life or any specific understanding of what 
capacities are necessary to pursue these different ways of living.  In effect, my account resists 
this way of considering the criminal law and takes it as a mistaken understanding of the 
general function of this institution in a free society.  Instead, by protecting the preconditions 
of freedom of association, the model of the criminal law that I defend is designed to 
contribute to individuals’ capacity to live whatever life they think fit within society.  Since 
these preconditions are immune to the objection of parochialism, the dilemma considered 
above between a pluralistic and a monistic criminal law does not touch the account I have 
offered here.  Within this account, both the autonomous and the non-autonomous life are 
possible, the religious and the non-religious, the egalitarian and the non-egalitarian.  The 
criminal law of the free society makes no distinctions between them.  
 
3 .  Conclusion 
The argument of this chapter has aimed to advance the basic general function of the criminal 
law of a free society.  The central claim is that the penal institutions of the free society are to 
serve the individual by enhancing individuals’ relevant stability of expectations.  As I have 
suggested, the focus of this contribution should be honouring and protecting individuals’ 
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capacity to associate freely, and more specifically, the preconditions of this capacity expressed 
in individuals’ fundamental right to bodily ownership and ownership in external things.  
These are the two necessary and sufficient conditions of the general function of the criminal 
law of the free society. 
As I suggested in chapter 1, a central motivation of my analysis lies in reforming the 
current illiberal condition of the criminal law.  The criminal law we have takes on functions 
far beyond is proper remit: we use the criminal law not only to prevent and sanction specific 
types of conduct, but also to educate, promote and enforce Samaritan duties, evangelise, 
moralise and so on.  The model suggested here resists this overexpansion by offering a 
minimalist alternative that, as I take it, is an adequate response to the current regrettable 
state of penal institutions.  Of course, the argument so far is by no means sufficient to claim 
victory against these illiberal developments in the criminal law.  To specify the function of the 
criminal law is necessary, but not sufficient, in offering an account that succeeds in the task of 
reformulating the criminal law.   In effect, there are other sources of illiberality in the criminal 
law that, although they relate to its function, are not necessarily about its function. 
As discussed at length in chapter 2, the phenomenon of overcriminalization is one of 
these sources of illiberality.  Rather than focusing only on the function of the criminal law, a 
model that attempts to respond to overcriminalization ought to account for a series of 
principles that determine the legitimate scope of substantive criminal law. To undertake this 
task we must consider, at the very least, the principles and rationales guiding criminalization; 
i.e., the principles and rationales guiding the enactment of penal law by legislators.  Building 
on the second part of this thesis, the third and last part turns to this task by considering the 
most plausible liberal principles of criminalization that might guide the creation of criminal 
statutes in a free society.  If successful, this analysis will provide a more determinate answer 

















The Question of Criminalization 
 
This chapter considers some of the most plausible, recognizable and influential liberal 
answers to the question of criminalization.  What this question asks is, given the type of 
individuals we are, what types of conduct may the state legitimately criminalize?  In other 
words, which classes of actions may justifiably mobilise the state institutions towards the 
imposition of punishment? These questions are, in effect, among the most central matters 
addressed by the philosophy of the criminal law.  To do penal philosophy is, to a large extent, 
to engage in the question of criminalization. 
I will present and criticise four plausible and influential answers to the question of 
criminalization in a free society.  The principles, reasons and/or motives considered are the 
harm principle (section 2), penal paternalism (section 3), penal moralism (section 4) and penal 
consequentialism (section 5).  From the outset, it is important to clarify that I do not offer a 
full account of these different positions and the authors that endorse them, but rather I 
present their core claims and see how they fare in reducing overcriminalization in a 
principled manner.  This is to say that my analysis and the criticisms I advance against each 
of these principles should be considered with a qualification: to the extent that theories of 
criminalization generally combine different considerations and principles, my analysis is not 
of theories or comprehensive models of criminalization but of principles, reasons and/or 
motives that are central constituents of different theories of criminalization.  In other words, 
I focus on some of the elements that different authors take as necessary but, generally, not 
sufficient for criminalization.  This qualified critical appraisal will nevertheless prove useful in 
understanding better which principles a theory of criminalization of the free society should or 
should not endorse.  
Finally, it must be noted that the following analysis and the conclusions it reaches are 
to be thought of as applying to the legislature, as opposed to the judiciary.  As will become 
clearer in chapter 7, the reasons, principles and constraints on criminalization that this third 
part of the thesis aims at are legislative reasons, principles and constraints.  This is to say that 
the question of criminalization as it is considered here is about the types of penal laws that 
our representatives in parliament should (or should not) enact.  Although the role of our 
courts and judges and their importance in the task of reducing overcriminalization are 
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important and need to be addressed in order to amend the institution of the criminal law, 
they are not queries that concern us in the following analysis. 
Having said this, and before looking at the four plausible answers to the question of 
criminalization that this chapter considers, let us briefly clarify what is meant by 
criminalization. 
 
1 .  Criminalization of  Actions 
Criminalization involves the penal prohibition of types of actions and, consequently, involves 
holding criminally liable those who culpably perform those actions.104  On the one hand, if the 
question of criminalization is answered by the claim that actions of type φ within a 
jurisdiction J should be criminalized, what we are establishing is that when an agent P 
performs a token of φ within J, all things equal, P ought to be held criminally liable for φ.  On 
the other hand, by criminalizing φ, a jurisdiction J is establishing that P’s conduct is 
condemnable and, absent justifications and excuses, P is to be condemned for φ.  This is part 
of the analysis of the specificity of the criminal law presented in chapter 1.    
Of course, criminalization is not tantamount to the conviction and sentencing of 
those who perform the criminalized action.  This is because not every instance of the 
criminalized action φ is ‘visible’ to the criminal law as only some offences are reported to the 
authorities.  Moreover, even when an instance of φ is visible to the criminal law, φ may not be 
further investigated.  This is because of the high levels of discretion that the bodies in charge 
of investigating and prosecuting offenders have.  To a large extent, it is up to these bodies to 
call offenders to respond for their actions.  However, even if a token of a type of action φ 
performed by an agent P is visible and prosecuted by the state, this does not mean that P is 
going to be convicted and sentenced for having φ-ed.  P may have φ-ed in circumstances that 
justify or excuse P’s φ-ing.  Hence, a mere instance of φ by P in a jurisdiction J does not 
necessarily mean that P is to be convicted, let alone sentenced and punished. 
That criminalization does not amount to conviction and sentencing of those who 
perform the criminalized action is important.  It shows that criminalization is not all that 
matters to tackle the predicaments considered in chapters 1 and 2.  In other words, that 
                                                
104 I use the term ‘conduct’ in a loose way to convey actions, practices and omissions.  These terms have different 
implications for the question of criminalization but, for the time being, they should not distract us. 
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conviction and sentencing do not necessarily follow from criminalization shows that when 
we advance an answer to the question of criminalization – that is, an answer to the question 
‘for what type of actions people should be held criminally liable?’ – we are only offering part of 
a complete normative answer to the problems that affect the system of criminal law.   The 
importance of this thought is that it makes explicit the limited – although fundamental – 
power that a theory of criminalization has to contribute to a fair system of criminal law:  to 
offer an adequate model of criminalization is to offer a necessary but by no means sufficient 
account of what should constitute the system of criminal law in a free society.  A more 
comprehensive analysis would have to include further consideration of types of defences, the 
scope of prosecutorial powers, conditions of due process, and so on.  Although very 
important, these issues are not part of my analysis here. 
With these preliminaries in mind, we pose again the question of criminalization:  
which types of actions may the state legitimately criminalize?  My answer is advanced in 
chapter 7 and derives from the arguments presented in the previous chapters, specifically 
chapters 4 and 5.  That is, the answer to the question of criminalization I defend derives from 
the idea that the primary function of the criminal law of a free society is to contribute to the 
stability of expectations of its members by protecting the preconditions of freedom of 
association.  My contention is that by deriving an answer to the question of criminalization 
from this idea we are in a position both to establish principled limits on the criminal law and 
to contribute a response to the problem of overcriminalization. 
 Before moving to the details of my own proposal in the following chapter, the 
following four sections consider an equal number of different and important liberal principles 
of criminalization that, it may be argued, should inform the criminal law of the free society 
and be effective against the problem of overcriminalization.105 Although each of these 
principles has positive features, my conclusion is that all of them are either incomplete or 
flawed and, therefore, should not be adopted without amendment.    
 
                                                
105 Since what we are looking for are the principles of criminalization of the free society, it is natural to confine our 
search to the reasons and principles of criminalization as presented in the most plausible liberal models of 
criminalization.  That is what I do in the following sections.  However, before kicking off, a note of warning is 
needed.  Liberalism, as we well know, is not all of a kind, so some of the principles/reasons to be considered in 
this chapter may be resisted by some on grounds that they are alien to fundamental liberal commitments.  I am 
not going to engage in that debate here.  Instead, I am going to assume that under certain ascriptions, each of 
these principles of criminalization lives up to liberal premises and that, consequently, each could contribute to a 
plausible account of criminalization in the free society. 
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2 .  Criminalization and the Harm Principle  
The harm principle is doubtless the most influential guide for liberal models of 
criminalization.  Its great strength derives largely from the moral intuition that, other things 
equal, actions that are not harmful to others are no-one else’s business.  This intuition is 
supported by both the value liberalism assigns to individual freedom, privacy and tolerance, 
and by how these central tenets are well honoured by a principle that, on the one hand, 
minimally interferes with individuals’ actions and, on the other, establishes a weighty 
presumption against external intervention over individuals’ lives. 
 
Mill’s Harm Principle 
In On Liberty, J.S. Mill offers the classical formulation of the harm principle:  
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.  
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant  (Mill 1989, 
p.13).  
Although Mill’s formulation is not explicitly concerned with criminalization, I will take the 
harm principle as a principle of criminalization only.  This should not be too contentious.  If 
the harm principle is going to have any bite in regulating interference upon the individual, it 
must, at least, work at its best in restricting the application of penal coercion by the state over 
its members.106 
So, what is the work that the harm principle is doing in relation to criminalization?  
For what interests us here, the most important role of the principle is to establish constraints 
on what counts as legitimate state intervention upon the individual through the criminal law.  
                                                
106  I cannot overemphasise that this is a reductive account of Mill’s principle.  In effect, Mill’s account talks to society 
in general rather than to the state in particular: he is more concerned with general types of interference upon the 
individual than with interventions upon the individual by the state through the criminal law.  Mill has strong 
reasons to opt for this broader approach: “Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong 
mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social 
tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such 
extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and 
enslaving the soul itself” (Mill 1989, p.8).  It is then a mistake to take Mill’s principle as a straight principle of 
criminalization.  For an example that illustrates this mistake see Richards 1982. 
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The limit is set in anti-paternalist terms, so the only type of action that can be rightfully 
prevented – that is, penally regulated – is harm to others (i.e., excluding interference for the 
agent’s own good).  This way of putting things is attractive, at least to liberal eyes, as it leaves 
the individual largely unconstrained; whenever a conduct falls within the set of self-regarding 
actions, it is beyond the legitimate scope of state interference.  Thus presented, the Millian 
principle emerges as a persuasive principle of individual liberty and tolerance.   
Notwithstanding its liberal credentials, Mill’s harm principle involves a series of 
problems extensively reviewed in the literature.107 My intention, however, is not to advance a 
systematic and/or comprehensive critique of Mill’s simple principle.  Instead, I would merely 
like to state, briefly, why my account takes this principle as neither sufficient nor necessary for 
criminalization in the free society.    
I shall argue that the harm principle à la Mill, despite appearances, cannot do the job 
of getting criminalization right.  On the one hand, the concept of harm is too elastic and thus 
would allow the criminalization of types of actions that a free society should not be willing to 
prohibit using the criminal law.  In other words, Mill’s harm principle does not provide 
sufficiently clear and determinate constraints on what should count as a crime in a free 
society.  This is why the harm principle is not a sufficient criterion of criminalization (should 
we criminalize other-regarding involuntary harmful actions? Should we criminalize any type 
of harmful conduct, however defined?).  On the other hand, the criminalization of harmful 
actions cannot be the only aim of a system of criminal law in a free society.  Both the penal 
law as it is, and the penal law as it ought to be, contain legitimate prohibitions of harmless 
actions.  This is why the harm principle is not a necessary criterion of criminalization.108 
Thus, adopting the harm principle as a principle of criminalization in the free society would 
require important qualifications and additional complementary principles that help us obtain 
a ‘complete’ (necessary and sufficient) principle of criminalization.109 
In addition, we should be aware of the difficulties that emerge from the general 
                                                
107 For a good collection of critical papers on Mill’s moral, political and legal philosophy see Ten 1999. 
108 It must be noted that Mill’s general account of interference upon the individual, as opposed to Mill’s account of 
the harm principle, has something to say against this last objection.  In effect, Mill accepts as legitimate certain 
types of intervention on grounds different from harmfulness.  For example: “[…] there are many acts which, being 
directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are 
a violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offenses against others, may rightly be 
prohibited” (Mill 1989, p.98.  See also pp.75-6). 
109 Although this section offers a generally critical account of the harm principle, I must note that my own answer to 
the question of criminalization can be understood as a re-elaboration of this principle.  See chapter 7. 
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utilitarian framework in which Mill’s harm principle is embedded.110  This becomes evident if 
we consider that the specific aim of the harm principle (prevention of harm to others) may be 
overriden by utilitarian considerations, such as promoting human development and 
happiness.  This possibility is suggested by Mill at the very beginning of the last book of On 
Liberty: “It must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to 
the interest of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does 
justify such interference” (Mill 1989, p.94).  What is worrying is that, in the end, the 
criminalization of harmful actions to others seems to depend – at least on occassions – not on 
harm itself, but on something else.  Consider a different passage in which Mill makes a 
similar point: 
There are often good reasons for not holding [someone who caused evil to 
others] to the responsibility [of being accountable for that evil]; but these 
reasons must arise from the special expediences of the case: either because it is a 
kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better, when left to his own 
discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it in their 
power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce 
other evils, greater than those it would prevent  (Mill 1989, p.15).  
Hence, Mill deems it legitimate that, under certain circumstances and from considerations 
different from the harm principle, state action directed to prevent harm to others might be 
hindered.  These is the result of utilitarian considerations upon which Mill’s harm principle 
ultimately depends.  This is problematic.  If we want to succeed in using this version of the 
harm principle as a principle of criminalization, we then need to specify the limits and 
conditions that make penal interventions upon the individual legitimate in the light of Mill’s 
utilitarianism.   
So understood, criminalization turns out to be grounded in standards – in this case 
utilitarian standards – that are determined independently of the general function of the 
institution of the criminal law.  Criminalization becomes an expression of the most 
persuasive (and contingent) utilitarian moral calculation, which makes this institution a mere 
instrument of the maximization of utility.111 This articulation of criminalization is to be 
resisted, as it opens the door to overcriminalization and to undesirable developments such as 
those considered in chapter 1.  Rather than building a system of criminalization in terms of 
                                                
110 For a similar critique see Brown 1972.  See also section 5 of this chapter. 
111 For a more detail criticism of consequentialism with respect to criminalization, see section 5 below. 
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the particular role and specificity of the criminal law, Mill’s harm principle applied to 
criminalization within a utilitarian framework permits the transformation of this institution 
into a mechanism to realise the results of moral calculation.  As it stands, there is nothing in 
this principle that would minimise the expansion (or reduction) of the criminal law for 
reasons alien to the proper function of the state and its institutions.  The combination of 
Mill’s harm principle and utilitarianism, we should conclude, does not do the job that a 
principle of criminalization in a free society is required to do. 
 
Feinberg’s Harm Principle 
Mill’s harm principle is not the only way to put forward a criterion of criminalization based 
on the notion of harm.  A more recent, influential and non-consequentialist variation of the 
harm principle is offered by Joel Feinberg.  He argues that “it is always a good reason in 
support of penal legislation that it would probably be effective in preventing (eliminating, 
reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting) […]” 
(Feinberg 1984, p.26).  Feinberg’s version of the harm principle is thus less strict than Mill’s.  
It establishes that harm to others is not the sole end but merely a good reason for enacting 
penal statutes;112 harm is one consideration, among others, for enacting penal law: on the one 
hand, a harmful action may not be criminalized given that other reasons (non-
consequentialist reasons) preclude or override its criminalization and, on the other hand, a 
harmless action may be criminalized given that non-harm related reasons sufficiently support 
its criminalization (the offence principle is Feinberg’s favoured source for a non harm-related 
reason for criminalization – Feinberg 1985). 
Thus, Feinberg’s account seems to avoid some of the difficulties found in Mill’s 
principle.  In establishing harm as merely a good reason for criminalization, Feinberg allows 
non-harm related considerations as being relevant for criminalization.  This should be seen as 
a step forward since it may seem that the principle now has the power to accommodate 
harmless conduct within the general model of criminalization in a free society (e.g., harmless 
rape, harmless trespass to private property, unauthorised touchings, risks unknown to 
others).113 
                                                
112 As Feinberg puts it, rather than claiming that the harm principle is “the only valid principle for determining 
legitimate invasions of liberty […] [w]e would be better advised […] to begin in a cautious way with the claim that 
the harm principle is a valid legislative principle […]” (Feinberg 1984, pp.11-2).    
113  For harmless rape see Gardner and Shute 2007.  For harmless trespass and unauthorised touchings see Ripstein 
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There is a second aspect of Feinberg’s account that enables his model fare better 
than Mill’s.  As suggested above, adopting harm as a criterion of criminalization forces us to 
face the difficult issue of the meaning and limits of harm.  As we saw, Mill’s On Liberty does 
not provide a sufficiently determinate account of what counts as harm in a relevant sense (in a 
sense relevant to count as a sufficient reason for criminalization).  Although the notion of 
other-regarding conduct (a term that Mill does not explicitly use) provides some insight, 
much more needs to be said if we want to achieve a sufficient criterion of criminalization.  
Feinberg’s account, by contrast, makes progress on this matter in distinguishing two 
conceptions of harm: harm1, a setback of an individual’s interests, and harm2, a setback of an 
individual’s interests that wrongs that individual.114  According to this account, only harm2 is 
harm in a relavant sense, that is, in the sense of being a good reason for criminalization (see 
Feinberg 1987, pp.xxvii-xxix, int. al.).115   
What distinguishes harm1 from harm2 hinges not on the consequences of the harmful 
action, but on the ‘nature’ of the action itself.  Thus, if an agent X pushes an individual Y in 
circumstances such that X pushing Y involves the death of Y we need to inquire into the 
‘nature’ of X’s action causing Y’s death to conclude both whether Y has been harmed1 or 
harmed2 and whether X’s action is a harmful1 or a harmful2 conduct.  Thus, if X pushed Y as a 
result of an epileptic fit, then, other things equal, X’s action is harmful1 and Y has been 
harmed1.  By contrast, if X pushes Y intending to produce Y’s death, and knowing that 
pushing Y would produce Y’s death, then, other things equal,116 X’s action is harmful2 and Y is 
harmed2.
117 
                                                
2006. 
114 Strictly speaking, Feinberg distinguishes three senses of harm, but he only endorses the two considered here.  The 
third sense, which Feinberg rightly dismisses, is harm in a transferred or elliptical sense (see Feinberg 1984, pp.32-
3).  An example of this use takes place when we say that a vandal has ‘harmed’ a window by breaking it. 
115 It must be noted that, according to Feinberg, not any kind of wrong is relevant to harm2, but only wrongs that are 
“morally indefensible, that is, [wrongs that are] neither excusable nor justifiable.” (Feinberg 1986, p.106)  This is 
central to my criticism below. 
116 The ceteris paribus clause is necessary to discard unusual cases of harm1 and harm2.  The clause avoids cases in 
which, say, X intentionally does not take the pill that would have impeded an epileptic fit producing Y’s death.  It 
also bypasses circumstances in which X’s intentionally and knowingly pushing Y in order to provoke Y’s death is 
the result of double effect, self-defence, and so on.    
117 I do not understand harm2 as a subclass of harm1 but rather as a different and independent type of harm, a type of 
harm that is relevant to the criminal law and that has distinct and distinguishable causes. Thus, since the cause of 
death of Y in the example above is different depending on whether X pushed Y because of his epilepsy or because 
of his mischievous motivations, then this case illustrates two different types of harm.  In turn, the different causal 
explanation of each harm determines the nature of the harmful action, so that pushing Y because of X’s epilepsy is 
an action different in kind from, say, pushing Y because of X’s selfish motivations.  In other words, these are 
different actions, emerging from different causal sources and bringing about different types of harm.  This reading 
of Feinberg’s distinction between harm1 and harm2 has been resisted by some.  Consider Antony Duff’s account 
of the distinction: “harms2 are simply harms1 that are caused in ways that wrong the person harmed.  What 
distinguishes harm2 from harm1 is not their intrinsic character as harms, but the extrinsic matter of how they are 
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Thus considered, Feinberg’s account seems to fare better than Mill’s.  It establishes 
that prevention of certain types of harm (harm2) is only a good reason for criminalization and 
that, therefore, harm is not always a conclusive or necessary reason for criminalization.  This 
seems to be a positive development because, first, it renders harm more determinate and, 
second, it resists the idea that harmful action is all that is needed for criminalization.  In what 
follows, and in spite of these positive features, I shall argue that Feinberg’s account is 
inadequate as a model of criminalization consistent with the demands of the criminal law in a 
free society. 
Let me begin by briefly expanding on Feinberg’s notion of harm.  Harmful2 actions 
involve wrongful conduct: “The sense of ‘harm’ as that term is used in the harm principle 
must represent the overlap of [harm1 and harm2]: only setbacks of interests that are wrongs, 
and wrongs that are setbacks to interest, are to count as harms in the appropriate sense” 
(Feinberg 1984, p.36; see also fn.115 above).  This understanding of harm within the context 
of the harm principle can be characterized as a moralized conception of harm (see Holtug 
2002).  Among the benefits of this approach is that it thwarts the criminalization of 
consensual activities that harm their participants (Volenti non fit injuria principle – see 
Feinberg 1984, pp.115-7) and establishes clearly that a large number of harmful actions are not 
within the dominion of the criminal law (i.e., harms that are not wrongs).  All these are 
elements that should count positively in a liberal account of the criminal law that aims to 
minimise overcriminalization. 
However, despite these positive elements, a moralized conception of harm à la 
Feinberg raises important difficulties.  To make this model work we need to advance an 
account of wrongness in a sense relevant to the criminal law.  This is because, for Feinberg, 
not any kind of wrong is relevant to criminalization but only wrongs that are “morally 
indefensible, that is, [wrongs that are] neither excusable nor justifiable” (Feinberg 1984, 
p.106).  What Feinberg offers as a response is a right-based conception of wrongness, so that 
“[o]ne person wrongs another when his indefensible (unjustifiable and inexcusable) conduct 
violates the other’s right” (Feinberg 1984, p.34; see also p.106).  Thus, when an individual X 
harms2 an individual Y (that is, when X harms Y in a sense relevant to the criminal law), X 
                                                
caused” (Duff 2001b, p.18).  My interpretation of Feinberg’s conception of actions is more holistic than Duff’s.  
That is, unlike Duff, I take the state of mind of the agent as part of the intrinsic nature of an action.   Although 
Duff’s reading is not ungrounded – consider, for example, the following passage: “Having qualified the harm 
principle so that legal coercion is justified by it only when necessary to prevent that subclass of harms that are 
wrongs […]” (Feinberg 1984, p.110) – it relies on a particular and not necessarily correct understanding of the idea 
of a subclass.  As I see it, both harm1 and harm2 are subclasses of harm simpliciter. 
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violates Y’s rights (see Feinberg 1987, p.xxix).  As it stands, I shall argue, this right-based 
conception is problematic. 
When we advance a principled model of criminalization we may be doing two 
things: (a) describing what the formal scope of criminalization is, or (b) prescribing what the 
formal scope of criminalization ought to be.  Were Feinberg opting for the former, he would 
not be really establishing limits on the criminal law, but merely establishing what is the case 
regarding criminalization.  If he opts for the latter – as he aims to do – then he is normatively 
committed to certain limits of the criminal law.  The extension of this normative commitment 
is a function of the rights that Feinberg takes to be relevant to the criminal law.  Although 
the details of these commitments are not fully specified, he is certainly aware that not every 
wrong violates rights in the relevant sense, which allows us to conclude that only some 
wrongs fall within the scope of the criminal law.  This move is done, partly, by distinguishing 
legal from moral rights, so that even though every wrong is a violation of a right, not every 
wrong is a violation of a legal right (and mutatis mutandis not every wrong is the criminal 
law’s business).   
As it stands, however, this distinction between legal and moral rights does not get 
criminalization right.  This is because, as Feinberg himself puts it, in some cases “moral 
rights seem to be derivative from, rather than prior to, legal determinations of one sort of 
another” (Feinberg 1984, p.110).  The legal norm of driving on a specific side of the road is a 
typical example of this.  At this point it looks as if Feinberg is shifting from a principled 
model of criminalization of type (b) to one of type (a).  This is because his account seems  to 
permit the establishment of moral rights from a mere description of legal rights and, in the 
abscence of further explanation, this seems to involve deriving a moral right from the 
existence of a legal right.  However, if it is permissible to derive moral rights from legal 
rights, then we are running a serious risk since nothing would impede us from expanding 
criminalization as we think fit.  The defence being that a fact of the matter (a legal right) 
justifies a normative principle (a moral right). 
In a rather underdeveloped passage, Feinberg clarifies his claim and says that in 
those circumstances in which we talk about legal rights that are prior to moral rights we 
should rather talk about “legal judgments that make possible findings of moral and legal 
rights alike” (Feinberg 1984, p.110).  His point is that those prior determinations are not legal 
rights creating moral rights but ‘legal judgments’ that provide a background for subsequent 
criminalization.  However, this move does not resolve the difficulties just mentioned.  
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Feinberg does not provide a criterion to differentiate legal judgments that support the 
enactment of criminal law from legal judgments that do not support it (and that, however, 
may support some form of regulation different from the criminal law).  Without this criterion 
in place, Feinberg’s account allows the discretional expansion of the criminal law and, 
ultimately, the discretional expansion of moral rights through the creation of legal rights.  
Without a precise criterion distinguishing legitimate legal judgments on criminalization from 
legal judgements on non-criminal issues, matters that legitimate fall under the scope of what 
can be criminalized are left, dangerously, to the discretionary powers of legislators and 
officials. 
However, Feinberg thinks that those cases in which moral rights seem to be derived 
from legal rights are atypical, and thus, perhaps my criticism is rather feeble.  We must focus 
instead on the standard case in which legal rights are derived from moral rights.  
As Feinberg puts it, a moral right is “a claim backed by valid reasons and addressed to 
the conscience of the claimee or to public opinion” whose function is to protect a certain 
interest (Feinberg 1984, p.110).  Feinberg does refer to some tokens of those interests that 
should fall within (what he takes to be) the proper scope of the criminal law and takes welfare 
interests to be “the grounds for valid claims against others (moral rights) par excellence” 
(Feinberg 1984, p.112).  He also thinks that ‘morally disruptable interests’ should be left to one 
side when it comes to the criminal law:  
If there are any interests in causing pain and suffering for their own sakes, for 
example, such interests cannot be the grounds of claims against others.  Cruel 
and sadistic interests, morbid interests, wicked and sick interests, if there are 
such things, can be peremptorily ruled out of court, and put aside  (Feinberg 
1984, p.111). 
Unfortunately, all of these specifications of moral rights relevant to the criminal law are 
insufficient.  Feinberg needs to do more than simply state that there are interests to which 
everyone (or no one) has a moral right and he needs to do more than state that these interests 
have (or not) the capacity to block state intervention through the criminal law.118  What we 
need is an argument that provides an account of those interests.  Without that account we 
lack what is needed to explain, first, why these interests are so important as to be protected 
                                                
118 A commentator has advanced a similar concern: “In […] Harm to Others, one finds a host of types of interests 
mentioned (private, public, welfare, sadistic and morbid, self-centred, self-confined, competitive interests etc.), 
there is, however, no further elaboration on the definition of an ‘interest’, and consequently of ‘harm.’” (Peršak 
2007, p. 58).  See also Stewart 2001, pp.59-60. 
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through coercive means and, second, why these interests are to be served through 
criminalization rather than through non-penal means.  These are the two issues that need to 
be addressed if Feinberg’s model is going to succeed.  
Let me begin with the first.  Does Feinberg have an account that explains and 
justifies why the interests and values he considers relevant to the criminal law prevail or are 
preeminent vis-à-vis other values and interests? I think the question must be answered in the 
positive.  Feinberg is a self-defined liberal, and as such, he may appeal to the importance and 
priority of values like human dignity, individual freedom and equality.119  In effect, his 
monumental The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law has as a main rationale “to trace the 
[legitimate] contours of the zone in which the citizen has a moral claim to be at liberty”, 
which is “an extremely valuable good, perhaps even necessary for a good life” (Feinberg 1984, 
pp. 7, 8).  Of course, in order to explain and justify the specific relevance and preeminence of 
the values and interests he takes into account much more needs to be said, but insofar as he 
explicitly claims to be committed to “vindicate the traditional liberalism derived from Mill’s 
On Liberty” (Feinberg 1984, p.15)  he has a story to tell in relation to the first issue: coercion 
needs to be made legitimate in relation to those values and interests that liberals take to be 
fundamental for a good life.   
However, in providing a convincing and ultimately successful account of the interests 
that our values underpin, one is not providing an answer to the second issue, that is, an 
answer to the question of criminalization.  This is because it does not follow from the fact 
that an interest I is either not morally disruptable or morally respectable that I provides a 
reason for or against criminalization.  To put it in Feinberg’s terminology, the existence of a 
liberty-limiting principle H does not entail that H should be put to work through the 
criminal law.  In fairness, Feinberg is not claiming that these liberty-limiting principles are 
sufficient and/or necessary to make criminalization legitimate.  However, he does claim that  
each liberty-limiting principle puts forth a kind of reason it claims always to be 
relevant – always to have some weight – in support of proposed legal coercion, 
even though in a given instance it might not weigh enough to be decisive, and 
even though it may not be the only kind of consideration that can be relevant  
(Feinberg 1984, p.10.  My emphasis). 
This is worrying.  First, the unconditional acceptance that substantive moral reasons provide 
                                                
119 For Feinberg’s explicit endorsement of liberalism see Feinberg 1984, p.15. 
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reasons for criminalization supposes that morality as such can carry some weight – 
sometimes decisive weight – in legislative decisions about penal statutes.  In the name of 
morality, then, it is possible to advance penal statutes and then, in the name of morality, to 
punish people for their deeds.  The problem with this combination of morality and rights is 
that it brings us back to some of the difficulties considered in previous chapters (e.g., chs.2 
and 4).  For example, the insurmountable disagreement about values and policies in 
circumstances of diversity, and the transformation of the criminal law into an institution 
primarily designed to express and coercively impose specific moral judgments.  As I have 
argued before, rather than building up criminalization in this fashion, and on pain of 
permitting overcriminalization and allowing an illegitimate system of coercion, we should 
stick to a minimalist function of the criminal law such as the one developed in chapter 5.    
However, it might be claimed that any type of argument that aims at legitimizing 
public policies ultimately has to appeal to morality at some abstract level.  If so, morality is 
inescapable when applying normative theory to matters of public policy.  I think this must be 
right.  However, I doubt that Feinberg’s appeal to morality is located at that abstract level of 
analysis.  For the sake of the argument, however, let us leave this doubt aside, and assume 
that it is.  This leads us to my second concern.  As I see it, even with this assumption, the 
question of criminalization remains unanswered.   
In Harm to Others, Feinberg formulates what he calls “mediating maxims”.  These 
are further specifications of the meaning of harm to help legislators to decide about the type 
of coercion that can legitimately be imposed upon individuals.  That is, specifications that 
should guide legislators to enact law that imposes penal or non-penal coercion on individuals 
for certain forms of conduct (see Feinberg 1984, chs.5-6).  These maxims seem to be the 
natural place to look for the determinacy required to make this model sufficiently workable. 
Among these maxims, and in addition to the specification of harms relevant to the 
harm principle as harms2, Feinberg considers: that harms relevant to the harm principle must 
be genuine (as opposed to minor and/or transitory disappointments or physical and mental 
hurts); that harms relevant to the harm principle must be located above a certain threshold of 
magnitude (this follows the De minimis principle that “The law does not concern itself with 
trifles” (Feinberg 1984, p.189)); that the application of the harm principle must be “based 
upon empirical generalizations about the likely effects on protected standard interests of 
various standard kinds of threatening actions” (1984, p.190); and that the application of the 
harm principle must be done by establishing the relative importance of each of the interest 
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under consideration, taking into account subjective, intrinsic and relational considerations of 
that interest (see 1984, pp. 202-6, 217).  
These mediating maxims are surely pertinent in determining what should count as 
harm relevant to the harm principle.  However, they do not say anything whatsoever about 
why those relevant harms should be addressed through the criminal law as opposed to 
through other coercive measures.  To leave this unanswered is to leave undetermined the line 
that differentiates crimes from torts and other wrongs.  Feinberg, in effect, seems to be 
undecided about this issue, as he constantly shifts his language from general legal coercion to 
specific penal coercion without really providing a justification for this move.  This 
inconsistency in the language reflects the lack of an answer to the second issue.  Although 
Feinberg advances reasons – generally good and convincing reasons – for legal coercion, he 
does not provide reasons specific to criminalization that may ground using the whole 
coercive penal power of the state to regulate and punish human conduct.  
If what I have argued is correct, Feinberg fails to provide a sufficiently determinate 
answer to the question of criminalization.  He certainly offers important criteria of legitimacy 
that need to be considered once we decide to use the law to coerce individuals.  However, 
the move from legal coercion to penal coercion is left unexplained, and this can support the 
unprincipled enlargement of the criminal law.  Moreover, Feinberg’s moralisation of the 
harm principle and the consideration of ‘the independent value’ of conduct to be interfered 
with (1984, ch.5 §3) or the ‘inherent moral quality’ of interests (1984, ch.3 §4 and p.205, int.al.), 
seems to take us into the murky and, in my opinion, unproductive waters of scaling the values 
that should count as relevant when thinking of justifying public policies.  In circumstances of 
diversity and disagreement, this is not a promising way to go.  
Despite all the difficulties and shortcomings, it must be emphasised that the harm 
principle provides crucial insight into the question of criminalization.  It tells us (1) that 
individuals’ interests are a fundamental consideration when assessing the enactment of a 
statute;  (2) that the setback of interests is at least part of what criminalization should aim to 
prevent;  (3) that a harmful condition represents a setback of an individual’s interests; (4) that 
the criminal law should at least aim to prevent wrongful harmful actions against others.  All 
these are important elements in constructing a model of criminalization for a free society and, 
consequently, they are incorporated in more or less explicit ways in the model that I defend in 
chapter 7.    
In the following sections I consider three other reasons or motives of criminalization 
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(penal paternalism, penal moralism and consequentialism). As we shall see, to a large extent 
each of them tries to accommodate or amend the difficulties that the harm principle involves. 
 
3 .  Penal  Paternalism 
Penal paternalism responds to the anti-paternalistic clause in the harm principle.  For a penal 
paternalist it is not always true that only other-regarding conduct can legitimately be 
criminalized.  The claim is that there are circumstances in which, on paternalistic grounds, 
the criminal law can rightly sanction types of actions that either harm the agent that performs 
that action or that are plainly harmless.   
What is of interest for this section is to consider (i) paternalistic justifications of penal 
statutes, as opposed to paternalistic justifications of non-penal statutes, and (ii) paternalistic 
justifications of penal statutes, as opposed to paternalistic attitudes within the penal law, 
paternalistic states of affairs brought about by the penal law, or paternalistic actions 
performed by the penal law.  This is not to say, of course, that there are not non-penal forms 
of paternalism or that paternalism is only predicated of justifications.  However, for our 
purposes, and in the light of the peculiarities and worries that permeate the criminal law, our 
concern here is only with paternalistic justifications of penal law.    
Thus, penal paternalism will be understood here as a type of justification in favour of 
the enactment of penal laws that interfere with the actions of agents on the grounds that this 
interference promotes agents’ own good.120 In what follows, and borrowing from Gerald 
Dworkin’s well-known work on the matter, I look at different versions of paternalism that 
further specify this general account of paternalism.  After advancing these different versions 
of paternalism I move on to consider both how liberal thinkers – namely Feinberg and Raz – 
have adopted some of these different types of paternalism and how they fare in the face of 
overcriminalization.     
 
                                                
120 Consider the general structure of paternalism in a non-penal context as presented by Douglas Husak: “When A 
treats B paternalistically […] B is prevented from adopting some course of action on the grounds that it would be 
bad for B.  As a rough approximation, one person A treats another person B paternalistically when A interferes 
with B’s freedom for B’s own good […]” (Husak 2003, p.388).  See also Gerald Dworkin’s account: “By 
paternalism I shall understand roughly the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons 
referring exlusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced” 
(Dworkin 1975, p.175). 
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Some Forms of Penal Paternalism121 
Soft and Hard Paternalism: Penal paternalism can be soft or hard (see Feinberg 1986, pp.12-
6).  The former justifies a paternalistic penal statute S on grounds that, and insofar as, the 
subject bound by S acts involuntarily and/or without knowing the harm risked by her action 
(the harm that S seeks to prevent and in the absence of which the subject of the law is better 
off).  For the soft penal paternalist, if the subject of the law acted voluntarily and knew the 
harm risked by the action that the statute prohibits, that penal statute would not be justified.  
Hard penal paternalism, by contrast, justifies penal statute S even if the subject of the law 
acts voluntarily and in full awareness of the risk. 
Provisions that make an agent criminally liable for consuming drugs are typical cases 
of penal paternalism.  A soft penal paternalist would justify this type of penal statute on 
grounds that the consumer does not know (or runs the serious risk of becoming an individual 
incapable of knowing) how harmful and addictive drugs are.  Since addiction undermines the 
voluntariness of an action, the soft penal paternalist theorist would claim that, for the sake of 
the well-being of the agent, a penal provision against drug consumption is justifiable.  The 
hard penal paternalist, instead, would claim that drug consumption is harmful to the 
consumer no matter how free or informed her decision to consume drugs so, insofar as 
consuming drugs is harmful in a relevant sense, then its criminalization is justifiable. 
Weak and Strong Paternalism: Penal paternalism can be weak or strong (see 
Dworkin 2005).  Weak penal paternalism justifies a criminal statute only if it interferes with 
the means an agent chooses to achieve an end, and the means that the criminal statute 
prohibits is likely to defeat that end.  Strong paternalism justifies statutes that interfere not 
only with the means an agent may choose, but also with the ends that those means aim to 
achieve.   
To illustrate, think of the end of procreating.  The weak penal paternalist may 
prohibit those means that are at odds with that end, so that he may criminalize contraception 
(on grounds that it does not promote the overriding end and that this hinders the agent’s 
own good) and/or alternative counterproductive fertilization techniques (on grounds that the 
means to promote the overriding end is mistaken and that this undermines the agent’s own 
good).  In turn, the strong penal paternalist may consider it legitimate to criminalize ends 
                                                
121 There are more distinctions than those I consider here.  See generally Gerald Dworkin (1972).  See also Jack 
Douglas (1983, pp.173ff) for cooperative and conflictful paternalism; John Kleinig (1983, pp.5-6) for coercive and 
non-coercive paternalism and for active and passive paternalism; Feinberg (1986, p.5) for presumptively blameable 
and presumptively non-blameable paternalism. 
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themselves on grounds that they are unreasonable, wrong or mistaken and that this hinders 
the agent’s own good.  Thus, in the face of the overriding end of procreation, the strong penal 
paternalist may, for example, criminalize a solitary life in the woods on grounds that it is alien 
to the possibility of procreation. 
Pure and Impure Paternalism: Penal paternalism can be pure or impure depending 
on whether the identity of the agent interfered with by the statute overlaps with the identity 
of the individual protected by that statute (see Dworkin 1975, pp.176-7).  While in impure 
paternalism the extension of the group that is interfered with by the law is not identical to the 
extension of those whom the law protects, in pure paternalism those protected by the law 
and those interfered with by the existence of the same law are groups with identical 
extension. 
Criminal statutes prohibiting suicide and attempted suicide are cases of pure penal 
paternalism – insofar as they criminalize the attempt independent of the consequences that 
this action brings about to others.  By contrast, provisions that criminalize the distribution of 
drugs are impure cases of penal paternalism.  Distributing drugs is not by and in itself 
harmful, so the protection that this type of law provides extends to the would-be consumers 
who may actually be harmed by consumption and not to the individual directly interfered by 
the law, that is, the trafficker.122 
Welfare and Moral Paternalism: Welfare penal paternalism justifies penal statutes in 
relation to the general well-being of the individual protected.  Moral penal paternalism 
justifies penal statutes in relation to the improvement or protection of the moral character of 
the agents that the law addresses.  Again, drug legislation is an apt example of this type of 
paternalism.  Welfare penal paternalism may criminalize drug consumption on grounds that 
a consumer is likely to be worse-off compared to the way she should be (however defined) 
were she not a drug consumer.  Moral paternalism, instead, criminalizes drugs consumption 
on grounds that it impoverishes the moral nature of the individual consumer by staining her 
soul, undermining her autonomous character and human dignity, or some such.123 
 
 
                                                
122 But, again, note that this is a matter of justification.  What is relevant is the justification offered in support of the 
statute.  Thus, the penal prohibition of drug distribution could be justified in pure paternalist terms if, for 
example, legislators argued that distributing drugs does harm the trafficker himself by, say, staining his soul or 
putting him at serious risk of becoming a drug consumer. 
123 For an analysis of the distinction between moral paternalism and legal moralism, see Ten 1971. 
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For Paternalism 
Each of the above categories represents a type of paternalistic justification of the penal law 
and, generally speaking, there is a presumption in the literature against these justifications.  
As Douglas Husak has put it, “[m]ost philosophers, it is fair to say, have relatively strong 
intuitions against the justifiability of paternalism, at least when it is imposed on sane adults” 
(Husak 2003, p.391).  However, it is fair to say that those who embrace some central tenets of 
liberalism have more explicitly voiced these intuitions against legal/penal paternalism.   
From a Kantian perspective, for example, penal paternalism appears to be 
objectionable because it does not address the individual as a fully rational autonomous being, 
and prevents her from deciding about her own actions and values.  Thus considered, penal 
paternalism fares badly vis-à-vis the Kantian idea that individuals are ends in themselves. 
Penal paternalism is also objectionable from a Millian point of view.  On the one 
hand, it seems to contravene Mill’s dictum that “when there is not a certainty, but only a 
danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive 
which may prompt him to incur the risk” (Mill 1989, p.96).  On the other, it expands the 
jurisdiction of the criminal law beyond the harm principle. 
Despite these general liberal objections, some liberals – for example, Joseph Raz and 
Joel Feinberg – defend certain versions of paternalism.  Feinberg endorses soft paternalism, 
although he concludes, in my opinion contentiously, that this version of paternalism is not 
paternalistic at all.  Feinberg argues that  
the law’s concern should not be with the wisdom, prudence, or dangerousness 
of B’s choice, but rather with whether or not the choice is truly his.  Its concern 
should be to help implement B’s real choice, not to protect B from harm as such. 
[…] The harm to others principle permits us to protect a person from the choices 
of other people; soft paternalism would permit us to protect him from 
‘nonvoluntary choices’, which, being the genuine choices of no one at all, are no 
less foreign to him  (Feinberg 1986, p.12).  
I cannot discuss here Feinberg’s claim that soft paternalism is not a form of paternalism (on 
this see Schonsheck 1994, pp.179-82).  Instead, my intention is simply to show that Feinberg 
is willing to endorse penal paternalism in one of the forms I have presented above.  For 
Feinberg, a statute S that prohibits an action φ is justifiable if S aims at preventing 
individuals from harming themselves as a result of φ-ing and individuals φ involuntarily.  Pace 
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Feinberg, I call this soft paternalism. 
Joseph Raz, in turn, endorses perfectionist penal paternalism.124 Like Feinberg, Raz 
is concerned with whether the choice of the agent is in a strong sense really his.  According to 
Raz’s perfectionism there are limits to what counts as autonomous choice, so autonomy 
proper extends to an adequate range of choices only, leaving aside, say, abhorrent or perverse 
choices that do not count as part of what we can autonomously choose.  This perfectionism 
can tint the penal law by justifying the criminalization of φ on grounds that φ is an action or 
conduct that does not fall within the sphere of those that are to count as proper expressions 
of autonomous choices (or, more strongly, that φ counts as a practice that undermines the set 
of autonomous choices).  In this sense, Raz’s penal perfectionism is harder than Feinberg’s as 
it makes irrelevant the epistemic status of the agent that is subject to the law and focuses 
primarily on the nature of the choices of the agent.  Raz’s position could also be characterized 
as being impure, in the sense that his position does not preclude criminalizing φ in order to 
impede others from choosing and/or being affected by φ-ing when φ-ing falls beyond the set 
of autonomous choices.  Moreover, his penal  paternalism seems to be strong, as it makes the 
distinction between means and ends irrelevant; what matters is whether the action is part of 
the adequate range of options, not if it is a means or an end.  Finally, Raz’s account may well 
be understood as a version of both welfare and moral paternalism.  A perfectionist defence of 
autonomy is justified on moral grounds, but the distinction between autonomous choices 
proper and the welfare of the individual is, on many occasions, indistinguishable.  In 
conclusion, despite its liberal credentials, Raz’s position may well be thought as endorsing 
most of the paternalistic categories mentioned above. 
What Feinberg’s and Raz’s examples tell us is that penal paternalism has a place 
among liberal thinkers despite the liberal presumption against paternalism.  In light of the 
current penal context, I shall now move to criticisms of paternalism as a justification of penal 
statutes.  
 
                                                
124 Some may want to resist labelling Raz as a perfectionist penal paternalist.  This may be for different reasons.  
First, Raz’s work of paternalism does not focus exclusively or primarily on the criminal law. His work on this 
matter is rather concerned with paternalism within the more general context of legal, political and moral 
institutions.  Second, Raz says that paternalism needs not be coercive (1986, 417-20).  This has led some 
commentators to claim that Raz’s paternalism is not coercive (Farrell 1991, p. 57).  In any case, it seems to me that 
this label is not utterly implausible.  Raz’s general approach to the issue of paternalism does not preclude the 
possibility that it applies also to some instances of penal paternalism.  Moreover, Raz’s claim that paternalism 
need not to be pursued coercively does not mean that paternalism may not be pursued coercively (that is, by 
resorting to the criminal law). 
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Against Paternalism 
Let me begin my critical appraisal by referring to another liberal thinker who has dwelt on 
the question of paternalistic justifications of the law: Douglas Husak.  In Husak’s account, 
what may or may not render paternalism justifiable is “how various paternalistic laws affect 
the conditions of autonomy” (Husak 2003, p.403). Thus, since he believes that it is not true 
that every paternalistic justification of the law is illegitimate, his account does not represent 
an absolute rejection of paternalism.  To ground this, Husak starts by distinguishing 
between paternalistic considerations that are applied to penal legislation and paternalistic 
considerations applied to non-penal legislation.  On the one hand, Husak accepts that 
paternalism can be amongst the justifications used in non-criminal areas of the law.  On the 
other hand, his account is much less permissive when considering penal statutes.  The kernel 
of his argument is that  
One side of the balance in endeavours to justify legal paternalism involves a 
judgment about how the law in question affects the conditions of autonomy.  
Punishment – at least when it is severe – always undermines these conditions to 
an extraordinary degree.  Persons are far less able to make their own lives when 
a criminal sanction is inflicted upon them  (Husak 2003, p.405). 
I share the spirit of Husak’s distinction.  If we are going to take punishment, criminalization 
and their consequences seriously, paternalistic justifications need to count differently when 
used to justify statutes backed by punitive practices.  This is precisely what Husak does.  
However, I have doubts regarding the ultimate rationale of his analysis.   
Husak argues that the conditions of autonomy are the touchstone determining the 
legitimacy of paternalistic justifications of the law.  Thus, given that punishment is generally 
such as to erode autonomy, Husak concludes that penal paternalism is, in principle, an 
illegitimate type of justification for penal statutes.  The problem I see with this type of 
argument – also endorsed by Feinberg’s and Raz’s models – is that it locates the protection of 
autonomy at the centre of what may justifiably be criminalized.  In other words, the rationale 
against paternalist penal justification emerges from the importance that Husak assigns to the 
conditions of autonomy.  For him, this is a legitimate type of objection to penal paternalism 
because punishment is destructive of autonomy, and given that “paternalists should be 
unwilling to impose a ‘cure’ that is worse than a ‘disease’, they should not back paternalistic 
laws with the criminal sanction” (Husak 2003, p.406).  Hence, since the costs of punishment 
overweight the autonomy-related benefits obtained through the criminal law, paternalistic 
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laws cannot be justified. 
Yet, my objection goes, what if the ‘cure’ is not worse than the ‘disease’?  What if we 
had an institution of criminal punishment that were not as inhumane as it is today?  It seems 
to me that under those circumstances Husak’s position would have to allow the justification 
of a series of statutes that a free society would not want to justify.  Consider Husak’s example 
of Bill the boxer (Husak 2003, p.405).125  If legislators were to criminalize boxing on 
paternalist grounds (which is something that they may have good reasons to do if autonomy 
is the key to some types of penal justifications), they would have to balance how much 
autonomy is undermined by allowing Bill and others to box and by criminalizing the 
practice.  If some sort of calculation establishes that the humane conditions of the penal 
sanction – which I have simply stipulated ex hypothesi – means that punishing those who box 
is less damaging of the conditions of autonomy than allowing boxing, then boxing should be 
criminalized (or, at least, it could be legitimately criminalized).  Moreover, there is nothing in 
this autonomy-laden type of argument that precludes punishing people for practices that 
seem much less borderline than boxing.  What about surfing, eating unhealthy food or 
smoking tobacco?  If the conditions of autonomy are the touchstone of what makes penal 
paternalism legitimate, then it is not difficult to think that under certain circumstances 
punishment undermines autonomy less than these practices.  For example, surfing has a high 
rate of accidents that threaten surfers with various types of injuries and permanent damage 
that, in Razian terms, can seriously undermine individuals’ capacity to be the authors of their 
own lives (Raz 1986, p.204).  Consuming unhealthy food and smoking may also have some 
important negative consequences for an individual’s autonomy and, under certain 
circumstances, these consequences may be more damaging to autonomy than the 
punishment that might be imposed were these things illegal. 
It may be objected that I am overdoing my case: incarceration, or more humane 
forms of punishment, can never be more damaging of autonomy than, say, basing one’s diet 
on beacon, French fries and donuts.  However, this objection is not without problems.  First, 
it is not obvious that my claim that unhealthy food can damage autonomy more than 
punishment is false (and it is not obvious that the contrary is true either).  A conclusive 
answer depends on a series of both empirical and metaphysical considerations that I cannot 
address here.  In any case, the problem is that the fact that the matter is debatable leaves the 
door open to the criminalization of those types of practices (surfing, smoking, consuming 
                                                
125 Husak borrows this example from Dixon 2001. 
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fatty food).  Second, even if we concede that, in relation to conditions of autonomy, unhealthy 
food is more innocuous than many forms of punishment, this does not mean that unhealthy 
food is less damaging of autonomy than any type of punishment.  If the sanction that these 
practices receives consisted of alternative punishments or penal compensations 
(compensations to tax payers, those who suffer ‘psychic costs’ or ‘public charges’ for the 
offence),126 then claiming that punishment is less onerous (for autonomy) than unhealthy food 
becomes more plausible.  Some punishments, e.g., community services, can be less 
burdensome to autonomy, and may even enhance autonomy, compared to allowing 
unhealthy food to go unregulated by the criminal law.  If this is correct, then Husak’s 
thoughts regarding penal paternalism – let alone Feinberg’s and Raz’s – insufficiently limit 
the over expansion of criminalization and punishment.   
Thus, when we locate the protection of autonomy at the centre of our justification of 
criminalization, a large number of actions that we ought not to count as part of the legitimate 
dominion of the criminal law fall within it.  In different words, paternalist justifications of 
criminal statutes allow using the coercive power of the criminal law for types of conduct that 
are beyond the principled minimalist function of the penal institutions of a free society.  
Permitting this extension is tantamount to tolerating the overexpansion of the criminal law 
and, thus, turning a blind eye to its current predicaments.  I therefore maintain that, if we are 
going to take the consequences of criminalization seriously, penal paternalism should not be 
part of what legislators ought to consider as a good reason to enact penal statutes.127 
 
4 .  Penal  Moralism 
Penal moralism is a subclass of legal moralism.128 In Harmless Wrongdoing, Feinberg 
defines the latter as the view that “[i]t can be morally legitimate to prohibit conduct on the 
ground that it is inherently immoral, even though it causes neither harm nor offence to the 
                                                
126 On ‘psychic costs’ see  (Dworkin 1972).  On ‘public charges’ see  (Kleinig 1983).  Public charges is a type of 
argument according to which injuries received in certain activities “may have costly consequences not only for the 
victim but also for others.  The victim may be incapacitated for a considerable period of time, requiring the use of 
scarce medical resources and possibly made dependant on public funds for support. […] Not only the victims, but 
also their dependents, may be cast on the public purse.  Spouses and children may have both a financial and 
psychological stake in the victim’s continued well-being, and the collapse of this may lead to their becoming 
charges on the community” (Kleinig 1983, p.92). 
127 But note that whether paternalism may have a legitimate place in other spheres of the law or in other state 
institutions is a different matter. 
128 The term ‘legal moralism’ was coined by H.L.A Hart in his debate with Lord Devlin in Law, Liberty, and 
Morality: “In England in the last few years the question whether the criminal law should be used to punish 
immorality ‘as such’ has acquired a new practical importance; for there has, I think, been a revival there of what 
might be termed legal moralism” (Hart 1963, p.6). 
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actor or to others”  (Feinberg 1984, p.27 and 1987, p.4).129  If we slightly amend this account to 
make it fit with our purposes, penal moralism can be defined as the view that it is legitimate 
to criminalize conduct simply on the grounds that it is immoral. 
At first glance, penal moralism seems to infringe the liberal tenet of neutrality (see 
ch.4 sec.1.3).  Penal moralism does not claim a mere overlap between the criminal law and 
morality, but rather argues that a legitimate justification for the enactment of a criminal 
statute is that the prohibited conduct is morally wrong.  Put differently, penal moralism 
judges as legitimate the criminalization of a conduct that counts as a morally wrong within a 
given moral framework because it is a morally wrong conduct within that framework.  
Hence, penal moralism seems to allow the criminalization of conduct on partial grounds, 
that is, on grounds that intentionally favour and promote one particular moral framework.  
For some liberal authors this would suffice to rule out the plausibility of penal moralism as 
providing guidance for criminalization in a free society. 
Penal moralism can also be attacked on different – although related – grounds.  Mill, 
as we have seen, argues that penal moralism violates the very simple principle since “the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant” (Mill 1989, p.13).  And H.L.A. Hart in his famous debate 
with Devlin defended the view that, for the sake of individuals’ liberty, in matters of sexual 
morality persons are to be left free from legal intervention: 
Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, acceptance 
of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others are 
distressed when they learn what it is that he does […].  No social order which 
accords to individual liberty any value could also accord the right to be 
protected from distress thus occasioned  (Hart 1963, p.47). 
Thus, penal moralism may seem to be indefensible from a liberal point of view and we may 
have the impression that we would do better debarring it from the principles of 
criminalization of the free society.  However, this would be too quick.  As with penal 
paternalism, there are authors who endorse some version of legal/penal moralism despite 
their liberal leanings. 
                                                
129 This corresponds to Feinberg’s definition of legal moralism “in the usual narrow sense”, as opposed to legal 
moralism “in the broad sense” (Feinberg 1984, p.27).  Since nothing relevant for our purposes hinges on this, I put 
this distinction aside. 
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Strong Penal Moralism 
Antony Duff has distinguished two versions of penal moralism, strong and weak.  The strong 
version is that “[t]he criminal law [...] should ideally prohibit all and only such actions as are 
seriously immoral, because they are immoral” (Duff 1986, p.41).  This type of penal moralism 
seems to me to be implausible.  It not only supposes that immoral action is necessary and 
sufficient as a criterion of criminalization, but also that wrongful action determines the 
boundaries of legitimate criminalization.  Strong penal moralism does not look like a 
promising candidate to reduce overcriminalization in the free society and I would like to 
reject it straight away.130 This can be done by reflecting on the fact that both the criminal law 
we have, and the criminal law we ought to have, include regulation of issues that are morally 
irrelevant or, at least, not 'seriously immoral'.  Modern criminal law is not only constituted of 
mala in se, but also of mala prohibita, and it is indefensible to argue that it should be 
otherwise.131 
The strong penal moralist may protest that my rejection begs the question since I am 
simply stipulating, based on empirical facts (i.e., the law as it is), that the criminal law is not 
only about seriously immoral actions.  The strong moralist could conclude that my focus on 
the law as it is does not undermine his claim about how the law should be.  To this I would 
respond (i) that, whatever the function of the law, there is not (and there could not be) a 
modern criminal law system whose statutes are determined exclusively on grounds of what is 
seriously immoral;132 (ii) that in circumstances of diversity and disagreement – the 
circumstances of the free society – even what is seriously immoral turns out to be contestable; 
(iii) and that even in the unlikely event that we achieve consensus on the set of conducts that 
would count as seriously immoral, the intromission of penal coercion in some of those areas – 
areas that rightly belong to the privacy of the individual – should count in itself as an 
unacceptable wrong. 
If this rejection of strong penal moralism still looks too swift, I would argue that if 
                                                
130 Lord Devlin is perhaps the most famous promoter of this position.  See The Enforcement of Morals (Devlin 
1965).  Interestingly, Jeffrie Murphy says that much fruitful and insightful can be extracted from Devlin’s position 
if, in considering it, “one applies the principle of charity of interpretation” (Murphy 2006, p.47). 
131 For a more detailed discussion of this distinction see Husak 2005.  See also State of Washington v. Thaddius X. 
Anderson (2000) and State v. Horton (1905). 
132 If the law in general, and the criminal law in particular, is going to fulfil its function as a public institution it needs 
to address issues that are independent of positive or comprehensive moral claims.  Secondary rules are examples 
of the general case, while some rules of possession and reckless behaviour are plausible examples of the particular 
case. 
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my rejection of the weaker version – which I present below – is successful, by extension, it 
should also prove successful in rejecting the stronger view.  Put differently, if my argument 
works against the more sophisticated and qualified version of penal moralism discussed 
below, then it should also work against the simpler and cruder version of the same argument 
discussed here.    
 
Weak Penal Moralism 
According to Duff – who endorses a version of this type of moralism – weak penal moralism 
establishes that 
while criminal punishment may properly have purposes beyond those of moral 
blame, an essential part of its meaning and justification lies in its relation to 
moral blame; and that immorality should be at least a necessary, if not sufficient, 
condition of criminal liability (Duff 1986, p.41).133 
The central tenet of this position is that the criminal law makes demands on citizens by 
prohibiting certain types of conduct.  These demands, in turns, are of a moral nature, so that 
the prohibition of a conduct φ is seen as a moral demand made by the state of the citizen:  
what is distinctive of criminal law is [...] that it purports to define, and provide 
for the condemnation of, certain kinds of moral wrong; to justify the criminal 
law's content we must therefore show that what it defines as crimes are indeed 
wrongs of the appropriate kind  (Duff 2007, p.81).134 
In the weaker version of penal moralism the difficulties faced by the strong version are 
cleared up.  Although the immoral character of the conduct criminally proscribed is still 
necessary if the penal prohibition is to be legitimate, we are told that not all moral wrongs are 
the business of the criminal law.  Rather, the criminal law is concerned only with those 
actions or forms of conduct that satisfy conditions other than moral wrongness. 
In Placing Blame, Michael Moore offers an important liberal formulation of weaker 
                                                
133 We do not need to get distracted with the way Duff construes what is at stake here.  Instead of referring to crimes 
he refers to the function of criminal punishment and criminal liability.  This can, I think, be easily translated into 
our question of what should be criminalized.    
134 As Duff rightly clarifies, this claim is different from the central claim of classic natural law theorist.  Duff's point is 
not that what defines the law is a moral criterion, but that the law must make a moral claim on the citizen.  In 
other words, Duff is not providing a criterion to identify the law, but establishing what a good law should do.  See 
Duff 1986, pp. 75-6.    
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legal/penal moralism.135  Moore believes that the fact that 
an action is morally wrong is always a legitimate reason to prohibit it with 
criminal legislation.  Put another way, a legislator should never restrain 
himself/herself from following his/her own best theories of what is morally 
wrong just because they are his/her own theories or just because they are 
theories of what is morally wrong to do.  Other goods may outweigh the good 
that is achieved by prohibiting behaviour that is immoral; but that the behaviour 
is immoral is always a valid reason counting in favour or prohibiting it  (Moore 
1997, p.70).136  
At other points Moore’s position is expressed in stronger terms that bring it close to Devlin’s 
moralism.  Legal moralism, Moore writes, “makes moral wrongdoing central to legal 
wrongdoing.  Prima facie […] all and only what is morally wrongful should be criminally 
prohibited”  (Moore 1997, p.669).  However, Moore’s legal moralism is liberal and cannot be 
bluntly linked to strong legal moralism.  This is because, in addition to the first passage 
quoted where he argues that immoral behaviour is only a legitimate/valid reason for 
criminalization, Moore endorses a characteristic conception of morality that commends that 
“avoidance of much else in the way of conventionally regarded ‘vice’ is only superogatory but 
not obligatory” (Moore 1997, p.662).  In addition, he notes that “the criminal law has no 
business criminalizing behaviours such as ‘deviant’ sex, abortion, drug use, and the like” 
(Moore 1997, p.661).  These considerations makes Moore believe that his account has 
important (positive) implications for the problem of overcriminalization since a morality thus 
articulated “by itself should stay legislatures from enacting much of what passes as ‘moral 
offences’ in our current criminal code”  (Moore 1997, p.662). 
In the face of Duff’s and Moore’s nuanced legal/penal moralism, it may be claimed 
that the aim of attaining a more restricted system of criminal law that takes punishment 
seriously, and that ultimately represents an adequate model of the criminal law of a free 
society, can be achieved by something like liberal legal/penal moralism.  After all, if we are 
penal moralists and endorse a minimal morality, then it follows that we should also obtain a 
minimal criminal law. 
This idea seems to be persuasive.  Douglas Husak, who has recently advanced an 
                                                
135 He deems his account of legal/penal moralism liberal at Moore 1997, p.662. 
136 This is what Moore calls a non-exclusionary view of legal moralism, which is, in his words, “the only correct theory 
of proper legislative aim” (Moore 1997, p.70). 
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argument against legal moralism, nevertheless concedes that what (specifically Moore’s) legal 
moralism  “ultimately would criminalize may not differ substantially from those [kinds of 
conduct] proscribed by [his own] minimalist theory”  (Husak 2008, pp.197-8).137 In my 
judgement, this concession blurs what is important about the search for a liberal model of the 
criminal law.  The ultimate rationale of this search is not merely to obtain a smaller, less 
stringent, less punitive, criminal law, but to obtain a criminal law that is consistent with the 
commitments of a free society (and this is a criminal law that will surely be smaller, less 
stringent and less punitive than the criminal law we have today).  If the former, but not the 
latter, were the case then legal moralism – if backed by a minimal morality – would arguably 
do the job.  But what we are looking for here is not simply a model that shrinks the amount 
of criminal law we have, but a model that advances in a principled way the criminal law of the 
free society, freed from overcriminalization but also from undercriminalization.  In short, we 
want to get criminalization right. 
Let me expand on my previous points in order to ground my critique.  We need to 
consider first the fact that minimal morality is something that we can predicate only of some 
types of legal/penal moralism.  Thus, it seems clear that this type of moralism is not an 
adequate characterization of Duff’s position.  His account, as we saw in chapter 3, is 
structured around a rich conception of community and shared values which, although not 
necessarily involving a non-minimal morality, suggests that the moral commitments of Duff’s 
liberal community involve more extensive and deeper allegiances than what we would 
normally consider as part of a minimal moral theory.138  In this sense, Moore’s account, but 
not Duff’s, may be taken as a version of the liberal legal/penal moralism that interests us here. 
So, in the face of the current condition of the criminal law, what are the reasons for 
not adopting Moore’s penal moralism? My first point, which reinforces what I said before, is 
that adopting a minimal morality per se does not mean that, when translated into the penal 
sphere, we will obtain a more adequate criminal law; one that is normatively well prepared to 
avoid the difficulties that affect our current penal system.  Although it might be true that 
something like Moore’s conception of morality could reduce the amount of criminal law that 
is enacted by our legislators (although, for reasons that will be clear shortly, I am doubtful 
                                                
137 Although Husak concedes this, he then moves to criticise legal moralism on grounds that this position does not 
show “why the state is justified in punishing […] culpable wrongdoers, or that consequentialism plays no role 
when state punishment is justified.” (Husak 2008, p.201).   As I take it, this is a relevant point, but it is not the 
right type of objection if the question that motivates the analysis are the problems of overcriminalization and 
inappropriate punishment. 
138 For a more detailed critical analysis of some of the aspects of Duff’s position see ch.3 sec.2. 
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about this as well) this would not be enough to obtain what we want to achieve in theorising 
the criminal law of a free society.  In other words, it is not clear that by adopting something 
like Moore’s penal moralism we will obtain a state of affairs in which we have the penal 
statutes that a free society ought to have.  Indeed, it is possible that a strict minimal morality 
may lead us to undercriminalization, which is a condition certainly not less pernicious than 
one characterized by overcriminalization. 
A second reason to worry about Moore’s legal/penal moralism is that the model 
makes a clear and principled distinction between criminal and non-criminal spheres 
impossible.  This distinction is fundamental to any adequate account of the law, so a model 
of criminalization that  cannot offer a clear distinction between these different spheres is 
problematic.  This becomes clearer in the light of its consequences for the problems of 
overcriminalization.  If moral wrongs are the touchstone of criminalization, then all those 
moral wrongs that normally and adequately fall within the private sphere – in, for example, 
tort law, contract law, and so on – become issues of proper concern for the criminal law 
(should we criminalize and punish unfaithful lovers, wrongful defamation, wrongful breach 
of contracts?).  This means that Moore’s penal moralism effaces the intuitive line that exists 
between what is in the business of the criminal law and what is not.  Although Moore 
suggests grounds to limit criminalization, even when considering immoral conduct (see for 
example Moore 1997, p.68), his account fails to provide a principled and sufficiently clear 
contrast between moral wrongs to be addressed through penal means and moral wrongs to 
be otherwise addressed.   
One response to this line of argument that is open to Moore is to argue that wrongs 
of the kind mentioned above are not part of morality, and that as a result the critique is 
weaker than it looks.  However, if Moore’s position is going to provide a principled model of 
criminalization – a model that succeeds in overcoming or minimising overcriminalization and 
that draws a clear enough line between moral wrongs to be treated criminally and wrongs to 
be treated otherwise – much more needs to be said about the criteria that help us to identify 
moral wrongs relevant to the criminal law.  The fact that Moore seems to endorses some sort 
of minimal morality does not suffice, precisely because the point at stake is not merely to 
reduce criminalization but to get criminalization right.   
As it happens, it is not at all clear that Moore does endorse a minimal morality such 
that his weak penal moralism would exclude wrongs normally thought of as beyond the reach 
of the criminal law.  Given that in Moore’s model penal laws “are justified because and only 
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insofar as they prohibit moral wrongdoing”, he believes that mutilation of dead bodies and 
extinguishing species should be criminalized because these actions are wrong (Moore 1997, 
pp.642-7).  I do not want to make the case here in favour or against the criminalization of 
these types of actions, but only to note that if these actions should be criminalized because 
they are moral wrongs, then it is difficult to see why much less contentious moral wrongs 
(like dishonesty, ill will or unfaithful conduct) should not be criminalized.  Thus, even the 
conclusion that Moore’s account, whilst it might not get criminalization right, will lead to a 
reduction in overcriminalization is (at best) moot.   
In the end, Moore’s account of morality seems to be simply the expression of a 
parochial viewpoint.  To that extent it represents the oppressive imposition of the criminal 
law upon members of society who do not share the account of morality protected by criminal 
legislation.  If this account of penal moralism cannot avoid these difficulties and offer 
sufficiently clear and principled limits for criminalization, then it is a model that, in the face of 
overcriminalization, we should resist.139 
These three different worries underpin the conclusion that, as it stands, Moore’s 
penal moralism does not fare well in the face of the need to reduce overcriminalization, get an 
adequate model of the criminal law and, ultimately, build a system of criminalization that 
reflects the values of the free society.  What this critique has shown is that principles of 
criminalization grounded in morality face a dilemma.  If they want to minimise 
overcriminalization they need further to specify the boundaries of the morality they embrace.  
But in firmly specifying those limits they end up offering a comprehensive moral doctrine 
that, given the liberal principle of neutrality of the state, is at odds with the characteristic 
plurality of views about the good existing in the free society.     
 
5 .  Criminalization and Consequential ism 
The final account of criminalization that I will consider is one grounded in consequentialism.  
The common denominator amongst the different types of consequentialist theory is the 
promotion of neutral value (Pettit 1997a).  In the case of criminalization, consequentialist 
                                                
139 Douglas Husak presents another objection to Moore’s penal moralism that also counts against the capacity of the 
model to resist overcriminalization.  The central point of the objection is that Moore’s account cannot explain 
why the state, as opposed to other institutions and/or individuals, must punish offenders if, as Moore believes, 
punishment is about satisfying just deserts for moral wrongs: “Legal moralism is problematic because it offers no 
principled reason to believe that the state should punish persons who break its criminal laws” (Husak 2008, 
p.203). 
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theorists further specify this common factor to endorse particular values.  For example, for 
consequentialists, the enactment of a penal statute S is justified if and only if the existence of 
S promotes values such as crime prevention, law abidance or the rehabilitation of the 
offender.  Of course, the mere enactment of S is not what brings about the promotion of 
these values.  Instead, the consequentialist reckoning – and what ends up justifying the 
enactment of the statute – is that without S there is, all things considered, a less likely chance 
that crime prevention, law abidance or the offender’s rehabilitation is going to be promoted. 
A contemporary example of a consequentialist model of criminalization can be found 
in a series of cooperative pieces between John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit (1990, 1993, 
1994.  See also Pettit 1997b int. al.).  In what follows I shall focus on the general model they 
advance.  Their substantive work, Not Just Deserts, offers a comprehensive normative 
theory of the criminal justice system and, as such, has much to say about criminalization.  In 
effect, Braithwaite and Pettit believe that the first key question that needs to be answered by 
a comprehensive theory like theirs is about the types of behaviours that should be 
criminalized (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, p.12).  Before getting into the details of their 
model of criminalization, let me present some basic tenets of their consequentialist account.  
The most characteristic aspect of their model is the value it aims to promote.  Rather 
than focussing on utility, deterrence, law abidance, incapacitation or any other traditional 
consequentialist target, this theory aims to promote the enjoyment of dominion.  Dominion, 
as the authors understand it, is the republican version of negative liberty; it is a conception of 
freedom in a social world.  Dominion involves the idea “that liberty is constituted by the 
support against interference, and the status of being manifestly so supported, which goes 
with citizenship in an appropriately governed society; in a society where the rule of law 
obtains and power is systematically checked”  (Braithwaite and Pettit 1993, p.226).  An 
individual enjoys dominion when she “has control in a certain area, being free from the 
interference of others, but has that control in virtue of the recognition of others and the 
protection of the law”  (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, p.60.  See also Pettit 1988, p.52).  For 
Braithwaite and Pettit, this understanding of dominion involves a holistic conception of 
society in which liberty is understood as a social status.  This means that whether an 
individual enjoys liberty depends largely on how the freedom of that individual fares in 
comparison to the freedom of other members of society.  In other words, she cannot enjoy 
liberty if she is subject to more constraints than some others.  Liberty is then defined 
relationally.  But liberty as a social status requires not only as much absence of constraints as 
anyone else.  It also requires assurance – as much assurance as anyone else – of that absence 
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of constraints, and common knowledge of that assured absence of constraints.  Thus, besides 
negative liberty, this account involves some positive epistemic and psychological features that 
are to be satisfied if dominion is to obtain (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, pp.62-69). 
For Braithwaite and Pettit, the promotion of dominion counts as an uncontroversial 
aim of a theory of criminal justice and, therefore, of criminalization.  Accordingly, 
criminalization is to prohibit those actions that diminish or undermine dominion.  From this 
general function of criminalization we can derive a more complex account of crimes as 
challenges to dominion, by which offenders “typically present themselves as dominators of 
the victim: they act in a way that suggests a belief that they can interfere on an arbitrary basis 
with that person”  (Pettit 1997, p.68).  Also, crimes not only involve the domination of the 
victim by the offender, but also a reduction in the extent and intensity of the dominion 
enjoyed by the victim.  In addition, crimes do an evil to the whole community, as they affect 
“the overall dispensation of dominion established in society […] because, with every act of 
crime, it becomes less clear to everyone that they really do have non-interference in a resilient 
manner”  (Braithwaite and Pettit 1993, p.230).  The republican model opposes all these 
developments resulting from criminal conduct and supports, consistent with its 
consequentialist nature, the promotion and maximization of neutral value, namely, dominion. 
On the face of it, the consequentialist character of this model may look to be its most 
obvious source of weaknesses.  However, Braithwaite and Pettit embrace a sophisticated 
consequentialism that combines elements of indirect consequentialist theory with a series of 
limits and conditions.  This allows them to avoid some of the well known objections 
traditionally advanced against consequentialist positions.140 Indeed, Pettit claims of his 
consequentialism that it is able to circumvent the idea that people “are pawns in the 
consequentialist’s beneficent scheme” (Pettit 1988, p.53) and thus that it can avoid the 
traditional difficulties of this ethical theory (for example, punishing the innocent).  Consider 
the following two passages illustrating the type of consequentialism that Braithwaite and 
Pettit endorse:  
We assume that under a republican dispensation criminal justice agencies 
should be assigned limited roles of briefs within the system; no agency should 
have the global brief of doing whatever it can to promote republican dominion. 
                                                
140 Pettit has dubbed his favoured version of consequentialism restrictive consequentialism (see Brennan and Pettit 
1986 and Pettit 1988), which “suggests that while it may be appropriate to evaluate options by the criterion of 
maximising probable value, it need not be sensible to select them on that basis.  The idea is that the way to satisfy 
the criterion of evaluation may often be to restrict or forswear its application, relying rather in some other criterion 
of choice” (Brennan and Pettit 1986, p.439). 
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[…] [I]f any agency had the discretion required for the global brief, then people 
would be peculiarly vulnerable to its decisions and that would impact negatively 
on their enjoyment of dominion (Braithwaite and Pettit 1993, p.231).  
There will be no point in criminalizing something in order to reduce 
domination, if the very act of criminalization itself facilitates more domination 
than it removes  (Pettit 1997, p.68).   
This republican restrictive consequentialism seems to emerge as a strong model of 
criminalization: it overcomes the traditional critiques that consequentialism both cannot 
accommodate rights and that it locates value in a way that leaves the individual in a 
vulnerable position.  Indeed, it looks as if this model of criminalization has the required 
conceptual tools to avoid overcriminalization.  The cornerstone of this account – the 
promotion of dominion – seems to be incompatible with policies and practices that 
unjustifiably expand penal statutes and, therefore, with overcriminalization. 
Part of the plausibility of Braithwaite and Pettit’s position depends on the fact that 
the enactment and enforcement of the statute under scrutiny does promote dominion (that is, 
the value adopted as the rationale of criminalization).  But, things are slightly more 
complicated.  Since penal statutes have to do (at least more directly) with conduct, not 
values, the plausibility of a consequentialist model depends, in addition, on the fact that the 
penal proscription of, say, conduct φ does promote dominion.  Whether φ promotes that 
value is something we cannot determine except empirically.  Thus, on the one hand, we need 
evidence supporting the idea that a penal statute proscribing φ will really serve the aim of 
minimising the occurrence of φ in the world.  And, on the other hand, we need evidence 
supporting the idea that criminalizing φ will promote dominion more than either not 
criminalizing it or pursuing some other policy altogether.  
Given these empirical elements, in many circumstances republican consequentialism 
will lead to a reduction in penal statutes.  This is because it will often be unclear whether a 
given statute S will actually reduce the occurrence of that action that it is intended to inhibit, 
or because some other public policy will enhance dominion more effectively.141 This feature of 
                                                
141 For example, on occasions, the prohibition of some types of conduct does not reduce the occurrence of that 
conduct and sometimes can even be counterproductive (e.g., criminalization of drugs and alcohol consumption, 
flag burning, risky driving). This is due to what has been called the ‘forbidden fruit effect’.  See Filley 1999, Husak 
2008, pp.147-8.  See also Sampsell-Jones 2005 for an empirical analysis of the contestable, opaque and 
counterproductive message of expressive legislation: “When the criminal law tries to teach them a lesson about 
drugs, they suspect ulterior motives.  The heavy imposition of criminal sanctions on members of street culture 
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Braithwaite and Pettit’s position is further reinforced if one considers their presumption in 
favour of parsimony, so that “less rather than more criminal justice activity” should be 
favoured (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, p.87).  In this respect, I share the spirit of the 
republican consequentialist theory of criminalization.  However, in what follows I want to 
raise doubts about the capacity this model has to minimise the problems in our criminal law.  
I will claim that, despite its attractive features, republican consequentialism cannot do the 
job of restricting criminalization in a way that is consistent with the demands of the free 
society. 
My first concern has to do with the extent to which the promotion of dominion has 
the power to avoid or minimise overcriminalization.  If we accept that an individual’s 
dominion is enhanced when she is free from other people’s interference, and that dominion is 
grounded in the recognition she receives from others and the law, then we may conclude that 
there are a large number of cases in which this model allows the enactment of statutes that a 
free society may consider unjustifiable.  Consider the following example: after an 
horrendously bloody terrorist attack dominion has certainly been critically undermined, 
mainly because people’s capacity to trust others may have been seriously undermined.  As a 
response – following the dominion-promoting rationale – the legislature decides to pass a 
package of penal statutes that enlarge the weakened dominion of society.  This package 
includes a series of very intrusive statutes (e.g., surveillance in private spheres, identity-check 
points in popular streets, long periods of preventive detention, and so on).  Under pre-attack 
circumstances these measures would diminish the dominion of society, whilst under post-
attack circumstances these statutes provide great reassurance for the community, 
reassurance that is needed and demanded by the people and that, consequently, is crucial in 
promoting dominion.  This reassurance is so appreciated by people post-attack that the 
magnitude of the dominion that these intrusive statutes provide overrides the discomfort that 
these statutes otherwise produce.  Since the set of criminal statutes passed by the legislature 
does enhance dominion overall, the model has no objection to offer againts augmenting the 
criminal law in the ways described.  This is problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, it seems that dominion is a too elastic value as to provide sufficient stability to 
people’s expectations in relation to the law.  When the promotion of a value like this is the 
cornerstone of a model of criminalization, then the criminal law becomes too sensitive to 
                                                
provokes many to deny the sincerity and the justice of drug policy.  As a response, some seek means of rebellion 
and expressive opposition.  Drug policy itself invests drug crimes with meaning of rebellion and resistance; it thus 
undermines its own expressive goals” (Sampsell-Jones 2005 , p.140).    
 167 
circumstantial vicissitudes which expand or shrink its scope of action depending on the 
social, political, or economic temperature of society.  Although sometimes this temperature 
may make the legislature lean towards the reduction of the criminal law – e.g., under 
circumstances of peace and prosperity – at another time circumstances may encourage the 
legislature to enlarge it.  In either case dominion may be promoted, independent of whether 
the system is over- or undercriminalized.  To follow the example above, after a terrorist attack 
dominion may need to be heavily boosted and this may be achieved by creating a statute that 
permits extended detention without charge, or the criminalization of storing material that 
can be useful to realise a terrorist act (for an apt example see the Terrorism Act 2006 part 1 
sec. 2).  What this shows is that a system of criminalization thus constructed ultimately 
becomes a function of the circumstances and contingencies that promote a given value.  In 
the face of the current predicaments of the criminal law, this dependence is pernicious as it 
allows the transformation (expansion/reduction) of the penal law in ways that are not 
constrained by the restricted role this institution should have.  As long as the criminal law 
promotes the value guiding republican consequentialist institutions (dominion), then, 
despite the constrained nature of the consequentialist theory, anything (in principle) goes. 
My claim here is not that criminalization should be indifferent to contextual 
elements, but rather that criminalization should not be dependant on those elements.  When 
a theoretical model permits that, overcriminalization – and in rearer circumstances, 
undercriminalization – becomes a likely outcome of the application of that theory.  As I see it, 
republican consequentialism is an example of that type of model, as it is not capable of 
preventing the inadequate enlargement (or reduction) of the penal law when such an 
enlargement (or reduction) promotes dominion. 
Second, this approach to criminalization seems to blur the basic distinction between 
penal and non-penal spheres of the law.  If the promotion of dominion is the ultimate 
rationale of public policy, then dominion is to be promoted by whichever means produce a 
favourable outcome.  The function and work of the criminal law then becomes dependent on 
how other institutions capable of promoting dominion fare.  If non-penal law (or any other 
non-legal coercive institution for this matter) fares better than penal law in promoting 
dominion, then the republican consequentialist will opt for the former.  Similarly, when penal 
laws produce a better outcome overall, then penal laws shall be favoured.  This is 
problematic because the promotion of dominion is undertaken without further consideration 
of the nature of the institution that promotes this value.  As I have argued here, this is 
something to be resisted because it obliterates the specificity of the criminal law and makes 
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this institution indistinguishable from other branches of the law (and from some non-legal 
institutions).  On the republican consequentialist account, if the criminal law is judged to be 
better than other legal institutions in advancing dominion within, say, the family, then the 
criminal law may legitimately include family law within its scope.  This outcome is 
indefensible.   
We must distinguish between the different branches of the law and the specific 
normative, functional and descriptive roles that each of them has.  Collapsing penal and non-
penal spheres of a legal system under one general umbrella or goal must be resisted, because 
the public condemnatory nature of the criminal law does not fit (neither normatively nor 
descriptively) with other social institutions and spheres of social interaction.  The 
consequentialist approach is in this sense flawed:  undermining the distinction between what 
should and should not fall within the criminal law risks overcriminalizing the system because 
it overlooks the principles that prevent making non-penal matters penal. 
As I argued in chapter 1, one of the chief aspects that any theory of the criminal law 
must clearly establish is the threshold that separates the penal system from other institutions 
of social control.  This is particularly important because the regrettable present condition of 
the criminal law is in part due to the absence of appropriate boundaries of legitimate penal 
coercion.  Consequentialism does not fare well in this respect when applied to the criminal 
law. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This chapter has explored traditional liberal principles and motives of criminalization in 
order to assess both their capacity to minimise overcriminalization and their compatibility 
with the demands of the free society.  As I have argued, each of these principles has some 
appeal and offers some type of limit on penal regulation.  To that extent, each of them has 
something positive to contribute to our understanding of criminalization in accordance with 
liberal commitments. 
However, as we have seen, these principles are not sufficient or adequate to 
constitute a model of criminalization in the free society.  A common flaw is that these 
principles ground their criteria for criminalization in something external to the function of 
the criminal law.  Thus, Feinberg trusts in moral rights, Raz in autonomous choices, Duff in 
communal values, Moore in a certain conception of morality, Braithwaite and Pettit in 
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maximizing dominion.  Although these criteria may have a role in an adequate model of 
criminalization, they are insufficient for distinguishing between legitimate penal coercion and 
legitimate non-penal coercion, and for explaining why this separation is justified as a matter 
of principle.  As I have tried to show, when a model of criminalization does not offer clear 
and explicit answers to these issues, it leaves the door wide open to overcriminalization. 
If these important and influential liberal principles cannot model criminalization in a 
way that impedes overcriminalization, what should we do?  Offering an answer to this 
question is the task of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Criminalization in the Free Society 
 
The foregoing chapter advanced a critical account of some of the most prominent liberal 
principles of criminalization.  If my analysis is correct, each of these principles – the harm 
principle, penal moralism, penal paternalism, and consequentialism – fall short in one way or 
another when answering the question of criminalization in a free society.  Insofar as these 
principles cannot systematically block the inadequate expansion of the criminal law, they are 
incomplete, insufficient or even flawed guidelines for criminalization.   
The question we now need to answer is, if these prominent principles of 
criminalization cannot do the job, what could do it?  In what follows I propose an answer to 
this question by presenting a model of criminalization that derives from my account of the 
general function of the criminal law in the free society as developed in chapter 5.  If 
successful, this model should be capable of both addressing the problem of 
overcriminalization and constituting itself as a model of criminalization in a free society. 
After a brief methodological note, this chapter proceeds by presenting the two 
principles of criminalization that constitute this model, namely, the principle of direct 
violation of bodily ownership and of ownership in external things (sec.2.1), and the principle 
of effective reduction of direct violations (sec.2.4).  The last section of the chapter puts these 
principles to work by considering a bill on hate-crime and whether a legislature using these 
two principles could legitimately make this bill a penal statute.  
 
1 .  A Methodological  Note 
In the analysis that follows this section I borrow some aspects of a method advanced by 
Jonathan Schonsheck in his book On Criminalization (Schonsheck 1994). Schonsheck 
develops a ‘filtering decision-procedure’ of criminalization, as opposed to a ‘balancing 
decision-procedure’.  He proposes  
that we think about criminalization in this way: when it is suggested that some 
action be criminalized, we think of that action as having to pass, successfully and 
successively, through three distinct ‘Filters’.  Failure to pass through any Filter 
entails that the action cannot justifiably be criminalized; passing through all 
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three Filters entails that the action is justifiably made criminal (Schonsheck 
1994, p.64).142   
There are various things that could be said about Schonsheck’s interesting approach to 
criminalization.  I shall mention one that I consider particularly relevant for my purposes: 
Schonsheck uses his filtering method as a method competing with, and more succesful than, 
what he takes to be a flawed methodological alternative, namely, the balancing decision-
procedure.  Unlike Schonsheck’s favoured method, the balancing decision-procedure 
addresses the question of criminalization by weighing arguments for and against 
criminalization.  In doing so, Schonsheck would say, this method weighs the un-weighable 
(see Schonsheck 1994, p.33) and renders decision about criminalization in a too simplistic 
either-or procedure: if something weighs, say, against dominion, then it weighs in favour of 
criminalization, if something weighs in favour of autonomy, then it weighs against 
criminalization. 
This is relevant because the ‘weight problem’ clearly points to a difficulty shared by 
the principles of criminalization reviewed in chapter 6.  All of these principles decide for 
criminalization by weighing conduct and comparing this weight with the normative weight 
of their favoured values and ideals.  This procedure for criminalization is very much evident 
in the consequentialist approach, but it also has important resonances in both Feinberg’s 
model (Schonsheck takes Feinberg’s account as one of his main targets) and in some aspects 
of penal paternalism and moralism (penal paternalists ‘weigh’ conduct vis-à-vis the weight of 
autonomy, and penal moralism tries to find the moral weight of conduct in order to 
determine whether that conduct should be criminalized).  The central problem of these 
principles and motives of criminalization is that, in the end, they fail to provide a sufficient 
and clear limit that differentiates conduct to be addressed criminally from conduct that is not.  
                                                
142 The three different filters Schonsheck considers are: (1) The Principles Filter: A conduct C satisfies this filter if C 
falls within whatever one takes to be the legitimate sphere of state authority.  The question to answer here is 
whether C (a conduct that the statute aims to criminalize) falls within those conducts upon which the state has 
authority to somehow regulate (see Schonsheck 1994, pp.64-8). (2) The Presumptions Filter: A conduct C 
satisfies this filter if the incidence of C will not succesfully be reduced by a less coercive measure than a criminal 
statute (see Schonsheck 1994, pp.68-70). (3) The Pragmatics Filter: A conduct C satisfies this filter if the social 
cost of enacting a criminal statute prohibiting C is less onerous than not criminalizing C.  According to 
Schonsheck methodology C is a conduct that can be legitimatelly criminalized if and only if it successfully and 
successively satisfies these three filters (see Schonsheck 1994, pp.70-2).  As Schonsheck himself notes, this 
methodology does not say anything about the content of the conducts that a statute may legitimately criminalize – 
we may well understand Schonsheck’s principles as second-order principles of criminalization.  The answer to the 
question of criminalization I defend derives from the general function of the criminal law as presented in chapter 
5, and in this sense it adds substantive and determinate content to the types of conducts that are to be considered 
as adequate subjects of criminalization. 
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The ‘weight problem’ points to this difficulty and invites us to find an alternative procedure.  
The filtering method is just that alternative procedure. 
A second and independent preliminary: as with any principles guiding a social 
practice, the principles of the criminal law cannot avoid at least some degree of vagueness, 
and this will surely be reflected in the filters of criminalization I shall put forward below.  
Thus, an important part of my efforts is to minimise this vagueness knowing from the outset 
that complete avoidance is not realistic.  As a result, the filters of criminalization that I am 
going to defend need to be understood as capable of, on the one hand, providing a strong 
presumption in support of the criminalization of action that successfully and successively 
passes these filters and, on the other hand, blocking the criminalization of action that does 
not pass them.   
There is, therefore, an asymmetry in the results provided by filtering actions: whereas 
action that gets ‘caught in the net’ of one of the filters should be discarded as a legitimate 
candidate for criminalization, action that passes the two filters should be considered ‘only’ as 
a strong candidate for criminalization.  The filtering procedure conveys more conclusive 
outcomes when impeding criminalization than when supporting it.  The reason for this 
asymmetry is that, as I have emphasised throughout this thesis, the consequences of 
criminalization have an enormous impact on people’s lives and, therefore, we need to be 
extremely cautious when establishing what type of behaviour is to be regulated through the 
penal law.  The unavoidable (but hopefully minimal) vagueness in the constitution of the 
filters of criminalization should make us be especially careful in the imposition of penal 
burdens, but it should not impede us from adopting a very firm position against 
criminalization when actions under consideration do not satisfy these filters.  As I argued in 
chapter 1, although the criminal law and criminalization are necessary institutions of the free 
society, their use should be strictly constrained and leaving action uncriminalized ought to be 
seen as the default practice. 
A last clarification before proceeding: my claim that the model presented below 
provides all the required tools for adequate criminalization needs to be qualified.  This is the 
case for the following reason: since my topic of analysis is confined exclusively to the criminal 
law, and since the criminal law cannot be understood other than as a part of a more general 
system of law, the model I present here takes for granted that fundamental principles of 
legality are in place (that is, principles that apply to a system of law generally, and not only to 
one ‘dimension’ of it).  Thus, and just to illustrate, the model I present supposes that the 
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general system of law in which this model of criminalization is to be located honours 
principles of legality that block ex post facto legislation and that are committed to both the 
idea of nulla poena sine lege and mens rea.  Were these principles and contraints not in place, 
this model (and any model for this matter) would be utterly unstable.  In short, my claim that 
the two principles of criminalization here presented are all we need to put forward a model of 
criminalization in the free society remains true if and only if more basic principles of legality 
are in place and enforced.    
Thus, keeping these considerations in mind, let us move now to the two filters of 
criminalization in the free society. 
 
2 .  The Two Filters  of  Criminalization 
The two filters of criminalization I will present establish the conditions that need to be 
satisfied for an action to qualify or not as a legitimate candidate for criminalization – that is, 
the conditions an action needs to satisfy to determine whether or not there is a strong 
presumption in favour of the criminalization of that action.   
As I have argued, the main and primary concern of the criminal law in the free 
society should be the preconditions of the capacity of the individual to associate with others.  
This is to say that the juridical goods that are to be respected and protected by the criminal 
law in general and criminalization in particular are bodily ownership and ownership in 
external things (see chs.4 and 5).   
However, establishing what are the legitimate and adequate juridical goods of the 
criminal law is only part of what we need in order to obtain a more comprehensive model of 
criminalization.  In addition, we also need to consider (I) the more specific conditions that 
make an action qualify for penal regulation and (II) the minimal requirements of legitimacy 
for the enforcement of penal regulation of actions that pass the conditions in (I).  The two 
filters that this section presents capture these two different aspects respectively. 
Thus, according to this account of criminalization, the legislature of the free society 
has a strong presumption in favour of the criminalization of action C if and only if C satisfies 
(I) the principle of direct violation and unacceptable risk to bodily ownership and/or 
ownership in external things and (II) the principle of effective reduction of C (for short, the 
principles of direct violation and effective reduction respectively).  These two principles 
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constitute the model’s two filters of criminalization.  According to the filtering method, there 
is a strong presumption for the criminalization of conduct C, if and only if the legislature of a 
general jurisdiction puts C through the two filters of criminalization and C is criminalized on 
grounds that it has passed successfully and successively these two filters.  The formulation of 
the two filters is: 
(I) Filter of Direct Violation: Action C is a direct violation of, or creates an 
unacceptable risk to, individuals’ bodily ownership and/or ownership in 
external things 
and 
(II) Filter of Effective Reduction: Criminalizing C effectively reduces the 
occurrence of C. 
In what follows I unpack these two filters by considering their different constituent elements.  
In conjunction with the juridical goods to be protected by the criminal law – bodily 
ownership and ownership in external things – the task I undertake in the next two sections 
provides an account of the principles of criminalization that should guide penal legislation in 
the free society.   
 
2.1 (I) Filter of Direct Violation 
This first filter of criminalization establishes that only direct violations and unacceptable risks 
to bodily ownership and/or ownership in external things can count as legitimate candidates 
of criminalization.  In the following three sections I unpack this complex claim into three 
parts: action, directness and violation.  Before doing so, it is important briefly to recall the 
view put forward in chapters 4 and 5 from which this principle derives. 
 The free society is an association of purposive individuals engaged in a common 
practice; the practice of living together.  Within this associative scheme, members of the free 
society live their lives in association with other individuals because these associations benefit 
their lives lived according to their life purposes.  Were agents not to perceive subjective 
benefits from the different associative schemes to which they belong, they would have no 
reasons to remain with others in those associations.  Within this context of free associations 
the state institutions fulfil an important role, namely, honouring and protecting the principle 
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of freedom of association.143 As I argued in chapter 5, the criminal law honours this 
fundamental liberal principle by protecting and respecting the preconditions of the capacity 
of the individual to associate with others, namely, bodily ownership and ownership in 
external things.  No other good qualifies as a legitimate juridical good of the criminal law of 
the free society. 
In relation to bodily ownership, what matters is that individuals own their bodies so 
that the exercise of their capacity to associate is not contingent on someone else.  The view I 
defend is that the very possibility of exercising our capacity to associate freely with others 
depends on the fact that one owns one’s body and that, without bodily ownership being in 
place, the exercise of one’s right to associate and dissociate would not depend on oneself, but 
would be contingent on someone else.  In this context, ownership refers to the entitlement to 
use and control our bodies as we think fit in a way compatible with the same entitlement for 
all. 
A fundamental complement of the right to bodily ownership is the right to 
ownership in external things.  Were bodily ownership not followed by some form of 
ownership in external things, bodily ownership would be devoid of meaning and/or all 
exercisability.  This is explained by the idea that in order to exercise the right to bodily 
ownership we need something in and on which to exercise such a right.  In this sense, the 
right to own one’s body, and therefore, the right to decide what to do to and with one’s body, 
requires, if it is going to be a meaningful right at all, the existence of a right to ownership in 
external things.144 
These two rights are stringent property rights to use and dispose both one’s body 
and one’s external goods as one believes fit and in a way compatible with the same rights for 
all members of the free society (see ch.5).  The more specific scope and limit of these rights in 
relation to criminalization is determined by the three different conditions that I now proceed 
to consider.    
 
                                                
143 According to this principle, individuals have a liberty-right to enter in associations with others for whatever 
purposes and duration in time, compatible with the same right for all, and with no constraints whatsoever on the 
voluntary benefits and obligations that may emerge from this association.  See chapter 4 sec.2 for further 
elaboration. 
144 As I argued in chapter 5, my claim does not depend on the possibility of deriving property in worldly things from 
self-ownership.  Instead, my claim is that however we determine property entitlements in external things, these 




The filter of direct violation of bodily ownership and/or ownership in external things focuses 
on human actions.  ‘Action’ (which I use interchangeably with ‘conduct’ and ‘behaviour’) 
refers to acts of the individual (or relevant failures to act) that bring about a certain state of 
affairs.  As it stands, this is a rather uncontroversial factor of the first filter.  In a free society 
the criminalization of things different from actions, such as status, physical or mental 
conditions, race and other things of this sort are simply unacceptable. 
However, things are more complicated.  For the purposes of the criminal law, 
actions are not merely bodily motions but, using Moore’s expression, “willed bodily 
movements” (Moore 1993, p.28).  The central thought is that actions, in the sense relevant to 
criminalization, are intentional bodily movements.  The mark of an agent’s intentional action 
is that the agent performs φ with the intention to bring about a state of affairs e believing and 
desiring that by performing φ she will bring about e.  Thus, an individual D intentionally kills 
V if and only if D kills V through the performance of action φ, D believes that φ will kill V, 
and D desires to kill V.145 
 What follows from this account of ‘action’ is that when considering whether an action 
qualifies as a legitimate object of criminalization, legislators of the free society must focus on 
intentions, not motives or other reasons for action.  To illustrate the contrast between what is 
relevant to criminalization and what is not consider the following case: Peter puts some 
drops of lethal poison in a cup of tea in order to kill George.  George does not want to die, 
but unaware of Peter’s action he drinks the poisoned tea and dies.  Now, what matters for 
the criminal law as a matter of criminalization is the agent’s action in terms of intentions 
(collateral or lineal).146  The reasons Peter may have had for the action (that is, Peter’s motive 
in putting some drops of poison in George’s tea believing that this would kill George and 
                                                
145 This account of intentional action is an adaptation of Lowe’s analysis of intentionality in Lowe 1980.  See also 
Kenny 1975, ch.4 and Hart 2008, pp.90-112.  I should note that this case is tighter than a law on, say, murder 
which holds that you can murder someone if you intentionally act to do him serious harm and he dies from that 
harm; that is, even if you did not intend to kill him. 
146 I borrow the distinction between collateral and lineal intent from Bentham: “A consequence, when it is 
intentional, may either be directly so, or only obliquely.  It may be said to be directly or lineally intentional, when 
the prospect of producing it constituted one of the links in the chain of causes by which the person was 
determined to do the act.  It may be said to be obliquely or collaterally intentional, when, although the 
consequence was in contemplation, and appeared likely to ensue in case of the act’s being performed, yet the 
prospect of producing such consequence did not constitute a link in the aforesaid link” (Bentham 1996, p.86). 
 177 
desiring to kill George) are a different issue and, as a matter of criminalization, should not 
concern legislators.   
The point of this specification is that, in order to determine whether an action C is a 
legitimate candidate for criminalization, legislators should only consider, and define C in 
terms of, the mental states that are necessary to qualify C as a violation of the relevant 
juridical goods.  Because motives are generally not necessary to determine whether an action 
is a violation, legislators must thereby define C in a way independent of the motives that an 
agent may have to perform C.  Thus, Peter may have decided to poison and kill George 
motivated by the prospect of getting George’s money to use it in the casino or to give it to 
charity, or perhaps he was motivated by the belief that George’s death would save hundreds 
of lives or he was motivated by the thrill that killing George would provide him.  However, 
whatever Peter’s motives are, they should not be what matter to legislators when thinking of 
criminalizing actions (although, of course, motives may be relevant to subsequent criminal 
procedures such as trial or punishment).  As we shall see below in section I.c, what matters 
to criminalization is whether an action can be described as a violation of the preconditions of 
the capacity of the individual to associate with others.  This description, in turn, only 
demands the appropriate type of intention, which is a matter that is independent of the 
reasons an agent may have had to perform the violating act.  
Hence, the temptation to define actions that are candidate for criminalization in 
terms of motivations and/or other reasons must be resisted.  To do otherwise is to involve in 
questions of criminalization factors that in a complex pluralist society cannot be judged 
without infringing the principle of neutrality (see ch.4 sec.1.3).  Judging motives involves 
complex considerations of values, preferences and interests, and – on pain of turning 
criminalization into an expression of oppression – all these are not what should matter when 
regulating action through the penal law.  In short, when legislating on penal issues, 
legislators should not be concerned with inquiring into the type of motivations that should or 
can guide individuals’ actions; that is not part of the legitimate function of criminalization 
and none of the business of legislators creating penal statutes. 
To be sure, nothing in what I have said negates that both motives and other reasons 
and intentions constitute human action, or that we can have intentions without motives, or 
that on occasion motives and intentions cannot be clearly distinguished from one another.  
The specification of actions in terms of intentions only sharpens the focus and indicates the 
adequate direction of what should matter for legislators when they are considering the 
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criminalization of action in a free society.  In a complex liberal society, constituted by many 
and perhaps conflicting views about the values and interests that should guide social life, we 
have very good reasons to leave judgments of motives aside when considering criminalization 
and, instead, to focus only on intentional violations. 
Furthermore, it cannot be argued against this account that motives and other 
reasons are necessary to make sense of central aspects of the criminal law such as defences.  
This objection would misunderstand the point of this analysis, as my concern here is not with 
doctrines of defence but with doctrines of criminalization.  Put differently, arguing that 
intentions are the primary, or only, state of mind relevant to criminalization does not mean 
that motives do not play any role whatsoever in a system of penal law.   
In effect, it may not only be legitimate but required to include motives as relevant to 
conviction or sentencing.  For example, if a free society has been achieved after circumstances 
of constant unfairness and illegitimate prosecution of some specific groups or individuals, we 
may plausibly think that their wrongdoings or the wrongdoings perpetrated against these 
individuals should count differently under current circumstances; the circumstances of the 
free society achieved through deep unfairness.  I understand this as a principle of historical 
rectification in criminal justice.  However, and independent of the criteria that allow us to 
establish whether or not this exception is justified under particular circumstances, it must be 
clear that in the model defended here such a principle of historical rectification is to be 
applied not as a matter of criminalization (which is what concerns us here), but as a matter of 
sentencing or as a part of a doctrine of defences. In other words, motives may matter in 
sentencing or defences not in criminalization.147 
 
I.b Directness 
In addition to the specifications just mentioned, the first filter establishes that actions that are 
relevant to criminalization – i.e., actions that should make criminally liable those who 
                                                
147 Alan Norrie and critical legal theorists in general are vocal opponents of the exclusion of motives from 
criminalization and their being restricted to issues such as sentencing.  As an illustration: “The possibility of 
mitigation of sentence is a marvellous mechanism for allowing the criminal process to ‘have its cake and eat it’.  
Having convicted the accused by strict, unbending set of rules, the rule books are cleared away and judicial or 
governmental discretion comes in to do ‘real’ justice to the individual, or to temper legal justice with ‘mercy’.  
None of the orthodox doctrinal scholars appear to appreciate the irony of this.  Having insisted upon a strict legal 
code so as to protect the liberty of the individual, it transpires that the individual’s liberty is ultimately dependent 
not upon the rule of law at all but on a group of men operating with a wide discretion at the sentencing stage” 
(Norrie 2001, p.46).  For a response to Norrie’s point, see Duff 1998b.  See also Kelman (1981) for a general 
account of critical legal studies. 
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perform it – must be direct violations.  The factor of directness relates to two different but 
related factors: causation and immediacy.  Actions that are legitimate candidates for 
criminalization must be either a proximate cause of the wrong to be prevented, or must be 
the wrong to be prevented by criminalization.   
When the immediacy between the action examined for criminalization and the 
wrong to be prevented is absolute – so we could perhaps talk of an identity between the two 
– the factor of directness is fully satisfied (such as in the case of rape and robbery).  However, 
proximate causation becomes a more complicated matter when immediacy is less than 
absolute (as in shooting a gun at someone).  In those cases, what matters is that the action 
under consideration causes in a relevant sense the wrong to be prevented by criminalization.  
As we know, a generally accurate way to determine causal relevance is to appeal to a 
counterfactual question: would the wrong to be prevented not have taken place but for the 
action that is being scrutinized; would the victim not have been injured had the gun not been 
shot?  As we also know, the literature is full of pages pointing to the problems of this ‘but for’ 
test.148 An important source of difficulties relates to potential overinclusiveness – the gun 
could not have been shot but for the presence of gunpowder in the bullet, so what made 
possible the presence of gunpowder in the bullet is a cause of the injury to the victim.  In 
order to avoid such an undesirable consequence, my model adopts a common-sense form of 
the ‘but for’ test (see Hart and Honoré 1985).  The idea is to use causation as a way to offer a 
common sense narrative of a state of affairs, which is a task different from attempting to 
account for the complete and/or sufficient conditions required for a certain effect to happen; 
individual acts are certainly only one of the numerous causal elements producing an effect in 
the world, but this should not stop us from talking about causation in the law and from using 
causation as a relevant factor to explain and account for states of affairs that concern the law. 
The common-sense approach adopts ordinary language and understandings to 
identify whether an action is a direct cause of a wrong to be prevented by criminalization.  To 
illustrate, it goes against this common-sense understanding to argue that Hitler’s mother’s 
action of giving birth to, and raising, her son is the, or even a relevant, cause of the 
Holocaust, even if it is true that the Holocaust would not have taken place but for her 
actions.  By the same token, it is not part of my understanding of causation that the cause of 
the suicide of a depressed person was the cold shoulder given by her friend, even if it is true 
                                                
148 For example, see Katz 1987 and Kagan 1989, ch.3, pp.92f.  For a volume covering many of the philosophical 
problems of causation and counterfactuals see Collins, Hall & Paul (Eds.) 2004. 
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that the cold shoulder was a part of what brought about her final decision to terminate her 
life.   
In my account, more precisely, the crucial point for why an action counts or not as a 
relevant cause is captured by the notion of directness.  Directness is a function of the 
foreseeability of a given event after performing an act, where that event is the wrong to be 
prevented by criminalization and the act is the action under consideration for criminalization.  
Thus, what makes the examples above not qualify as proximate causes is the lack of sufficient 
foreseeability of the undesired effects (the Holocaust and the suicide) after the agents have 
performed their intentional actions (Hitler’s mother bringing up her son and the giving of a 
cold shoulder to the depressed person).  The more foreseeable is the occurrence of the wrong 
to be prevented as a result of the action under consideration, the more direct the relationship 
between the action and the wrong and, therefore, the stronger the presumption in favour of 
criminalizing the action.   
What justifies my emphasis on directness is the general function of the criminal law 
(see ch.5).  The criminal law is to maximize individuals’ freedom within the context of society 
by contributing to individuals’ stability of expectations without interfering with the capacity 
of individuals to associate with others as they wish (recall that this general function of the 
criminal law is determined by the respect owed by the state to the principle of freedom of 
association).  By contrast, to widen the scope of authority of this institution to the extent of 
introducing actions that non-directly produce the wrong to be prevented represents an 
illegitimate attack on the exercise of the capacity to freely associate with others.  Making 
individuals liable for types of conducts whose consequences cannot reasonably be anticipated 
shrinks people’s freedom in a way incompatible with the general function of the institutions 
of a free society. 
The criterion of directness as a function of foreseeability is certainly not clear-cut, 
and many of its limits may have to be determined as a matter of policy.  However, it indicates 
a general and necessary feature of any action that is legitimately criminalized.  Furthermore, 
this lack of complete determinacy turns out to be less problematic than it may seem once we 
recall that this model has adopted a filtering strategy.  Directness is only one of the different 
factors relevant to the first filter of criminalization and, therefore, there is much more to the 
criminalization of actions than directness. 
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I.c Violation and Unacceptable Risk 
This third factor of the first filter of criminalization is grounded in Judith Thomson’s 
distinction between infringements and violations.  Whereas the former may produce injury or 
damage and may perhaps require some compensation on the part of the responsible agent in 
favour of the injured or damaged, the latter represents a wrongful incursion into the relevant 
interests of others and is to be responded to with appropriate reactive attitudes.  Thomson 
writes, “I shall say that we infringe a right [...] if and only if we bring about that it is the case.  
I shall say that we violate a right [...] if and only if both we bring about that it is the case and 
we act wrongly in doing so” (Thomson 1977, p.47). 
 The emphasis of this first filter on actions that are violations resembles a central 
aspect of Feinberg’s harm principle in so far as violations of individuals’ bodily ownership and 
ownership in external things constitute a setback of interests that wrong those individuals 
violated.  This use of violations mirrors the general structure of harm2 as developed by 
Feinberg (see ch.6 sec.2).  To this extent, I understand the principle of direct violation as a 
re-elaboration of Feinberg’s harm principle.   
In addition, the sense in which actions that create unacceptable risks are violations 
(and therefore wrongs) is that unacceptable risks to bodily ownership and ownership in 
external things undermine stability of expectations in relation to these two goods.  Because 
the main rationale of the criminal law of the free society is to assure individuals about the 
preconditions of their capacity to associate, actions that make these expectations unstable by 
creating unacceptable risk – i.e., risks that according to our best normative theories we have 
good reasons to avoid or minimise – represent a legitimate concern for individuals and the 
criminal law and, therefore, are to be considered as legitimate candidates for criminalization. 
 The idea that only actions that are violations and/or unacceptable risks should be 
part of a system of criminalization results from taking seriously the specificity of the criminal 
law as considered in chapter 1.  What characterizes non-criminal violations is that they are 
condemnable actions simpliciter, whereas what characterizes violations of bodily ownership 
and ownership in external things (to the extent that they are preconditions of the capacity of 
the individual to associate) is that they are condemnable actions of a relevant public interest 
and, thus, a matter of proper concern for the criminal law.  Violations, and not other type of 
incursions into individuals’ bodies and property, are the only adequate foci of the criminal law 
of a free society. 
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2.2 Taking Stock: The Principle of Direct Violation and The Harm Principle  
As I noted above, the principle of direct violation can be seen as a re-elaboration of 
Feinberg’s harm principle.  However, given my critical analysis of that version of the harm 
principle in chapter 6, and in order to clarify further the different conditions that constitute 
the first filter of my own model, it makes sense to differentiate my position explicitly from 
Feinberg’s.  
The principle of direct violation is more determinate than the harm principle (in both 
Feinberg’s and Mill’s versions).  Unlike the harm principle, the principle here endorsed 
establishes explicitly that only setbacks of interests that represent a direct violation or an 
unacceptable risk to individuals’ body and/or ownership in external things are legitimate 
candidates for criminalization.  Conversely, setbacks of interests that remotely violate 
individuals’ bodily ownership and/or ownership in external things or that merely infringe 
these two claim-rights (as opposed to violate them) are not to count as legitimate candidates 
of criminalization.149  This, I think, clearly separates the principle of direct violation from 
both Mill’s and Feinberg’s account of the harm principle. 
To illustrate consider the following cases: 
(i)  A intentionally pushes B in order to kill B.  
(ii)  A intentionally pushes B in order to kill C and it is reasonable to think that 
by pushing B, C will die.   
Respectively, these cases represent the direct violation of B, and of both B and C.  My 
account would certainly criminalize the actions of A in both cases and so would the harm 
principle in any of the two versions considered.150   
Think now of a case of direct non-violation (that is, infringement) of an individual B.   
(iii) A unintentionally pushes B, in virtue of which B dies.  
(iv) A intentionally pushes and harms B to save B (or D) from C’s illegitimate 
attack. 
                                                
149  I do not distinguish here between remote violations and non-direct violation.  My conception of a remote 
violation derives from the notion of remote harm, which is “harmless ‘but for’ the fact it encourages another 
independent party to commit a harmful criminal act” (Baker 2007, p.370). 
150 Of course, the sentences in cases (i) and (ii) would differ, but that is something we do not need to worry here. 
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My account would not criminalize (iii) for the simple reason that a direct or indirect 
infringement of bodily ownership is not a violation of bodily ownership and only violations 
are part of the legitimate concern of the criminal law.  In turn, case (iv) is covered by my 
model of criminalization (A intentionally pushes and harms B), but the addition of an 
explanation as to why A pushes B suggests that there is an infringement, not a violation.  
However, whether A will be punished in this case is not a matter of criminalization – and 
therefore something my model does not answer – rather it is something that needs to be 
responded to through a theory of sentencing and/or defence.  I believe all this mirrors 
Feinberg’s account of harm1 and harm2, which is well equipped to separate infringements 
from violations of interests.  In turn, Mill’s harm principle would have difficulties explaining 
why we should not criminalize the conduct in (iii) and is ambiguous about the 
criminalization of conduct in case (iv) and so needs some additional argument in this case.  
Consider now indirect violations.  
(v) A intentionally convinces B that members of a given group should be 
exterminated (and perhaps, to convince B, A has intentionally deceived, 
misled, confused, and manipulated B).  B knows that C belongs to that 
given group and because of A’s words, B intentionally pushes C in order to 
kill C.151  
Although the principle of direct violation makes legitimate the criminalization of B’s action, 
it impedes the criminalization of A’s conduct.  By contrast, in Feinberg’s account of the harm 
principle, the criminalization of A in case (v) is legitimate because he accepts that actions that 
have indirect harmful effects in others are within the proper scope of the criminal law 
(Feinberg 1987, pp.128, 131-2, 329).  Conversely, Mill’s harm principle is ambiguous about the 
criminalization of indirect violations.  On the one hand, Mill’s principle claims that only self-
protection and the prevention of harm to others is the legitimate source of criminalization.  
On the other hand, Mill argues that “even opinions lose their immunity, when the 
circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a 
                                                
151 Note that this case is different from one in which A convinces B that C should be killed and A does this intending 
to kill C through B.  The principle of direct violation would criminalize A’s conduct on the grounds that A’s 
action intends to wrong C and the wrong prevented by criminalizing this action is directly linked to A’s action, 
where directness is used in the technical way specified above. 
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positive instigation to some mischievous act” (Mill 1989, p.56), which suggests that for Mill 
there may be sources of criminalization different from the harm principle (see ch.6 sec.2).152 
The principle of direct violation is not only more determinate than the harm 
principle, it is also more comprehensive.  In including the protection of ownership in external 
things it easily accommodates as matters of legitimate criminalization violations of things 
other than harmful conduct against the body.  In addition, since the principle makes 
legitimate the criminalization of violations (as opposed to harm or material setbacks of 
interests), harmless trespasses of property, joyriding, wrongful incursions into private 
documents, unauthorized touches, and cases of harmless rape are all seen as matters of 
legitimate concern for the criminal law.153  What matters to this principle is the actual 
violation of the preconditions of freedom of association, not the perceived setbacks as a result 
of incursions like those just mentioned.  By contrast, the criminalization of all of these cases 
cannot be easily justified by the harm principle.  Feinberg’s definition of harm as a setback to 
interests can accommodate incursions into ownership in worldly things, but it cannot do the 
same when these incursions are inconsequential and/or unknown to the victim. 
Although the comprehensive scope of the principle of direct violation should be seen 
as a positive accommodation of non-harmful conduct, it needs some extra justification.  It 
may be striking – and objectionable – that a model of criminalization like the one I defend 
here, one that wishes to reduce overcriminalization and adopt a minimalist shape, legitimises 
the criminalization of inconsequential actions.  However, this objection emerges from 
confusion.  As I take it, the claim that only relevant actions with undesired consequences are 
to be the legitimate focus of the criminal law results from the mistaken belief that 
criminalization of action has as its primary concern the direct would-be victim of crime.  As I 
argued in chapter 1 and in other passages of this thesis, the criminal law should not be thus 
understood.  The public dimension of the criminal law supposes that criminal conducts are 
acts of concern for the public as a whole (actions that are to be condemned by the polity) and 
for each individual member of society qua member of society, independent of whether they 
happen to be the direct victim of the crime.  Thus, whether a type of conduct has undesired 
consequences for an individual (the direct victim of an offence or someone else) is irrelevant 
                                                
152 I must emphasise that I am pointing to the ambiguity of Mill’s model in relation to the criminalization of conducts 
like the one illustrated by (v) and also by (iii and iv).  This is to say that, as it stands, Mill’s harm principle is 
indeterminate about whether we should criminalize A’s conduct, not that his position cannot be complemented to 
support (or not) the criminalization of A’s behaviour.  The same applies to the rest of my analysis of Mill in this 
paragraph. 
153 For harmless rape see Gardner and Shute 2007.  For harmless trespass and unauthorised touchings see Ripstein 
2006. 
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(or of not primary importance) in determining whether this conduct falls within the 
legitimate scope of the criminal law.  As I argued in more detail in chapters 4 and 5, a central 
matter for the criminal law in general and for criminalization in particular is whether a given 
conduct contravenes the basic preconditions of the capacity of the individual to associate 
with others.  This contravention does not require that a disadvantageous state of affairs is 
brought about, but simply that the preconditions needed for individuals to associate with 
each other are not being respected.  This is not to say that just because some action passes 
through the filters it must be criminalized.  An action that passes through the two filters is an 
action that falls within the legitimate scope of the criminal law and, therefore, is (only) a 
legitimate candidate for criminalization. 
Thus, the principle defended here states that harmless trespasses of ownership in 
external things can legitimately be criminalized because they are illegitimate trespasses.  In 
turn, their illegitimacy is independent of the negative impact trespasses may have on an 
individual’s interests and independent of whether these trespasses are known to the 
individual.  These trespasses are illegitimate because they undermine the stability of 
expectations in ownership in external things that members of society require to exercise their 
bodily ownership.  This is the basis of their illegitimacy.  Unknown harmless trespasses 
(upon the body or external things owned by the individual) can be criminalized for the same 
reason.  If rightful owners know that others can legitimately trespass their worldly things – 
and joyride in their vehicles and access their private information – even if they do not know of 
these trespasses and no material setback of interests is created, then individuals’ stability of 
expectations is undermined because both ownership in external things and, ultimately, the 
principle of freedom of association have been violated.  The individual exercise of the 
capacity to associate freely requires reasonable assurance that the claim-rights individuals 
have over their body and property is respected, and this assurance cannot depend on whether 
an individual believes no one is violating their body and/or property, but on whether an 
individual believes no one is entitled to violate them.  Violations are actions that lack due 
respect for the preconditions of free association, that is why they are condemnable, even if 
there is no knowable or material setback against the victim. 
 
2.3 The Principle of Direct Violation and Overcriminalization 
Despite my efforts to differentiate my account from the harm principle and to show it to be 
superior to that principle – and, by extension, to the other three principles considered in 
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chapter 6 – what I have said up to this point only shows that the principle of direct violation 
is different from the harm principle and that, consequently, these two principles may end up 
criminalizing different types of conduct.  In other words, what I have said in this section 
seems to work solely as a comparative analysis of two principles that reaches the following 
conclusion: the sharper determinacy of the principle of direct violation makes it criminalize 
less than the harm principle and its wider comprehensiveness makes it criminalize more types 
of conduct than the harm principle.  Then, on pain of being trivial, an additional question is 
in order: if the question of criminalization is about getting criminalization right – as opposed 
to either overcriminalizing or merely shrinking the amount of criminal law – why should we 
prefer the principle of direct violation to the harm principle? 
In addition to the more determinate specification of the juridical goods that 
criminalization is to protect, the principle of direct violation fares better than alternatives 
because of its capacity to minimise overcriminalization.  As I showed in the first part of this 
thesis, the problem of overcriminalization is not uniquely reduced to – and, in effect, it is 
independent of – the number of penal statutes a general jurisdiction may have.  
Overcriminalization, the abuse of coercive power by the state through the criminal law, can 
adopt different forms.  In chapter 2 I considered five forms of penal statutes that, under 
certain circumstances, qualify as instances of overcriminalization.  These statutes – ancillary 
offences, inchoate offences, vicarious penal liability offences, jurisdictionally mistaken 
offences, and overlapping offences – represent some of the penal developments where we 
might discover overcriminalization.  In what follows, I shall argue that the principle of direct 
violation has positive effects not only in reducing the number of penal statutes the legislature 
of a free society may enact, but also in responding to most of the different instances of 
overcriminalization that I have discussed.  
The principle of direct violation establishes a stringent limit on the enactment of 
ancillary offences.  The emphasis on the directness of the violation means that criminalization 
is about actions that directly cause the wrong to be prevented by criminalization, and not 
about actions that non-directly contribute to these violations or about actions that follow the 
commission of the violation.  Although the precise threshold at which actions leading to a 
violation become a criminal matter remains indeterminate (this is something that no general 
model of criminalization can completely avoid), the emphasis on direct violations suggest a 
clear and strong presumption against remote or non-direct violations.  Legislators creating 
the law will have to work out the limits between direct and non-direct/remote violations, but, 
whatever conclusions they reach in this matter, they should favour a threshold that gets 
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closer to the actual foreseeability of the wrong to be prevented as a result of the action under 
consideration: the weaker the foreseeability of the wrong to be prevented, the stronger the 
case against criminalization, and the stronger the foreseeability, the stronger the 
presumption in favour of criminalization.   
For example, under the principle of direct violation, acts of preparation are to be 
considered beyond the pale of criminalization, as there is no unacceptable risk created and 
the levels of foreseeability of the wrong to be prevented are too unclear at this stage.  
Genuine attempts do satisfy the unacceptable risk clause and, therefore, there is a case for 
their criminalization.  Similarly, given the unacceptable risk clause of the principle, 
unsuccessful violations are to count as a legitimate part of what matters to criminalization 
(insofar as they are violations of the relevant type).  Unknown violations are also to count as 
candidates for legitimate criminalization.  As discussed above, not to criminalize unknown 
violations would undermine individuals’ expectations in the exercise of their capacity to 
associate with others and, thereby, undermine the respect due to the principle of freedom of 
association that the state is to protect and honour through the criminal law. 
For similar reasons, the principle of direct violation should also count against the 
enactment of inchoate offences.  As we saw in chapter 2, and adapting Douglas Husak’s 
definition, these offences proscribe conduct that does not directly violate others on each and 
every occasion in which it is performed.  Thus, some of the conduct proscribed by inchoate 
offences does not directly violate any individual.  Again, since the emphasis of the principle I 
am defending is on the directness of the violation, typical inchoate offences like offences of 
possession, reckless behaviour or incitement are presumptively not candidates for legitimate 
criminalization.   
As I suggested above, at this level of abstraction, a degree of indeterminacy as to 
where exactly draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate inchoate offences is 
inevitable.  However, as a general rule the principle of direct violation advocates pushing the 
threshold towards actual violations or unacceptable risks.  If we follow this general rule, drug 
possession, for example, would be beyond the limits of criminalization.  In turn, reckless 
conduct would require a more contextual analysis since the extent to which a conduct is 
reckless is relevant to determine whether or not it falls within the pale of the criminal law.  In 
any case, what matters here is that the level of recklessness is to be considered only in the 
light of the preconditions of freedom of association.  Thus, careless conduct that does not 
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impose unacceptable risk upon individuals’ bodily ownership and ownership in external 
things should not count as a legitimate object of criminalization. 
It is clear that vicarious penal liability offences do not fare well in the face of the 
principle of direct violation.  Holding a person responsible for actions that he has not 
committed does not fit with the principle that only direct violations are to be candidates for 
criminalization.  Vicarious offences are not direct offences.   
To illustrate, consider again the case presented above as a direct violation: A 
intentionally pushes B in order to kill C and it is reasonable to think that by pushing B, C 
will die.  Although the most immediate cause of C’s death is B’s unintentional action (let us 
suppose that B performs the deadly action but for A’s action would not have done so), A’s 
conduct is to be counted as direct to the violation of C because A’s conduct is aimed at killing 
C.   
Now, contrast this with a case closer to a vicarious offence, like case (v) presented 
above: A intentionally convinces B that members of a given group should be exterminated.  
B knows that C belongs to that given group and because of A’s conduct, B intentionally 
pushes C in order to kill C.  In this case, A’s conduct, even if someone could show that it was 
sufficient to ensure B’s killing of C (which is unlikely), is not to count as part of what the 
criminal law is to regulate through criminalization.  A’s conduct is not a direct violation of C 
in the relevant sense because A’s conduct is not intended to kill C (it would be different if A 
intentionally convinced B that C is to be killed and A ought reasonably to expect that 
convincing B would be sufficient for B to kill C and A desires C to die.  In that case, A’s 
conduct would presumably count as a direct violation of C’s bodily ownership – see fn.151 
above). 
Similarly, the principle of direct violation counts against jurisdictionally mistaken 
offences.  The principle explicitly confines legitimate criminalization to direct violations of 
bodily ownership and ownership in external things.  It offers this conclusion in a principled 
manner by establishing that the function of the criminal law derives from the general function 
of state institutions in a free society and the commitment of those institutions to the principle 
of freedom of association.  These factors are important features guiding the job of legislators 
when deciding about the penal statutes that ought to be enforced in the free society.  The 
principle of direct violation, considered within the context of the free society and its 
commitment to freedom of association, makes clear that the criminal law is not to command 
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individuals in whatever sphere legislators or judges may wish.  On the contrary, the criminal 
law thus shaped has a very specific and reduced sphere of action. 
All this shows that, within the reasonable levels of indeterminacy that characterise 
any model of criminalization offered at this level of abstraction, the principle of direct 
violation has the power to reduce overcriminalization in a substantial way.  Consider, for 
example, the significant impact this model would have when confronted with the panoply of 
drug-related penal legislation (one of the most important sources of punishment today): no 
criminalization for drug possession, trafficking, production or consumption would be 
allowed.  The effects of this would be enormous, not only on criminalization, but also on 
some of the other predicaments of the criminal law, such as the overpopulation of prisons 
and the imposition of harsh and unfair punishments.154 Unlike the other principles and 
motives of criminalization discussed in chapter 6, the principle of direct violation represents a 
principled and strong filter to catch some forms of criminalization.  
 
2.4 (II) Principle of Effective Reduction 
It is now time to consider the second filter of criminalization, which is the principle of 
effective reduction.  Unlike the previous filter, the principle of effective reduction does not 
refer to the content of the criminal law, but sets minimal conditions of justifiability for the 
criminalization of actions that have passed through the first filter.  As I put it above, this 
principle establishes that for a conduct C to fall within the legitimate scope of the criminal 
law, criminalizing C must reduce effectively the occurrence of C.  If we are going to take 
criminalization and the criminal law seriously, this constraint ought to be respected. 
To introduce this filter it is helpful to recall the way in which criminalization 
performs its function.  As I have put it in several places, the criminal law threatens an 
individual with certain condemnatory consequences whenever the individual performs an 
action that has been deemed criminal by the jurisdiction.  Because we can reasonably expect 
that people will avoid actions that are generally followed by public condemnation, if the 
criminal law of a given jurisdiction holds an action φ to be criminal, members of that 
                                                
154 This especially true if we consider that according to the Office for National Statistics a third of all adults in 
England and Wales have used illicit drugs in their lifetime and one in ten used them in the last year (Office for 
National Statistics 2008, p.14).  These are actions for which people may face years in prison (note that 
consumption is not a penal offence in this country, but people may face some form of prosecution and punishment 
for inchoate offences, like drug possession). 
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jurisdiction may reasonably expect a reduction in the occurrence of φ compared to what 
would happen were φ not criminalized.  Additionally, if a member of that jurisdiction does φ 
she may expect certain consequences on part of the state – say, prosecution, conviction and 
punishment – as a result of her doing φ.  By the same token, if she does not do φ, she may 
expect the absence of certain course of actions as a result of her not doing φ.  She may, at the 
very least, expect not to be prosecuted, convicted or punished.  Hence, criminalization also 
contributes to individuals’ stability of expectations by establishing with a reasonable degree 
of certainty what individuals’ ought to expect from others and the state when acting (or 
failing to act) in certain relevant ways. 
 
Effectiveness and Reduction 
The principle of effective reduction can be helpfully spelled out by considering its two central 
components, namely, effectiveness and reduction.  The reduction condition supposes that an 
important part of the legitimacy of holding an action φ to be criminal depends on whether 
criminalizing φ reduces its occurrence when compared to the same circumstances without 
criminalization.  This means that legislators need to compare the effects of criminalizing φ on 
the occurrence of φ with the effects of not criminalizing φ.  Given that criminalization has 
such serious consequences in individuals’ lives, the enactment of criminal statutes must be 
bound by the reduction condition that constraints the principle of direct violation.  The claim 
is that if legislators were to enact statute S prohibiting φ on grounds other than that enacting 
S reduces the occurrence of φ-ing they would not be taking these consequences seriously.  
Let me elaborate. 
When it is believed that criminalization does not have any effect on whether people 
constrain their behaviour in the relevant way, the condition of reduction holds that 
criminalization should be barred.  Inconsequential criminalization represents a waste of all 
sorts of resources for everyone.  The cost in time, money and human resources that passing a 
penal law involves must not be overlooked when determining the criminal law that we ought 
to have.  Moreover, inconsequential criminal statutes passed despite having failed to satisfy 
this principle involve the imposition of coercive measures by the state when it is believed that 
these measures are not going to live up to the general function of the criminal law, which is to 
protect the preconditions of the capacity to associate.  This is problematic, particularly when 
we consider the coercive and condemnatory nature of the criminal law and the impact of 
criminalization on people’s lives.  Inconsequential criminalization, ultimately, represents the 
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use of coercion for reasons other than the protection of the goods the criminal law is meant to 
protect.  Inconsequential criminalization is, in the end, simply the infliction of brute might by 
the state. 
Many features of drug legislation are apt examples of penal legislation that does not 
meet this principle, and the same could be said of legislation that tries to criminalize identity-
related conduct (for an example see section 3 below).155 Of course, if we think of a society 
governed by an unreasonably intrusive penal state that does not draw any limit between the 
private and the public and that uses all possible means to coerce individuals, then it is likely 
that people will choose (or be forced) to avoid those forms of conduct prohibited by the law 
of the oppressive state.  But in a free society, where people are at liberty to associate as they 
wish, where the general function of the criminal law does not extend beyond honouring the 
principle of free association, there will be a different outcome.  
In addition to reduction, we need to consider the second condition of this filter: 
effectiveness.  According to this condition, not any type of reduction of the action to be 
prevented by criminalization will do, but only effective reduction. This is a standard that 
needs to be considered holistically.  That is, by reference to various circumstances and 
available policies.   
Briefly, let me mention two holistic considerations that should shape this factor of 
criminalization.156 The first relates to the economic costs involved in criminalizing φ 
compared to both not criminalizing it and using other legal or non-legal course of action to 
regulate it.  Indeed, criminalization should not be considered in isolation from the additional 
economic costs for the state and the taxpayer involved in enacting and enforcing each specific 
piece of legislation.  Consider, for example, the resources that could be used in different 
policy areas if the state did not prosecute and punish drug related offenders.  A second 
holistic consideration refers to the serious risk of error and the cost of these risks becoming 
material.  The criminal law, as any institution, errs, but the mistakes in unfairly prosecuting, 
convicting and punishing an individual have an extraordinarily heavy impact on people’s lives 
                                                
155 It must be noted that my use of examples in this section is illustrative of the second filter only – the principle of 
effective reduction.  I am saying this to make clear that when a given conduct is being tested against this filter, the 
conduct under scrutiny should be deemed to have satisfactorily passed the principle of direct violation.  Thus, the 
examples offered in this section have a rather illustrative character, not of the model in general, but of the second 
principle in particular.  In effect, some of these conducts (like drug consumption and homosexual behaviour) 
would not have passed the first filter and, therefore, would not have ‘survived’ to be tested against the principle of 
effective reduction. 
156 The following paragraph draws from Husak 2000, pp.996-1000.  See also Husak’s account of the drawbacks of 
punishment in Husak 2008, pp.203-6. 
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and do a serious moral wrong.  The risk involved in criminalizing action must be taken 
carefully into consideration, as it may well be that, under certain circumstances, it is a risk not 
worth taking. 
The decision to enact criminal law, and therefore, the decision to criminalize those 
actions that have passed the first filter, must carefully consider the costs and benefits of 
criminalization compared both to other possible forms of state regulation and to non 
regulation. Of course, these are only general indications of the type of costs that 
criminalization of action in the free society would have to deal with effectively.  The precise 
meaning of what counts as ‘effective’ will have to be determined by empirical analysis and 
interdisciplinary work that go far beyond of the scope of this work. 
It must be noted that, because the workability of these conclusions depends on 
empirical evidence, there is not a ‘once and for all’ standard of effectiveness.  Thus, it is 
possible that under certain circumstances the principle of effective reduction bars the 
criminalization of conduct φ because all available evidence shows that criminalizing is 
inconsequential.  That is, that criminalizing φ will not reduce the occurrence of φ.  But under 
different circumstances, circumstances in which certain empirical evidence has been 
defeated, or improved, or enhanced, conduct φ may possibly pass the principle of effective 
reduction and then a jurisdiction may legitimately criminalize φ.  Thus, the effective 
reduction of conduct does not take as given that criminalization reduces the occurrence of 
undesired behaviour nor does take empirical evidence as a once-and-for-all type of proof for 
(or against) criminalization.  Legislators need to be alert and states should be willing to 
contribute to the advancement of independent and unbiased research on these matters. 
 
Effective Reduction and The Problem of Demandingness 
The way I have presented the central elements of the second filter may suggest that it is very 
demanding and that there is therefore a risk of impeding criminalization beyond what is 
reasonable.  Think of murder, a type of conduct that would surely pass the first filter.  We can 
then say that the empirical evidence we have now makes us conclude that its criminalization 
does reduce its occurrence.  But, once we have reached this conclusion, there still is the 
different question of whether criminalizing murder is an effective way to reduce its 
occurrence. 
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For example, given that criminalization of action is a very expensive way of dealing 
with problems, it is natural to think about reducing the occurrence of murder by non-
punitive means that may be, ex-hypothesi, cheaper than criminalization.  We could reduce 
the occurrence of murder, say, by creating hi-tech systems of bodily protection that impede 
various forms of homicidal assault.  Or, more simply, we could reduce attempts at murder by 
multiplying the number of CCTV cameras on the streets, or confiscating guns, or building 
fences and improving pre-crime detection systems.  We can also think of some educational 
schemes that emphasise something like the ‘sacredness’ of life or the wrongfulness of 
infringing other people’s rights.  In short, there are a series of different ways in which society 
can think of reducing the incidence of murder that, for the sake of the argument, may be 
more effective than criminalization.  Indeed, it looks as if we have entered into a problematic 
slippery slope that makes us think that there are always more cost effective ways to minimise 
the occurrence of types of conduct.  But, if that is the case, and provided we have all the 
empirical evidence we need to compare the payoffs of these different ways of reducing 
behaviour, the issue is whether or not the second principle of criminalization provides too 
strong an argument against criminalization.  In other words, is not my search for a model of 
criminalization that minimises overcriminalization ultimately allowing a version of 
abolitionism?  This question needs a nuanced answer.   
On the one hand, the answer is negative.  The principle of effective reduction is a 
principle of criminalization and, as such, admits that criminalization fulfils an important role 
in society and that criminalization is an institution that must be maintained.  Put differently, 
this principle resists abolitionism and does not invite us to get rid of criminalization 
altogether.  Although we should do whatever we can (subject to some further principles) to 
reduce through non-penal means the occurrence of murder and/or any conduct that passes 
the first filter of direct violation, we need to keep in mind the positive function of the 
institution of the criminal law.  As stated in chapter 1, the criminal law has a minimal and 
precise role that cannot be fulfilled by other policies or institutions.  Those types of 
behaviour that pass the principle of direct violation are such that their occurrence not only 
has to be minimised, but also, when they do occur, are such as to require publicly 
condemned.  Condemnation by the polity – as opposed to condemnation by a particular 
individual or group within the polity – is condemnation directed through the channel of the 
criminal law.  No other institution available to the free society can fulfil this social role.  Thus, 
the principle of effective minimisation states that, insofar as a given conduct has passed the 
first filter of criminalization and insofar as the occurrence of that conduct can be effectively 
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reduced through criminalization, the legislature has a very strong presumption in favour of 
penal regulation of it.  Of course, this is a grey area, but it seems clear that most offences 
passing the first filter are types of action that the state has a duty to criminalize – which is 
something that must also count in the cost/benefit reckoning – because these conducts 
contravene the preconditions of the capacity of individuals to associate with others. 
However, there is a sense in which the answer to the question of whether the 
principles of criminalization share something with abolitionism is partly positive.  Once we 
are aware that the principle I am presenting here is a principle of criminalization, we should 
consider what effectiveness amounts to within this context.  Given the serious consequences 
that the criminal law has in people’s lives we should make our criminal statutes the least 
extensive we can when criminalizing conduct that has passed the first filter.  This is to say 
that the principle of effective minimisation commends that if we have two different possible 
statutes (P and Q) aiming to criminalize C, and one of them (P) is more extensive than the 
other, we should then block the enactment of P and pass Q – assuming that either both P 
and Q, or Q effectively reduce the occurrence of C.157 This principle commands effectiveness 
in the sense of making us opt for the least extensive statute, where extensiveness is a function 
of the restrictions imposed on individuals, their right to associate with others, and the costs 
involved in criminalizing action. 
So understood, the principle of effective reduction is a principle of parsimony in 
criminalization constrained by the condemnatory function of the criminal law of actions that 
satisfy the principle of direct violation.  To get criminalization right supposes embracing 
parsimony without forgetting the central social condemnatory role of this institution.   
To conclude, I would like to indicate briefly how this second principle complements 
and completes the first one in the task of minimising overcriminalization.  As noted above, 
the principle of direct violation has a positive impact in preventing most instances of 
overcriminalization.  However, it is the second principle that is most likely to diminish the 
occurrence of overlapping offences.  Recall, statutes that create overlapping offences 
criminalize conduct that has already been addressed by the legislature.  The demand of 
effectiveness posited by the principle of effective reduction rules out criminalizing action 
twice (or more).  Overlapping criminalization is not an effective way to address the same type 
of conduct and, therefore, the second filter should block this multiplication of penal statutes.  
                                                
157 Schonsheck’s second and third filters fulfil a function similar to my principle of effective minimisation (see fn.142 
above). In Overcriminalization, Husak develops a similar constraint on criminalization.  It “requires the state to 
show that the challenged offense is no more extensive than necessary to achieve its objective” (Husak 2008, p.153). 
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The next section provides an example of the way in which this principle contributes to ruling 
out overlapping offences. 
 
3.  An Il lustration:  Hate-Crimes 
In the last part of this chapter I shall put the two filters of criminalization to work.  I will do 
so by considering an adaptation of the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention 
Act, a bill recently passed by the U.S. Senate and signed by President Barack Obama (also 
known as the Matthew Shepard Act – House of Representatives 1913 (2009)).  This bill 
expands and amends the 1969 United States Federal hate-crime law which gives the federal 
government authority to prosecute hate crimes motivated by race, colour, religion or national 
origin if the victim was attacked whilst performing a federally protected activity such as 
voting or attending school.  The new Act expands jurisdiction of the federal government to 
hate crimes motivated by, in addition to the elements just mentioned, gender, sexual 
orientation, identity or disability.  Moreover, the bill extends the authority of the federal body 
to prosecute these offences independent of whether they were committed whilst the victim 
was engaged in a federally protected activity. 
Two preliminaries justifying my choice of the example of hate-crimes: first, although 
I shall not undertake a comprehensive analysis of this timely and complex issue, choosing 
hate-crimes as a way to test my model of criminalization should prove helpful in beginning to 
capture the complexities involved in this problem as well as the consequences of my model 
for matters as important as this.158  Second, and this is something I shall consider now, this 
example gives me the opportunity to sharpen my analysis by contrasting it with the worries of 
those interested in a specific aspect of overcriminalization in the Unites States and 
elsewhere.  These worries relate to the overexpansion of federal law.  Although this 
expansion is an important cause of the inappropriate extension of the criminal law I would 
like to separate my position from these concerns (see also ch.2 sec.2.1). 
Overfederalization is certainly worrisome.  By making sentences harsher (federal 
sentences are generally more stringent), it contributes to more and inappropriate 
punishment, it threatens some fundamentals of the rule of law (e.g., double jeopardy), it 
deflects scarce federal resources into matters that are already dealt with by the states, and it 
                                                
158 For two opposed approaches to the question of legislation on hate crimes see Lawrence 1999 and Jacobs & Potter 
1998. 
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expands the competence of the federal state into issues that are considered to be in the 
business of states governments.  Many of these legitimate concerns are aspects of 
overfederalization that anyone worried by overcriminalization should take into account. 
However, and despite these genuine and important concerns, my analysis does not 
concentrate on this matter.  For my purposes it is not of great importance whether 
overcriminalization emerges as a result of overfederalization or of any other constitutional 
arrangement.  Rather, my main concern is with overcriminalization itself.  Thus, it is not of 
particular importance whether the problem of overcriminalization emerges as a result of 
abuses and misuses of the criminal law by the federal or by state government.  What matters 
is only that the criminal law is being misused and abused. 
 
3.1 The Hate-Crime of Identity-Related Assault 
Let us now move on to the analysis of the hate-crime Act.  For the sake of clarity I shall 
reformulate the Act and present it in a simplified version.  According to the adaptation of the 
Hate Crimes Prevention Act that I propose, the type of conduct considered for analysis – the 
conduct that a hypothetical legislator of the free society may propose for criminalization – is 
the assault of an individual or group motivated by the victim’s identity (ethnic, religious, 
sexual, and any other) or disabilities – for short, let us call this conduct IA (identity assault).  
It is on this type of conduct that I shall apply the filters of criminalization considered above. 
By now it should be clear that a type of conduct becomes a legitimate candidate of 
criminalization – i.e., there is a strong presumption in favour of making it criminal – if and 
only if it passes successfully and successively through the two filters (of direct violation and 
effective reduction) considered above. 
 
IA and Direct Violation 
In undertaking the task of filtering IA, legislators would immediately find a difficulty due to 
the peculiar nature of the conduct covered in IA.  This complication emerges from the fact 
that IA is a type of action partly defined in terms of motivations.  It is thus in tension with the 
limited scope of authority that the principle of direct violation leaves to the criminal law.  As I 
argued above (section I.a), legislators should refer solely to those states of mind that are 
necessary to characterise an action as a violation of the preconditions of the individual 
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capacity for association.   This means that legislators must specify those actions to be tested 
for criminalization not in terms of motivations or other reasons, but only in terms of 
intentions.  When we do so, only assault, and not IA, meets the requirements for the 
characterisation of actions commended by the first principle of criminalization.   
The assertion that intentions are necessary for a plausible characterisation of 
violations connects with another condition of the first filter that impedes the criminalization 
of IA.  Violations are the only legitimate focus of criminalizing action.  Criminalizing IA, in 
turn, suggests that part of what is being considered as a candidate of criminalization is not a 
violation, but a state of mind which is independent of any material violation of the 
preconditions of the capacity for free association – to hate, and wish the death of, white 
people violates neither the right to bodily ownership nor the right to ownership in external 
things.  The criminalization of IA is thus indefensible.  What matters to criminalization in the 
free society is that violations of the relevant type be captured by the enactment of penal 
regulation.  To consider the motives of an action as part of what is going to be criminalized is 
to go far away from the legitimate limits of the criminal law of the free society. 
We should then conclude that IA cannot pass the first filter of criminalization and, 
thereby, we should deem it as an inappropriate object of criminalization.  The analysis that 
legislators should pursue when scrutinizing IA should finish here.  As I have argued, the fact 
that a type of conduct has not passed the first filter successfully is sufficient to conclude that 
this conduct is beyond the legitimate scope of the criminal law.  
 
IA and Effective Reduction 
For the sake of offering an exposition of the second principle using the same example, let us 
consider a scenario in which our hypothetical legislators are divided about whether IA passes 
the first filter (perhaps they consider, contentiously, that IA is defined in terms of intentions, 
not motivations) and decide to move to the second filter of criminalization in order to 
establish whether IA should be criminalized.   
In applying this filter, legislators should ask themselves whether criminalizing IA 
effectively reduces the occurrence of IA.  There are two reasons to think that there is a strong 
case against the possibility that IA passes this second filter.  The first reason is, for the most 
part, a matter of empirical speculation about the lack of impact that criminalizing IA would 
have on the reduction of the occurrence of identity-oriented assault.   
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First, assaults motivated by the victim’s identity are the result of deeply entrenched 
prejudices that would very unlikely be overcome through criminalization.  In effect, it seems 
that criminalizing IA would not only be ineffective, but counterproductive.  As some 
theorists have explained it, this is because hate crimes are typically characterised by the 
expression of the identity of the offender in contrasting ways – that is, the identity of the 
offender is reaffirmed by acts of violence against an identity that is different from his (see, for 
example, Hamm 1993).  Thus, criminalization and punishment of IA may create a stronger 
and ‘clearer’ message to be delivered on the part of prejudiced individuals who are now 
encouraged by the existence of identity-hatred penal laws.  Indeed, the inclusion of ethnic, 
racial and/or religious considerations in the criminal law undermines the capacity this 
institution has to address all members of society as citizens (as opposed to members of a 
particular racial, ethnic or religious group) the ultimate outcome of which is social upheaval 
and more inter-group violence (see Jacobs and Potter 1997 and 1998, ch.9).   
Moreover, given its indeterminacy, criminalization of IA poses extremely difficult 
interpretative problems for all the parts of the penal system responsible for enforcement.  To 
illustrate consider four of the nineteen questions that the Training Guide for Hate Crime 
Data Collection offers as a way for an officer to make “the final determination of whether an 
incident was motivated by bias” (U.S. Department of Justice 1996, p.22): 
1. Is the victim a member of a target racial, religious, disability, ethnic/national origin, 
or sexual orientation group? 
2. Were the offender and the victim of different race, religion, ethnicity/national origin, 
or sexual-orientation?  For example the victim was black and the offenders were 
white. 
3. Does a substantial portion of the community where the crime occurred perceive that 
the incident was motivated by bias? 
4. Does a historically established animosity exist between the victim’s and offender’s 
groups?  (U.S. Department of Justice 1996, pp.22-3). 
This is too indeterminate.  The Guide, for example, does not say precisely how many of the 
nineteen questions need to be answered in the positive for an action to be declared to have 
been motivated by identity bias.  Indeed, these questions represent an arbitrary (and surely 
inefficient) way to determine the motives of a given action.  Consider this counter questions: 
are able white people part of ‘target’ groups? (question 1). Can there be identity bias directed 
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against members of the same race? (question 2).  What does ‘a substantial portion of the 
community’ mean? (question 3). Can there be identity bias directed against members of 
traditionally friendly groups? (question 4).  What these counterquestions and the difficulties 
involved in them suggest is that, ultimately, whether criminalization effectively reduces the 
occurrence of IA will depend on the details, and use, of the classificatory scheme for 
identifying these acts. 
But, in the light of the second filter of criminalization, there is a second reason 
against the penal prohibition of IA: it does not effectively reduce the occurrence of any 
violation of the relevant kind because it is an overlapping offence.  If the criminalization of 
assault simpliciter is already in place in the jurisdiction, as it ought to be, then IA does not 
contribute to the protection of bodily ownership and/or ownership in external things, but it 
only repeats what has already been established as a criminal violation, i.e., assault simpliciter.  
If legislators of the free society want to reduce the occurrence of IA through the criminal law, 
the existence of the crime of assault (as opposed to the crime of IA) is the only legitimate way 
to achieve that aim.  IA, thereby, contributes to overcriminalization by multiplying the 
number of statutes, permitting stiffer punishments for the wrong reasons, and allowing the 
criminal law to enter into areas beyond its proper jurisdiction (see ch.2).  The second 
principle of effective minimisation, then, rules out IA on grounds that it does not effectively 
reduce what it aims to minimise. 
It is worth noticing that although the criminal law of the free society does not allow 
the criminalization of IA even if it is argued that the victim of this conduct suffers differently 
(or suffers more) than a victim of mere assault, this does not mean that the free society is not 
to do anything else to favour the victim of IA.  Although the victim’s feelings should be 
irrelevant when assessing what types of conduct we should criminalize, victims of IA must 
get all the support they need.  In effect, if one assumes (perhaps mistakenly)159 that hate-
crimes victims are more psychologically damaged than those who suffer a similar wrong out 
of different motivations, special care needs to be provided to those who suffer from this type 
                                                
159 I say mistakenly because my assumption seems not to have clear empirical evidence.  Arnold Barnes and Paul 
Ephros argue that the emotional responses of hate-crimes victims compared to common emotional reactions of 
ordinary crime victims (based on existing research on victimisation) is less severe: “A major difference in the 
emotional response of hate violence victims appears to be the absence of lowered self-esteem” (Barnes and Ephors 
1994, p.250). 
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of conduct.  This means that the free society may then allow an asymmetry in its response to 
certain type of crimes (amongst which I would include hate-crimes).160 
However, independent of how much support the victims of IA should receive and of 
how the free society will arrange the provision of this support, what needs to be clear is that 
criminal law is not to provide that special succour.  Instead, its function is effectively to 
reduce those forms of conduct that threaten the preconditions of free association.  This is to 
say that the victim may in justice receive larger amounts of support than she currently 
receives (and larger than the victim of assault simpliciter receives), but – the claim goes – this 
support is not to be provided by special pieces of criminalization or by the criminal law as 
such. 
What this exercise should make us conclude is that IA ought not to be criminalized.  
The first filter pointed to the peculiarity of IA, a type of conduct partially defined by its 
motivation.  Since the criminal law of the free society is to criminalize only actions that violate 
the relevant juridical goods, and since the state of mind necessary to determine violations 
refers to intentions, not motives, the first principle rules out the criminalization of IA.  For 
methodological reasons – as a way to illustrate the second filter of criminalization – I 
considered whether IA satisfied the principle of effective minimisation.  IA did not satisfy 
this test either.  This was because criminalizing IA is not an effective way to minimise its 
occurrence.  Assuming that a crime of assault simpliciter is already in place, the creation of 
further pieces of legislation that simply add overlapping criminal regulations ought not to be 
considered as an effective way of reducing the occurrence of an action.  If we want to reduce 
the occurrence of actions motivated by identity hatred, the criminal law is not the right 
mechanism to use.  The criminalization of assault simpliciter (as a violation of bodily 
ownership) is the only legitimate contribution the criminal law can make to the reduction of 
actions motivated by identity hatred. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the two principles of criminalization of the criminal law of the 
free society: the principles of direct violation and effective reduction.  I have argued that these 
                                                
160 But remember that under certain exceptional social circumstances my model allows motives to be included in 
sentencing and, therefore, under those circumstances, it may be legitimate to punish hate-crime offenders more 
stringently than non-identity-related ones.  For a case illustrating an enhanced sentence for hate-crimes see 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993). 
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principles derive from the general function of the criminal law as developed in chapters 4 and 
5, and they are to honour and protect the preconditions of the individual capacity freely to 
associate with others; namely, bodily ownership and ownership in external things. 
The basic methodology of this model of criminalization is based in the idea of 
filtering (Schonsheck 1994).  Thus, for a given type of conduct to count as an object of 
legitimate criminalization, it needs to pass successfully and successively through the filters 
constituted by the two principles of criminalization.  When criminalization is the result of this 
filtering process, the outcome is a model of criminalization that, on the one hand, represents 
more closely the ideal of the criminal law of the free society and that, on the other, minimises 
overcriminalization in a more substantive and principled way than the principles of 
criminalization considered in chapter 6.  This is the case because the model of 
criminalization here proposed establishes explicitly the limits that ought to exist between 
legitimate penal coercion and illegitimate penal coercion and other types of non-penal 
coercion by the state.  In doing so, this model of criminalization has the capacity to minimise 
overcriminalization and its perils.  
Of course, criminalization is only one of the stages of the criminal law that needs to 
be considered if we are to overcome overcriminalization.  Thus, what I have offered here 
should only be seen as part of a complete response to this regrettable phenomenon.  
Nonetheless, criminalization is without doubt one of the crucial ‘moments’ of a system of 
criminal law that aims to pursue its role in a principled and legitimate manner.  The model I 
have defended here should then count as a crucial first step towards the construction of a 




It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose 
that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human 
beings have no business with each other’s conduct in life, and that 
they should not concern themselves about the well-being or well-
being of one another, unless their own interest is involved.  Instead 
of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested 
exertion to promote the good of others.  But disinterested 
benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their 
good, than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the 
metaphorical sort. 
J.S. Mill, On Liberty, IV, §4 
 
This work has presented the criminal law of the free society.  To do so, I have reconsidered 
the general function of the criminal law and of criminalization in particular.  As I take it, this 
re-articulation offers an account of the criminal law that we ought to have when we take 
individuals and liberty as sources of paramount value.  In addition, I have defended the view 
that a criminal law so understood has the capacity to avoid and/or minimise one of its most 
serious current predicaments: overcriminalization.  Thus, the account I have defended not 
only represents the criminal law of an ideal free society, but also counts as a normative model 
that confronts some pressing and timely difficulties faced by existing criminal law systems. 
This account, I believe, should be judged as an adequate expression of both the 
penal institution we ought to have in a free society as well as the normative principles that 
should guide legislators enacting penal law.  However, it is evident that numerous details 
and nuances of this account are still to be scrutinized, developed and/or defended.  As 
mentioned in different passages and footnotes of this thesis, important issues that it would be 
necessary to discuss in a comprehensive account of the criminal law of the free society have 
hardly been mentioned and many challenges are still to be faced.  Thus, this account should 
be seen only as a first, but necessary, step towards a complete model of a genuinely liberal 
criminal law. 
In what follows, I would like briefly to consider two issues.  The first one presents in 
a concise manner the answer to one of the central questions that has guided this thesis – is it 
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possible for a liberal state to justifiably coerce its members?  Although an answer to this 
question has been advanced in extenso both in part II and III, at this point it is worth re-
presenting it in a more succinct fashion.  The second issue is the extent to which my 
conception of liberalism, and its application to penal theory, may persuade others who 
endorse a different account of liberalism in particular and the good society in general.  
Because the liberalism defended here will be rejected by many – perhaps for reasons like 
those mentioned by Mill in the epigraph to this chapter – it seems that the proposals of this 
thesis are unlikely to be sufficiently persuasive and convincing.  
 
1 .  The Free Society  and Legitimate Coercion 
In chapter 1, I referred to the tension that exists between liberalism and coercion.  Part of the 
point of this thesis is to offer an account of the criminal law that makes the justified coercion 
of individuals possible in a liberal system.  In these concluding remarks, I would like to take 
stock of the analysis developed in previous chapters and offer a concise answer to the 
question of the possibility of legitimate coercion in the free society. 
My account in chapter 7 defended a model of positive criminalization.  In contrast to, 
for example, Mill’s harm principle, the principle of direct violation tells us not only what not 
to criminalize, but also what we have a very strong presumption to criminalize.  In effect, and 
despite the importance and emphasis I have put on the idea that criminalization in the free 
society should be kept to a minimum, the model suggests that, when certain conditions apply 
– conditions that have to do with the principle of effective reduction – there are certain types 
of actions that should be criminalized.  Thus, the criminal law of the free society has a 
positive role that is expressed in the idea that the liberal state has a duty of coercion.  In those 
circumstances, if the criminal law does not impose coercive measures upon the individuals of 
the free society, then the criminal law is at fault. 
Thus, the free society, contrary to what some may believe, is not one that favours 
abolitionism.  There is a conclusive difference between a minimalistic model, such as the one 
I defend, and a straight abolitionist theory of the criminal law.  From the point of view of 
abolitionists, the main claim against the criminal law is that criminalization and punishment 
impose a specific and partial standard on how people should conduct certain aspects of their 
lives.  In this sense, the criminal law, or at least some aspects of it, is illegitimate.  The 
abolitionist claims that the criminal law system transforms conflicts among individuals into 
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crimes and, by doing so, ‘steals’ what belongs to the individual and illegitimately transfers it 
to the sphere of the criminal law, where victims and offenders are denied real and effective 
participation.161 Although I believe that some of the worries that abolitionists point to need to 
be seriously considered (part of my concerns, discussed in chapter 1, emerge from a 
standpoint similar to some versions of abolitionism), I also believe that, in the end, none of 
those worries should make us abolish the criminal law, criminalization, or punishment.  
What a free society demands is less unprincipled criminalization, not a penal vacuum. 
This distinction between abolitionism and the criminal law of the free society means 
that penal coercion can be made legitimate and, thereby, that the tension existing between 
liberalism and coercion can be reduced.  This thesis has shown that the existence of the free 
society makes legitimate institutional arrangement to ensure that some types of conduct are 
both condemned and minimised.  These two purposes of the criminal law must go together, 
so that actions that are to be condemned (because they fall under the principle of direct 
violation) are also to be minimised (on grounds of, and constrained by, the principle of 
effective reduction).  The question is how does the criminal law of the free society, motivated 
and constrained by these two principles, render penal coercion legitimate? 
An answer to this question should begin by considering, as I did in chapter 1, the 
notion of crime.  As we saw there, one plausible way of understanding crimes is to conceive 
of them as public wrongs that disrupt a public good of the relevant type.  When a public 
good of the relevant type is disrupted by the action of an individual offender, a series of things 
may happen (an offender may trespass the rights of others; the victim may be worsen off, the 
offender may become better off, and so on).  However, what is crucial from the point of view 
of the criminal law is that a public wrong has taken place – because a public good has been 
disrupted – and that it is for the state to respond to that wrong by condemning the offender 
in the name of the members of the polity.  The basis of my justification of coercion depends 
on this articulation of crimes – an articulation that, in turn, results from the three elements of 
the specificity of the criminal law. 
The idea that crimes are disruptions of public goods of the relevant type supposes 
that crimes are actions taking place within the context of society.  In other words, there is no 
plausible conception of crimes without some form of association in which a public shares 
some type of common interest.  As we have seen, a free society is a free association of 
individuals committed to the joint activity of coexisting, and this commitment is a function of 
                                                
161 This is roughly what Nils Christie, a notable theorist of abolitionism, develops in Christie 1977.  
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the advancement of each individual’s interest in living the life each of them thinks fit.  It is 
within this framework that both crimes occur and the coercive action of the state through the 
criminal law can be justified. 
Crimes undermine the conditions of the free association in which individuals live 
their lives.  Following a passage by Scanlon quoted in chapter 1, I said that crimes impair the 
type of relationship that should exist between individuals acting together within a free 
association.  When crimes impair this relationship the stability of expectations that 
individuals enjoy by associating with others is undermined, and thus the very possibility of 
society as a free association is put at risk.  The criminal law is there to ensure, as far as it is 
reasonable, the survival of that association in which individuals benefit themselves.  Thus, 
failures of the criminal law are failures against the stability of society and the interest 
individuals have in societal coexistence. 
 Thus, the legitimacy of coercion is the result of understanding crimes as actions that 
ultimately attack individuals’ common interest in a life shared with others.  More precisely, 
the criminal law of the free society, through its coercive mechanisms, is there to protect and 
respect this interest that relates to everyone’s capacity to live a life as they think fit in 
association with others.  This, I have argued, relates specifically to the interest individuals 
have in maintaining the preconditions of freedom of association.  The difference between 
illegitimate and legitimate coercion, then, depends on the type of connection that holds 
between the reasons offered by the coercer and the interests held by the coerced.  When the 
criminal law is understood as an institution whose aim is to protect the interests individuals 
have in a life shared with others, then it represents an instance of legitimate coercion.  Both 
the reasons for criminalization of action and the reasons individuals have to remain in 
association with others, converge in these circumstances.  By contrast, when the criminal law 
is understood as an institution designed to defend the interest of some faction – as it does 
when it criminalizes action on moral grounds, or in accordance with the values or interests of 
the majority, or in order to make the government popular in the eyes of the electorate (in 
short, when it overcriminalizes) – it becomes an instance of illegitimate coercion.  The 
reasons for action it offers to the whole polity are not consistent with (or worse, are in conflict 
with) the common interest of the individuals coerced by the penal law. 
In conclusion, the criminal law of the free society defended in this thesis is an 
instance of legitimate coercion to the extent that it contributes to the advancement of 
individuals’ common interest in living their lives as they think fit in association with others.  
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The criminal law of the free society is bound by the principles that express this interest and 
by its coercive, condemnatory and public dimensions (what I have called, its specificity).  
When it goes beyond these limits, or when it falls short of them, the criminal law fails all of us 
and may become an instance of oppression. 
 
2 .  Classical  Liberal ism and Criminal  Law Theorising 
Finally, I would like to reflect on the capacity of my account to persuade legislators and other 
people interested in the question of criminalization.  It is clear that many of the different 
aspects and proposals of this work may sound appealing to those with libertarian or classical 
liberal leanings.  Yet, all sorts of liberals and non-liberals alike are concerned with the kind of 
criminal law we should have.  Those who believe that the criminal law is there, for example, 
to promote the value of autonomy, enhance equality, protect individuals from themselves, 
impede society from falling into the arms of false creeds, or increase overall economic profit, 
may certainly feel uneasy with some (or all) of what I have been proposing here.  What can I 
say to them? 
First, it must be clear that, despite my emphasis on the idea of a free society shaped 
by libertarian authors and arguments, the central focus of this work is the institution of the 
criminal law and the way this state institution may become more responsive to the type of 
beings that we are.  This is to say that a central goal of this work is to conceive a model of the 
criminal law that takes individuals seriously, independent of whether other non-libertarian 
political and philosophical ideals inform the nature of non-penal institutions of the state 
(institutions about civil law, distributive justice, education, health care, and so on).  In effect, 
I do not see why a liberal egalitarian, for example, may not want to apply the filters of direct 
violation and effective reduction when deciding the type of criminal law her model of society 
should adopt, and the model of criminalization we ought to have, in the face of 
overcriminalization.  As I see it, if we want to succeed in reducing the expansion of the 
criminal law in a principled manner, what I have offered here under the label of the criminal 
law of the free society should be appealing to most people independent of their preferred 
distributive, moral or aesthetic commitments. 
But, is this too optimistic?  What could my model possibly say to someone such as 
Professor Biggar, who I quoted in the Preamble?  Indeed, in response to the central tenets of 
this work, he would be quick and ready to say that it follows from what I have argued  
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that not just the terminally ill, but the chronically ill or disabled, the grievously 
bereaved, the philosophically miserable and the amorously unsuccessful should 
have the same right [to kill oneself]. After all, if the individual is the sole arbiter 
of the value of his or her own life, and if some adult reckons that living is no 
longer worth the candle, then who may gainsay them? It also follows that when 
someone should volunteer to die in the masochistic ecstasy of being mutilated 
and eaten [...] the law should be silent, no crime having been committed (Biggar 
2009).   
The arguments advanced in this thesis do not contradict a single word in Professor Biggar’s 
letter.  My account takes the individual and her interests as fundamental sources of value.  
From this, one can derive a case against the criminalization of all types of suicide, masochistic 
conduct, self-inflicted harm, drugs consumption, and consensual cannibalism (as well as a 
case against all the five forms of overcriminalization discussed in chapter 2). 
However, the argument against criminalizing these forms of conduct does not 
depend on a moral judgment about their legitimacy or rightness.  An action can be morally 
condemnable and still be such that it should not be criminalized.  Moral condemnation does 
not entail condemnation by the state in the name of all the members of the polity.  In effect, 
the criminalization of an action and the moral evaluation of that very action are independent 
matters that, I have argued, should not determine each other. 
If one has a different understanding of what the criminal law is for (that perhaps 
flows from a different understanding of the nature of human beings), then the minimalist 
model will not be persuasive.  In that sense, I cannot hope to persuade someone like Biggar 
(but then, it should not be expected that some ideas on liberalism and the philosophy of the 
criminal law could convince someone with other entrenched views on the meaning of life and 
humanity).  What can be said, though, is that opponents of the minimalist model presented 
here need to complete their arguments for criminalization. 
Sadly, Biggar’s letter represents an unfortunately widespread argument for 
criminalization that holds sway amongst both the laypersons and legislators.  The loose 
structure of the argument is that some forms of conduct are so reprehensible, immoral, or 
otherwise repellent that ‘something must be done’.  The thing that must be done must be 
done by the state, and that what the state should do is criminalize the conduct.  Thus, 
perhaps even in response to an unusual, random, and individual incident, the cry goes up that 
‘something must be done’ and criminalization follows. 
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Whatever one’s liberal or other commitments, this is a plainly fallacious argument 
that is nevertheless at the heart of many calls for the criminalization of conduct.  It is at the 
base of the problem of overcriminalization.  What is needed, of course, is an explanation of 
each step: of why the conduct requires a response, why that response is the business of the 
state, and why, if it is, it is properly the business of the criminal law (rather than some other 
kind of public policy).  
This thesis has specified when and why a type of conduct either should or should not 
be criminalized.  It has done so by resorting to the specificity of the criminal law and the 
value one ought to assign to human nature; if unsuccessful in the task of persuasion, it 
should, at least, invite others to recognise and avoid the dangerous and pervasive mistaken 
reasoning presented above. 
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